- Shankar Ananth
Nuclear annihilation, this product of the Cold War, is naturally identified with the two great powers of the time - the United States and the Soviet Union. Overshadowing this rivalry, however, was another conflict that would later also develop into a dispute between nuclear powers. India versus Pakistan. The two countries have fought three wars in the last 75 years, and there is no end in sight to the strained relations between Delhi and Islamabad.
With India's growing international stature and Pakistan's rapprochement with China, the conflict between the two capitals is becoming increasingly important. Also on a global scale, given that their combined population exceeds 1.5 billion and both India and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons. There is much to suggest that the likelihood of nuclear war between the two countries is one of the highest in the world.
But what is the genesis of this seemingly age-old rivalry? How does it affect the international situation today?
The legacy of the British
South Asian national identities were more or less shaped in the early 20th century, under the British Raj. When the British colonized the Indian sub-continent, one of the communal fractures they exploited to divide the society was religion.
See, pre-independent India was a pluralistic society – a melting pot of different cultures, languages and religions. The most prominent of those religions were Hinduism, making up about 70% of the population and Islam, making up close to 25% of the population before independence and partition in 1947.
Indian freedom movement was composed of representatives from both these religions, in additional to other religious minorities. At the forefront were two leading organizations - the Indian National Congress, secular but predominantly Hindu, led by Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, and the Muslim League, that was, as the name suggests, predominantly Muslim, notably led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah. As the freedom movement surged ahead, Jinnah began to feel marginalized, often clashing with Gandhi. Political tensions continued to rise between the pair, gradually trickle down into the larger community. With seeds of discord sown, the cracks began to show between the Hindu majority and the Muslim minority, leading to an escalation in violence starting in 1930s till the late 1940s.
The hostilities eventually manifested into political will in March 1940 with the passing of Lahore declaration by the Muslim league - a resolution to establish a separate homeland for the Muslims of British India.
Meanwhile, the second world war forced the British to rethink the occupation of the sub-continent. The sheer cost and energy expended during the war trying to defeat Hitler’s Germany made maintaining order in India for further exploitation unviable. Subsequently, plans were drawn up for a hasty exit from South Asia, and a critical part of the plan was to split British India into two countries, accommodating the demand for a separate Muslim nation.
Thus were born two countries - a Hindu majority India, and a Muslim majority Pakistan.
But in addition to India and Pakistan, there were also a set of 565 ‘princely states’ that the British had left to their own devices. It was up to them to choose their loyalty – either join India, or Pakistan or remain independent.
Most princely states acceded with none or minimal coercion with either India or Pakistan. Typical factors that mattered involved geographical location and collective interests. In general, Muslim majority states ceded to Pakistan, while Hindu majority states ceded to India.
But there was one princely state that became a point of the altercation - Jammu & Kashmir. And this would remain, till date, the biggest factor in deciding relations between the two countries.
Jammu & Kashmir
Unlike most other princely states, Jammu & Kashmir was peculiar for a few reasons. First, it was a Muslim majority state with a Hindu ruler, although it also had a sizeable Hindu and Sikh population in the sub-region of Jammu. Second, the strategic location of the state, bordering China to the East, India to the south and Pakistan to the west, made it extremely desirable to India and Pakistan. China also claimed a part of the state towards the east. Third, the ruler, Hari Singh had signed a ‘standstill’ agreement, and wanted to take his time before making a decision on whether to cede to either country, or whether to remain independent.
The Pakistani leadership believed Hari Singh may eventually tilt toward India if no action was taken. They were also aware of uprisings happening within Kashmir by the ruler’s rebellious Muslim subjects. Backed by the state, Pakistani tribal militants invaded Kashmir’s western border in October of 1947, and plundered through, occupying significant portions of the state and almost reaching the capital Srinagar.
Hari Singh panicked and asked India for assistance in fighting back. His request was accepted, but was conditional on him signing the instrument of accession to India, which he did. The Indian forces were then airlifted into Kashmir to fight back the invading forces from the west. In response, the Pakistani army entered the battlefield, and thus began the first formal war of Kashmir. After about a year of fighting, a formal ceasefire was declared on 1st January, 1949, mediated by the UN.
The region was subsequently divided into two parts – India administered Kashmir, which spanned around 60% of the total state, while most of the remaining part was held onto by Pakistan.
A plebiscite that never happened
The ceasefire between India and Pakistan over Kashmir was subject to UN resolutions. These resolutions recommended, among other things, for a plebiscite to be held to decide the status of Jammu and Kashmir, conditional upon Pakistan’s complete withdrawal from the state and India reducing its military presence to the bare minimum.
None of the conditions required for the plebiscite have been met till date. So a plebiscite in the state has never been held.
But plebiscites are not uncommon in modern South Asian history, and were in fact a common way to determine the fate of some of the disputed territories during independence. North-western provinces (currently in Pakistan), Sylhet district (currently in Bangladesh) and Junagadh (currently in India) were all cases where public opinion had been sought to make decisions.
In fact, the Junagadh plebiscite was precedent set by India, with a situation closer to the one in Jammu and Kashmir, but the other way. It was a princely state where the ruler was Muslim and the majority population was Hindu. When the ruler of Junagadh ceded to Pakistan despite no commonality of culture or the lack of shared borders, driven by political coercion, India intervened and forced a plebiscite, where the overwhelming majority favoured Union with India.
As the plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir never took place, the fate of the former princely state continued to remain uncertain and was a hotbed of further clashes.
As it turned out, the battle in 1948 would not be the last war fought over Kashmir. India and Pakistan would go on to fight war again in 1965, establishing the neighbours as sworn enemies. Pakistani forces launched a covert attack across the ceasefire line in Kashmir in an attempt to capture territory, leading to India crossing the international border to attack Pakistan’s military bases. The war was again inconclusive, and after a month an armistice was declared, brokered by the US and the USSR. Both sides agreed to return to their pre-war positions. This was the first intervention of the Cold War superpowers in the South Asian region.
Yet, perhaps the most significant war between the two nations took place in 1971. And this time it ended in a decisive victory for one side.
The genesis of the 1971 conflict was not the Kashmir issue per se, but rather the internal civil conflict between the Punjab-dominant West Pakistan, and the Bengali-dominant East Pakistan, both separated by the vast Indian landmass. The struggle for Bengali rights started as soon as Pakistan formed as a state, since religion was the only unifier between the two cultures. Despite East Pakistan having a larger population, the gulf in the quality of life, political influence and economic wealth between the two sides was heavily skewed toward West Pakistan. The cultural embargo can be estimated by the fact that Bengali, East Bengal’s de facto language, was even refused a place as a state language by Islamabad.
Tensions rose when the Awami League, a political party from East Pakistan won elections in 1970, but political parties from the western side refused to hand over power resulting in unrest. The Pakistani army intervened in March of 1971, using the unrests as an excuse and invaded East Pakistan. In what is seen as a dark and violent period in the civil strife, the Bangladeshi genocide is said to have resulted in approximately 1.5 million Bangladeshis displaced, 3 million people killed and at least 200,000 women raped.
This unrest had ramifications on India, with about 10 million refugees from East Pakistan driven into the country fleeing Pakistan army. India’s then Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi pre-empted a conflict with Pakistan, and began meeting world leaders, shaping the narrative for India in anticipation of the war.
On 3rd December, 1971, Pakistan launched a pre-emptive strike on India’s western border, and full-fledged war broke out.
13 days after the war broke out, India forced Pakistan to surrender, and Bangladesh was born.
Towards a nuclear war
Indo-Pak relations were on the fringe after 1971, with Pakistan trying the avenge the loss of Bangladesh. The rivals started eyeing non-conventional weapons.
Despite global opposition, India conducted its first nuclear test in 1998, followed by Pakistan the very same year.
Given the newly acquired nuclear capabilities, it was a matter of grave concern when India and Pakistan clashed once again in 1999 – this time over a region in Kashmir called Kargil. While this was not a full-fledged war like 1971, the threat of crossing the nuclear umbrella loomed heavy. Yet the short-lived conflict ended in minimal territory change. But it went on to prove that a conventional war below the nuclear threshold is possible.
Now, while military conflicts have indeed been the highlights of the Indo-Pak relationship, the question arises – why did they not just talk it out?
The answer in theory is simple - a lack of political will. But there is a wider context behind it.
See, India and Pakistan started with political and legal systems that were passed on from the British Raj, but gradually diverged. Both countries were established federal democracies and started with strong prime ministers – Jawaharlal Nehru for India, and Mohammed Ali Jinnah for Pakistan. While Nehru remained prime minister till his death in 1964, giving him a good 17 years to establish fundamentals of a new nation, Jinnah passed away in 1948. Pakistan’s pre-occupation with Kashmir allowed Pakistan’s army to have a substantial say in national, political and economic matters, unlike the Indian counterparts. As a result, while the Indian democracy stayed largely intact except for a brief period of political uncertainty from 1975 to 1977 when a national emergency was declared. Pakistani democracy faced staunch opposition from its deep state.
Pakistan has had 3 military coups in its history, and spent more than half of its 76 years under military dictatorships. In addition, no Pakistani prime minister has served a full five-year term.
The impact of such an unsteady leadership has been a lack of effective dialogue and virtually no policy continuity within the civilian leadership, since any policy of peace needs the stamp of approval from Pakistan’s military HQ. And given military’s self-interests, a policy of peace with India is not the easiest to establish.
The economic aspect of the Indo-Pak rivalry is one that has started playing increasingly pivotal role in the power dynamics, predominantly due to the growing differential in economic fortunes between India and Pakistan. As it stands today, India is the 5th largest economy globally, one of the fastest growing and part of the BRICS and G20, while Pakistan is teetering on the brink of default.
This wasn’t always the case though. How did things come to this?
Immediately after independence, India, wary of capitalism and shaped by a heavily left leaning leadership, drew more from the USSR model of development though officially, it remained non-aligned. The goal was self-sufficiency. This meant that starting in 1950s, the state took control of everything from steel, mining, water, telecommunications, insurance, and most importantly, banks.
A strong, robust banking system is fundamental to a strong economy, which the government controlled banks with poorly spread facilities and inefficient credit systems were unable to provide. In addition, a politically driven growth in non-performing assets led to the gradual stagnation of the Indian economy.
In 1950, India had 430 commercial banks. By 1980, all banks in India were nationalized.
Socialism became so embedded in the Indian ethos that it was eventually enshrined in the Constitution. The result? When India was forced to go to the IMF for support in 1991, the fund forced India to liberalise its economy. Growth rates began to rise again.
Pakistan started off with a different approach. It grew closer to the US right after independence. Economically, Pakistan’s economy was much more open than India's, and coupled with American assistance, the economy grew.
In the 1960s, Pakistan was one of the fastest growing countries in Asia if not the world, with around 6% economic growth driven by a manufacturing-focused economic policy, rural credit program and agricultural reforms.
Pakistan’s political troubles gradually started weighing on the economy, most significantly from 1978 to 1988 when the military dictator Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq islamized the economy. Fledgling industries like cinema, and music were effectively shut down to comply with his interpretation of the Shariah law. Economic growth stalled and never really recovered.
Pakistani GDP per capita was higher than India’s till about 2010, before India’s economic liberalization that had started in 1991, put it ahead.
India’s economy today is much more open to private businesses and foreign investment than it was prior to 1991. With key government interventions like the United Payments Interface or UPI, a digital payments infrastructure designed to bring as many people into the formal banking system as possible, a vibrant start-up eco-system, established pharmaceutical and IT industry, and a growing manufacturing sector, India is poised for a better economic future than Pakistan in the next decade. You can hear more about this in one of our previous episodes.
While both countries still struggle with substantial poverty today, the future trajectory places India in a much better place than Pakistan.
Big players' perspective
The decades-long Indo-Pakistani rivalry has led both centres to alter, if not reverse, their alliances. From the outset, India sought to remain unaligned with either side, but had de facto close relations with the USSR. Pakistan, on the other hand, began to work closely with the US as its main ally. The US needed Pakistan's military support for its operations in Asia, such as the war in Afghanistan, and as a result remained the main financier of Pakistan's military apparatus - so much so that Pakistan's main armament was and still is US F-16 aircraft.
But with the capture of Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan, the relationship went south, and the US tilted toward India, driven by common denominators of secular democracy, economic opportunity and above all, the challenge posed by China.
While Pakistan always had a cordial relationship with China, since the fallout with the US, Pakistan has started relying heavily on China, both for economic and military assistance. This is driven by a common strategic interest against India, and a mutual interest in Kashmir.
While both India and Pakistan lay claim to the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir, there are parts of Kashmir that even China lays claim to, and in fact controls. This part of China controlled Kashmir, or ‘Aksai Chin’, has also been a point of dispute between India and China.
In this triangle, China and Pakistan have grown to support each other’s claims. In fact, Pakistan willingly ceded parts of Kashmir it administered to China in 1963. This of course was refuted by India, and has only served to keep the Indo-China relationship frosty despite the size of the underlying trade.
China also made CPEC – the ‘China Pakistan Economic Corridor’ the centrepiece of its ‘One Belt One Road’ initiative. The CPEC links Pakistan administered Kashmir to its southern port of Gwadar with industrial infrastructure, and has been contested by India.
China is the de facto third actor of the Jammu and Kashmir issue. In 2019 India unilaterally revoked Kashmir's special status as a disputed region and divided it into two territories in an attempt to integrate it into India. As expected, Pakistan rejected India's move as illegal. And to no surprise - Pakistan was supported by China.
To this day, Kashmir remains the biggest thorn between India and Pakistan, and the result of this spat is a drastically under-utilised potential for trade between the two countries. According to some estimates, the trade potential between India and Pakistan could be as high as $37 billion, compared to about $1-2 billion of trade today.
Future of Indo-Pak relations
What lies ahead?
Both India and Pakistan have similar ethnic make-up, similar cultures , similar tastes and very similar problems. This makes a great case for normalization of relations, perhaps driven by increasing bilateral trade. A higher economic dependency on each other would raise the threshold for military aggression, and boost regional productivity. This is exemplified by regional trade blocs like ASEAN and the EU, where promoting regional trade acted as wealth multipliers.
But as the current situation drags on, the differential in terms of economic and military might is set to increase in India’s favour. Subsequently, India is less likely to be compelled to make amends with Pakistan, keeping the probability of military conflict high.
It is thus in global interests to push both India and Pakistan toward normalizing relations with each other. While avoiding further military conflict between two nuclear-armed nations remains the key concern, better Indo-Pak relations would mean better lives for one of the poorest, most populated regions in the world.
Shankar Ananth
Sources
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