- Jakub Knopp
The Final Clash.
China's challenge to US hegemony is real. The executive arm of American power remains the US Navy - the most powerful navy in the world. Through it, Washington can project its military dominance to any corner of the globe and block major sea lanes around the world. Beijing knows that, and so to challenge Washington, it must simultaneously challenge the US Navy, and Beijing is doing just that. It has been almost a decade since the Chinese Navy overtook the US Navy in terms of number of ships. Between 2017 and 2019, China added more ships to its fleet than India, Japan, Australia, France and the UK combined. But as usual, the devil is in the detail. Will China end the US Navy's maritime supremacy?
Land, not sea
In more than 3,000 years of history, the navy has never played a primary role in China's strategy. Apart from an episode lasting less than 30 years in connection with Zheng He's expeditions in the early 15th century, Chinese emperors tended to focus on strengthening the land forces, determined by the Middle Kingdom's geographical location and its perennial 'inward' orientation.
In time, with the dynamic development of European powers, this oversight would come back to haunt China. Naval weakness and technological backwardness became a major cause of the 'Century of Humiliation', whose symbolic beginning was the defeat in the Opium Wars against the British Empire in the 1840s. As a result, in the decades that followed, the Chinese had to accept the dictates not only of other Western powers but also of Japan, which, after the war of 1894-95, gained control of Formosa (now Taiwan) and Korea, changing the balance of power in Asia and laying the foundations for another, much bloodier, second Sino-Japanese war.
The century of humiliation theoretically ended with the proclamation of the People's Republic of China in 1949. However, this did not mean that the Chinese navy (PLAN) was reborn. On the contrary, it remained subordinate to the land forces and, due to its underdevelopment, simply weak.
This was somewhat of a problem because, with the establishment of the PRC, the Republic of China was also established in Taiwan. The reunification of China became a long-term goal of the Communists, but at the time it was unattainable due to the lack of capacity to carry out a landing operation by sea.
It was not until the period of reform and opening initiated by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s that the navy began to gain importance in the eyes of Chinese strategists. The main factor accelerating the development of the navy was the PRC's entry into the structures of globalisation and opening up to maritime trade. After joining the WTO in 2001 and the influx of Western investment, China's prosperity, a key element of the Party's legitimacy, began to depend on free access to maritime routes. This strategic vulnerability was well illustrated by Hu Jintao, who in 2003, after the US invasion of Iraq, declared that China integrated into the global economy faced the Malacca dilemma.
Indeed, it's no secret that two-thirds of China's and one-third of the world's maritime exports traverse the Strait of Malacca. Furthermore, 80% of China's oil supply relies on unobstructed passage through this strategic waterway. China's geographic location, situated at the crossroads of major maritime routes that fostered prosperity during peacetime, can potentially transform into a vulnerability in times of conflict. As China increasingly integrates into the global economy, it finds itself constrained by its geography. Presently, nearly 90% of China's trade volume occurs via the sea, and 70% of its GDP is generated in coastal regions. According to data from the World Shipping Council, China hosts half of the world's 20 largest ports, illustrating the remarkable growth of its maritime economy since the period of economic reform and opening-up. However, due to the concentration of economic activity in coastal areas, China is unable to fully exploit its territorial depth. This limitation has driven the development of strategic doctrines aimed at altering this state of affairs.
'Metal chain' - China's geostrategic position at sea
To even begin to consider the structure of China's naval build-up and the objectives it aims to achieve, one must first understand the factors that define China's geostrategic position. This cannot be done without mentioning the concept of island chains, which has been a major focal point for Chinese planners for decades. The concept of island chains was introduced in the 1980s by the Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese navy, Liu Huaqing, who in time was dubbed the 'father of China's modern navy'.
These chains determine the operational range of US naval forces and, at the same time, key constraints on the Chinese fleet. The most significant are two of them. The first chain extends from the Japanese Islands, the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, and the north-western Philippines, turns around at Borneo, and finally runs towards Vietnam. It is seen by China as crucial from the perspective of securing the core interests of the state. Depending on interpretation, it can be equated with both a sphere of influence and a buffer zone boundary. One author has compared it to the Great Wall of China à rebours holding back Chinese maritime expansion. Given that most of the countries forming the first island chain are allies or partners of the US, Beijing openly sees it as a symbol of containment, accusing Washington of stirring up a second Cold War. At the same time, the first chain in effect blocks China's access to the open oceans and increases the risk of an effective blockade in the event of conflict. Liu Baoyin and Yang Xiaomei list as many as 22 straits and channels of critical importance to the PRC. The key one, in particular, is the Bashi Channel south of Taiwan, which is the main gateway to the ocean for Chinese naval forces.
Many Chinese, including Lin Hongyu, note that due to its long coastline of 14,500 km, China should be counted as a maritime power. At the same time, due to the existence of a 'metal' chain, they have limited access only to the near seas and not, as in the case of natural maritime powers like the US or the UK, to the world's oceans. Precisely for this reason, Taiwan's status beyond its political and prestige significance determines the PRC's strategic position in the Indo-Pacific. In addition to reducing the effective operating range of the US Navy, the potential control of the island negatively affects the position of US allies like Japan and the Philippines. It can, therefore, be argued that the status quo in the Taiwan Strait is a key foundation for US credibility in the region.
The second chain is much further afield, beginning with the Japanese volcanic Ogasawara Islands and running through the Marianas, the Carolinas and ending in West Papua. The most important point here is the American island of Guam - also the largest American stronghold in the western Pacific. In fact, all the island chains have centres of concentration of US forces, giving them a degree of flexibility and the ability to react in the event of a crisis.
Asymmetric Response - The Origins of China's Active Defense Doctrine
In addition to geographical factors, the approach of Chinese planners was significantly influenced by the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-96. It's important to note that by the mid-1990s, China had already experienced 25 years of average GDP growth at 10%, giving rise to the first hopes of realizing the PRC's major strategic plans, including the territorial unification of the country.
However, the intervention of US aircraft carriers in the Taiwan Strait underscored China's acute sensitivity to US power projection. The Americans applied the lessons learned from the first Gulf War, including elements of the Air-Land Battle doctrine and the advantages of adopting technical solutions within the 'Revolution in Military Affairs.'
In the aftermath of these events, the direction of Chinese strategic development became clear. Chinese planners focused on building capabilities designed to target the core strengths of US forces. These included intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); networked command and control; and air power. In response to this challenge, the Chinese devised a set of tactics under the 'active defence' doctrine. These tactics encompassed the use of precision weapons, the integration of all types of forces, a multi-layered reconnaissance system that involved radar, unmanned vehicles, and satellites, as well as enhanced capabilities in electronic warfare and the cyber domain. This led to the creation of an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) zone, effectively limiting the effectiveness of the US Navy, particularly its naval aviation, thereby reinforcing the 'tyranny of distance.'
It's worth noting the significant influence of Admiral Liu Huaqing, who popularized the concept of island chains and developed the doctrine for protecting the near seas. This doctrine has become a crucial reference point for the development of active defence strategies in the 21st century. For decades, air supremacy was a fundamental condition for the success of the so-called Western way of war. In response to this threat, both the Russian Federation and China have invested substantial resources in air defence, precision weapons, and reconnaissance capabilities to establish 'anti-access zones' as a shield for conventional operations.
The importance of China's missile forces
Overall, China's evolving naval strategy bears resemblance to the Jeune Ecole established in France during the 19th century as a response to the conventional dominance of the British Royal Navy. The French admiralty opted for asymmetrical competition and cheaper ways to deter a larger adversary. The proliferation of submarines, torpedo boats, and naval mines at the turn of the century ushered in a new era of naval warfare, marking the twilight of the battleship's significance, previously considered the decisive factor in naval power.
Martin N. Murphy and Toshi Yoshihara draw direct parallels between France's experience at the end of the nineteenth century, the development of naval warfare doctrine in the Soviet Union, and the ongoing process in China. Aside from the French Jeune Ecole, Admiral Gorshkov's 'Blue Belt Defence' concepts of the 1970s significantly influenced Chinese anti-access doctrine. Modern anti-ship missiles represent the embodiment of such capabilities and are central to China's defence doctrine.
Missile forces also provide a 'defensive umbrella' for naval operations within the first and second island chains. Through the Dong Feng program initiated in the 1950s, China has continually improved its capacity to engage enemy vessels from its territory. Presently, China stands as the only nation with anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) like the DF-21D, boasting a range of up to 1,550 km, and the DF-26B, claimed to target objects as distant as 4,000 km. China has also made considerable progress in anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), which form the bulk of its anti-ship arsenal. Beijing uses Russian anti-ship cruise missiles, but they've also developed their own, such as the YJ-83, with a range of up to 180 km, and supersonic variants like the YJ-12, which ranges from 240-400 km or even 470 km (YJ-18). In comparison, the diversity and range of US anti-ship missiles lag. The AGM-84 Harpoon, with a range of up to 240 km, remains a primary weapon. Accompanied by naval aviation, historically a pillar of the US Navy's offensive operations, making carriers the centre of gravity of the US Navy, providing the most firepower.
However, despite the advanced air defence and sensor network of the AEGIS system, US Navy vessels remain vulnerable to Chinese missile attacks due to the volume and intensity of Chinese firepower, with aircraft carriers particularly exposed. A recent war game conducted by the Washington think-tank CSIS revealed that in the event of a conflict over Taiwan, the US Navy could lose two aircraft carriers in the initial days of the war. US military officials point out that the effective range of Chinese missiles extends across the entire second island chain.
The ongoing arms race in this domain is predominantly focused on hypersonic weapons, which combine the best features of ballistic and cruise missiles. China, for instance, is developing an anti-ship version of the DF-17 missile. The trajectory of precision weapon development, now an indispensable component of naval warfare, indicates increased missile range, accuracy, and speed. This evolution highlights the vulnerability of large surface ships, aligning with China's sea denial doctrine and challenging the inherent advantages of the US Navy.
China's Emergence as a Modern Maritime Power - Naval Modernization
With the painful lesson of the mid-1990s in mind and the even more disastrous lessons of a century of humiliation that led to Chinese weakness in the decades that followed, and with a massive budget at its disposal after four decades of continuous growth, change had to come to China. The PRC leadership, led by Xi Jinping, asked a fundamental question - how to prevent China from collapsing a second time? The answer was simple - by having an army that would not allow it. So, Beijing came up with a plan.
By 2035, the army is to be fully modernized, and by 2049, the centenary of the founding of the PRC, the Communist authorities aim to have a 'world-class' armed force, indicating a desire to rival the US, including in the naval sphere. Until the 1970s, the Chinese navy was considered a brown-water navy, focused on operations in inland waters and limited coastal missions. Today, according to experts, the Chinese navy is already a green-water navy, capable of conducting advanced operations in coastal waters, especially within the first island chain. As far as the technical condition of the ships is concerned, it should be noted that the PRC fleet is relatively new, which means that most of the budget can be spent on building new platforms. It has been almost a decade since the Chinese Navy surpassed the US Navy in terms of the number of warships. However, this fact only allows for a simplified assessment, as the US still has a twofold advantage in terms of tonnage. The Chinese navy has 260,000 personnel and is organized into three separate fleets, the Eastern, Southern, and Northern Commands. By 2021 alone, according to the British think tank IISS, China commissioned 28 ships, four times more than the US. This quantum leap is even more striking when compared with other green-water navies. Between 2017 and 2019, China added more ships to its fleet than India, Japan, Australia, France, and the UK combined. In 2022, 10 vessels with a total tonnage of 110,000 tonnes were commissioned, equivalent to ⅓ of the entire French fleet. The PRC has consistently been the world's largest producer of warships over the past five years. According to estimates by US institutions, the US Navy will have 290 ships in 2030 after the retirement of older ships, including the entire Ticonderoga class cruisers, while the Chinese fleet will have up to 440 ships.
China has 2 aircraft carriers, 7 cruisers, 42 destroyers, 41 frigates, 72 corvettes, and 60 missile boats in active service. The dominance of smaller and medium-sized vessels such as frigates, corvettes, and missile boats is therefore notable. This fleet layout allows for the skilful dispersal of anti-ship missile-armed units, which poses particular problems for US carrier groups. Such an asymmetric approach is also characteristic of the Russian navy, which relies mainly on corvettes and submarines. In the case of China, this approach is particularly effective against regional rivals such as Vietnam or the Philippines. These vessels are also an executive tool of the so-called 'gunboat diplomacy,' which aims to force concessions without the use of force. In addition, Chinese paramilitary vessels, along with naval support, use the fait accompli method to enforce Chinese territorial claims based on the nine-dash line, which covers about 90 per cent of the South China Sea. This is also closely linked to the militarization of the basin that Xi Jinping began in 2015, despite earlier promises to the contrary.
Against the dominance of undersized vessels, some analysts point out that the Chinese navy already exhibits many of the characteristics of an ocean-going fleet, the so-called blue-water navy. Indeed, despite a preference for asymmetric measures, the Chinese have shown a growing interest in expeditionary capabilities that allow for greater force projection in recent years. Beijing has the tools to do so, that is two aircraft carriers in active service - the Shandong and the Liaoning. Both are based on the Soviet Kuznetsov design and are, therefore, significantly inferior to their US counterparts. For this reason, it was decided to develop a national aircraft carrier program. In June 2022, the construction of a third aircraft carrier, the Fujian, was completed, the first of its kind, designed entirely in China. The Chinese are also investing in the development of naval aviation, with plans to introduce the fifth-generation J-31 fighter, which is expected to be a direct rival to the US F-35C.
China's push to "go global" also signifies Beijing's attempt to establish its network of naval bases. Presently, Sri Lanka, Djibouti, and Pakistan are the main targets of China's expanding maritime presence. Still, this pales in comparison to the US network of bases in the region, and even less so globally.
A decisive decade? The US response to Chinese naval power
But how does all this compare with the current hegemon of the seas and oceans - the US Navy - which is inevitably being challenged by Chinese maritime expansion?
Today, as the dominant power, the US plays both the role of the world's policeman and the guarantor of free access to the sea lanes of communication. This role, which used to be played by the United Kingdom, for example, because of its maritime influence, is in practice an excellent tool for shaping the international order. In other words, a global hegemon must also function as a maritime hegemon. As China's potential grew, the US definition of its raison d'état began to clash with the strategic objectives of the emerging power. The overarching goal of the US Navy remains to ensure unrestricted access to the world's oceans by the principles of a 'liberal rules-based order.' And this, according to Beijing, is merely a cover for US hegemony. The White House believes that this decade will be crucial in determining the outcome of this struggle.
The Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) and Force Design 2030 documents show that the Americans are giving priority to increasing the mobility and expeditionary capabilities of the Marine Corps. Offensive measures, on the other hand, are to be based on long-range precision weapons to enable, among other things, the creation of anti-access zones as part of sea denial missions. The Navy's long-term plans, like those outlined in the Battle Force 2045 document, emphasize the need to build smaller units in an approach known as distributed lethality. This is largely in response to the development of Chinese asymmetric capabilities and the increasing vulnerability of large surface ships such as aircraft carriers and destroyers within A2/AD zones. At the same time, the US Admiralty recognizes that control of the sea cannot be taken for granted as it has been in recent decades. The Americans, therefore, aim to disperse the fleet to neutralize the Chinese navy's main asset, its missile power. The document also gives a greater role to unmanned and autonomous platforms. Under the plan, the US Navy plans to build 20 Constellation-class frigates. In total, the US Navy Force Design 2045 plan, presented by Admiral Michael M. Gildey, envisions a fleet of 373 ships and 150 autonomous units.
The Gap
Overall - it is fair to say that the Chinese are closing the gap with the US Navy every day. However, the superiority of the US Navy in several areas remains unquestioned.
Arguably, the Chinese navy's most significant vulnerability lies in its submarines. China indeed has 7 SSBNs (i.e., nuclear-powered submarines equipped with ballistic missiles). But the core consists of 46 conventional, diesel-powered vessels. These ships are very easy to detect, which severely limits their effectiveness outside the first island chain, a relatively 'noisy' body of water. In contrast to the surface fleet, there are no significant improvements forecasted in this area. By comparison, the US Navy operates 68 submarines - all nuclear-powered. This force includes 50 attack submarines (SSNs), 14 SSBNs, and four SSGN cruise missile submarines. The disparity in submarine warfare capabilities would pose a lethal threat to a hypothetical Chinese landing operation in Taiwan.
Thus, submarine warfare is China's greatest weakness, but so undoubtedly is its limited experience in combined operations. This, along with limited anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, subpar submarine capabilities, few bases, and a shortage of sailors, leads to a sober evaluation of the Chinese navy's potential. Effectiveness may also be hindered by the extensive indoctrination of the armed forces and the maintenance of a divided command structure between admirals and political commissars. Mobilizing public opinion and gaining support for further naval expansion will also be a challenge for Beijing, especially in the face of a deteriorating economic situation and long-term demographic problems. Looking ahead, the Chinese navy will face a growing dilemma as it tries to reconcile its asymmetric strategy of active defence with its ambitions for greater power projection.
American problems, on the other hand, are primarily related to the 'tyranny of distance' mentioned earlier, and a derivative of this is the inadequate range of naval aviation. For instance, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet aircraft with standard armament and additional fuel has a range of only 723 km. Although the F-35C Lightning II increases the maximum range with precision weapons to 1,915 km, it remains relatively short. This leaves aircraft carriers vulnerable to Chinese ballistic missile attacks when entering certain zones.
Experts emphasize that long-range bombers, particularly platforms with stealth capabilities like the B-2 and the upcoming B-21, scheduled for service by 2026, could provide a solution. These aircraft are crucial components of conventional and strategic deterrence, influencing Beijing's calculations. Another challenge is the insufficient stockpile of precision-guided munitions, notably JASSM missiles, which, by some estimates, would last for only 10 days of operations.
The conclusions are clear: the success of US operations in the region hinges on the progressive expansion of the range and capabilities of interoperable air vehicles. Developing air-to-air refuelling capabilities will be vital, as will the improvement of precision weapons. Work is already underway on the 6th generation fighter under the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program, which aims to address the issue of range limitations. It is worth noting that the overreliance on naval aviation within the US Navy may introduce greater predictability, making China's defensive task easier. On the plus side for the US Navy, when excluding China's missile forces, there is a significant advantage in the number of Vertical Launch Systems (VLS), with a ratio of 9 to 1.
James E. Fanell, a specialist in Chinese naval studies, argues that a fundamental mistake made by the US Navy has been the delayed prioritization of doctrine against the conventional threat posed by the Chinese Navy. Therefore, in his view, the current state of US naval forces is inadequate for conducting intense warfare against a country of similar capability. While the long-term plans outlined in Battle Force 2045 accurately diagnose the problems afflicting the US Navy, they do not provide short-term solutions.
Countdown to War
The Americans are indicating that the coming decade will be pivotal for the Sino-US rivalry on the seas and oceans. Affecting these calculations is the inevitably increasing likelihood of conflict over Taiwan. The countdown to war looms in the Taiwan Strait. The rapid Chinese naval development, years of neglect in the US Navy, and the relentless 'tyranny of distance' have left the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific becoming much more even. The Chinese have gained many arguments that call into question US dominance in the region. On the other hand, the currently dominant superpower still retains many areas of advantage, while the contender is beginning to experience increasingly pronounced problems - as shown, for example, by the demographic collapse or crises in the domestic property market.
So does the expansion of the Chinese navy end the US Navy's hegemony? Everyone, given the arguments cited above, can answer this question for themselves. At the end of the day, there is only one form of ultimate verification of pre-war calculations - war. This triviality is mercilessly demonstrated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine - a strategic error in the Kremlin's calculations. Let us hope that a similar verification does not occur in the Taiwan Strait.
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