- Hubert Walas
Sovereign force.
The collapse of Europe’s security architecture, coupled with the rapid increase in the rivalry between the United States and China, both create a feeling of anxiety in Europe and the need to create a new and grand European strategy. The need for an immediate response, which France is particularly pressing for, results from the rapid decline in the importance of European countries, including France, in relation to great power competition. French Economy Minister, Bruno Le Maire, stated that if Europe is to be "just a trading port and a common market, I am not interested." Paris' response to this challenge is the idea of the strategic autonomy of the European Union. What's behind this vague slogan? Does France have a chance to lead Europe towards superpower status?
Archimedes Lever
During his 2017 presidential campaign, Macron said that Europe was "at the crossroads between strategic non-existence and the reaffirmation of its strength in the international arena." Europe cannot afford to remain a mere observer of events, or worse, be the subject of Washington's clash with Beijing. It must have its own goals and tools to achieve these goals. In a word - it must be a significant force. That is why one of Macron's most important postulates for the Union was to make Europe strategically autonomous.
The strategic autonomy of the European Union, defined as the ability to react independently to crises and threats, first appeared in the conclusions of the European Commission in December 2013, which was continued in EU Global Strategy in 2016. This has been a recurring topic for decades, however usually only ad hoc measures were presented that did not have a major impact on the security architecture of Europe. The overarching attitude of European officials is presented in the opening sentence of the European Security Strategy, a document from 2003:
“Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history.”
The Union lived with notion of the ‘end of history’ or, as formulated by Francis Fukuyama in 1992:
“...the end-point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government."
Historically France, although it displayed a strong sense of sovereignty within the Union, nevertheless opted for an independent course for Europe. In practice, it can be said that the European Union project, in the eyes of the French, was a geopolitical response to growing American domination on the Old Continent. Charles de Gaulle's France was Eurosceptic, but in fact, the general's vision was close to what is today presented as European strategic autonomy. In the 1960s, de Gaulle saw the European collective as a force to balance the clashing powers of the United States and the USSR. The French believed that the 6 consolidated founding countries presented comparable potential to talk with the Americans and the Soviets on an equal footing. However, it was key that this consolidation take place under the leadership of France. As he used to say, Europe would be an "Archimedes Lever" for France. Before the reunification of Germany, such ambitions were not surprising, as France was by far the strongest founding country. However, after the reunification of Germany and the widespread enlargement of the Union, such plans now seem far beyond the reach of the French.
European Hard-Politics
Today, the French see the benefits of the European Union differently from the rest of Europe. According to an ECFR survey, as many as 27% of French citizens most appreciate the defense function of the Union - this is the highest percentage among all EU countries. Only 17% consider economic benefits to be a key advantage of the European format. Why is this happening? To understand this, one must go back a few decades and look at the narrative accompanying the emergence of the European project in France. Since the inception of the European Union, schools by the Seine have taught their children that it was a reconciliation project between France and Germany. One that will ensure peace in the decades to come and, in fact, for the second part of the 20th century. Additionally, it was, and still is, accompanied by a graphic with the presidents of both countries in a cordial handshake.
Here we enter into the sphere of differences between the two largest players in the Union. Germany, unlike France, sees an economic and trade power as the main source of its strength, and thus the strength of the Union. As a result, Germany, based on its export power, uses the freedom of navigation in international waters provided by the US Navy. Germans have complied with the US security strategy for Europe, deeply demilitarizing their armed forces. Moreover, the US market still has great export potential for the Germans. In addition, there is the issue of nuclear deterrence. While France has its own nuclear weapons, the French nuclear umbrella is quite small and effectively only covers its own territory. That is why Germany must rely on the Americans and on transatlantic cooperation in this respect. This also explains why in Berlin the concept of creating EU foreign policy, in opposition to the United States, is viewed with great skepticism.
For the French, in turn, following the policy of the United States for the last several years has become more and more detached from their national goals in the international arena. This includes, among others, the differences of interests with regard to the conflicts in Syria, or more broadly in the Middle East, North Africa, the Sahel region, or even the policy towards Russia, with which France wants to establish an order in Eastern Europe.
It is also presented by the negative attitude of France towards NATO, which Paris perceives as an exclusively anti-Russian alliance. France has a problem in redirecting the alliance's attention to areas that are more important to its interests. Thus, in order to understand the French perspective, it is first necessary to identify the main areas and crises that Paris treats as key to its national interest. In recent years, these have included the migration crisis, the Arab Spring, the conflicts in Syria and Libya, the rise of Daesh, the assertive attitude of Turkey in the Mediterranean, the departure of the British from the European Union, and the threat of terrorism inside of France itself. This often comes from the Sahel, which is very important to the French. At the turn of 2013 and 2014, the French carried out a successful military intervention in Mali, but the area is far from stabilized. In turn, the attention of the Americans was directed mainly towards China and Russia, both with which France doesn’t have any major disagreements.
Macron's Big Ambitions
The French see themselves as a global player whose influence and interests are all around the world. Paris has never abandoned its main levers of power - nuclear weapons, a seat on the UN Security Council, diplomatic assertiveness, and strategic independence in power projection in the French-speaking world and overseas territories. Only in the last decade has France confirmed this with interventions in Libya in 2011, in the Sahel and the Central African Republic in 2013, against Daesh in Iraq and Syria, and against the rule of Bashar al-Assad after his use of chemical weapons.
However, at the same time, France played the card of the European Union to modernize its economy, stabilize monetary policy, or have the appropriate critical mass in global negotiations, which Paris likes to conduct on behalf of the Union. Often without the mandate of the other members. Macron took advantage of the frequent blandness of German diplomacy by advocating controversial theses allegedly on behalf of the European Union. This was the case, for example, in Macron's talks with the Chinese, in which he referred to the French agenda as the EU agenda, or his talks with the US when he threatened EU sanctions on US products when Washington was pushing for sanctions of French products. This was also the case with the geopolitical renewal of relations with Russia in 2019, when he stated that the Union should overcome "misunderstandings" with Russia, which is ultimately "deeply European."
France would like to distance EU policy from the United States, while aligning it more closely with Russia, which would have Paris' unwritten consent to stabilize Europe’s eastern borders with its own methods. This can be seen in the soft approach of the French to the conflict in Ukraine, in which France practically put an equals sign between the two sides in the conflict; in Paris blocking the enlargement of the EU to the Western Balkans; or in talking about the “brain death of NATO,” which is in Moscow's interest. The French were usually against further enlargement of the Union, because they believed that it makes it heavier, less cohesive, and less manoeuvrable than the USA or Russia.
The idea of French proposed European autonomy is intriguing, but in practice Paris' actions are often the opposite and weaken the credibility of this rhetoric in the eyes of the rest of Europe. The dialogue between Paris and Moscow, which the French conduct on their own, without inviting the rest of the countries to the table, directly affects the sense of security of many EU countries. In particular, those that are geographically close to the Russian Federation, such as the Baltic States, Poland or Romania. At the same time, discrediting the effectiveness of NATO - which serves as the basic instrument of defense of these countries - with statements such as "brain death of NATO" as the French president put it, is in the eyes of these countries seen as an almost hostile act. Due to their geography, the French see the Russians as a business partner balancing the entire East.
The resistance of NATO's eastern flank to such actions has made France’s attempt to centralize power in Europe an example of the "two-speed Europe" as promoted by Paris. That is, strengthening the position of the "old" Union, while weakening the position of the states that joined in 2004 and after. As a result, during the nominations to the leading positions of European institutions in 2019, there was no place for representatives from Central Europe. And when nominating the heads of the committees at the European Parliament, the Germans were given 5 stools, the French 4, while the whole of Central Europe received only 2. The French would also like an end to the requirement of unanimity in determining European foreign policy. As a result, it would give full agency to the strongest states of the Union - France and Germany. An exception to this rule would be the admission of new members to the Brussels project, which Paris sees as opposition to the strengthening of the Union.
Conversely - the French diagnosis of the disease that is consuming Europe is accurate. However, the therapy adopted is merely wishful, takes into account only French interests, and has no hard grounds. Paris does not define what Europe really is, and apart from general statements, it does not define its common goals. It is true that Europe, in order not to lose its importance completely after 500 years of world domination, must unite and present a common and coherent position on each of the great geopolitical challenges of the 21st century. France is right to raise this topic, but at the same time it is breaking EU solidarity with its actions. Macron's narrative is based on strategic autonomy, but the actions of the French administration are more like a traditional concert of powers in which Paris wants to use the strength of the Union for its own interests.
This game beyond one's own strength is recognized in the world and after the initial enthusiastic reception, Emmanuel Macron's ratings fell significantly. Macron's strategy was "too ambitious," said Tara Varma, head of the Paris branch of the European Council on Foreign Relations think tank. France was cut off from the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, even though it officially sat on the council of the Minsk OSCE Group dealing with conflict resolution. Similarly, Macron failed to gain strong support against Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean in an internal NATO dispute. French actions in Libya also did not bring a significant result for the resolution of the conflict.
The last internal crisis also adds fuel to the fire. In late April, a group of 50 retired generals wrote a letter warning of the specter of a civil war against the "Islamic hordes of the suburbs." Soon after, a similar letter was sent by active French soldiers, signed with their names and surnames. Although the majority of the political community recognized this as an exaggerated view of the far right, it certainly shows a large split in the country's internal cohesion. Thus, as Emmanuel Macron's position weakens, Marine Le Pen has a stronger voice, taking in more and more of the moderate electorate.
A Superpower for Peaceful Times
France sees itself as the leader of an autonomous Europe. However, few countries will want to follow a leader who pays attention to only his own national interests, while ignoring the goals and concerns of the rest of the continent. Therefore, in order for the project of strategic autonomy to be taken seriously by all EU countries, it needs a common supranational strategy that takes into account the interests of each of its members, regardless of latitude. Establishing a list of goals and threats for all countries, and then drawing a great European strategy is an extremely difficult task that requires many compromises. Perhaps, not all of these are possible. However, this is the only way for Europe to speak with one voice and for smaller players not to be excluded, thus maintaining confidence in the EU project. Only then can Europe, as a coherent and autonomous player, take up the gauntlet thrown by the United States and China.
The answer to this challenge may be presented in the "Strategic Compass" - a document developed by the EU to set the direction of the EU's foreign policy. It is to be presented during the French Presidency of the EU Council. The French, together with the countries of the south - namely Italy, Greece, Spain, Cyprus, and Malta - will want to attract the attention of the EU to the Mediterranean and North Africa. Moreover, Paris will want to redefine the transatlantic cooperation and the European perspective on the threats posed by Sino-American rivalry, and this without any special support from the Americans. The East of the Union, in turn, will place the greatest emphasis on the issue of Russian revisionism, while maintaining the strong role of NATO. 21 members of the Union are members of NATO. At present, it is not possible to create any defense initiative in Europe outside of NATO.
Despite voices of Europe's collapse, the European Union still has the strong and effective tools that it can effectively employ. Economic, human, and innovative potential - Europe has all of this within its own borders. However, the validity of these tools fades away as nations seek to use them for only their side. Europe needs a big new strategy. The French understand this, but the Macron administration is playing a short-sighted game, focusing only on national interests. This inherently distrusts the rest of Europe and, in effect, makes the idea of a strategically autonomous Europe that is on a par with the US and China, a fictional entity. The deepening chaos in the world order makes everyone play the diplomatic game for themselves, only looking for answers for their own here and now.
This principle also applies to the Union, which once again shows that it remains a daughter of peace, rather than its mother and guarantor.
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