United States of Europe.

Germany's idea of a New Europe?

On 24 November 2021, a coalition of parties - the SPD, the Greens and the FDP - reached an agreement to form a new German government, the first one involving three parties after World War II. At the same time, a 177-page coalition document was presented outlining the basic goals of the new government. The proposals contained therein, if implemented, would cause a breakthrough not only in Germany, but also in the entire European Union. That’s because Berlin wants the EU to move towards a United States of Europe.

European Federal State

The United States of Europe - this is how the plan for the new coalition was entitled by Germany's most widely read weekly, Der Spiegel, just after the coalition agreement was presented. And this is not an overstatement. For the first time so directly, all three parties emphasised that the federal European state should be the integration objective of the European Union.

What would this entail? The coalition agreement talks about, among other things: the introduction of a European electoral law, transnational lists, a common foreign ministry, strengthening the power of the European Parliament and, above all, abolishing the requirement for unanimity in foreign and security policy. With the progressive disintegration of the security arrangement in Europe, the implementation of the last point would be particularly groundbreaking. The coalition agreement also mentions a pan-European infrastructure network - railways, energy grid, hydrogen - while the ongoing 'Conference on the Future of Europe' would serve a purpose as a starting point.

The 'traffic light' coalition, named after the colours of the parties within it, cannot be denied ambition. It is a bold counter-offensive given the chronic weakness of the Union in recent years revealed by Britain's exit from the EU and the response to the pandemic with the burden of the fight resting on the shoulders of national governments. It would, however, take a huge effort to achieve this ambition. The abolition of unanimity in foreign and security policy matters, which has been on the radar of the Germans or the French for years, cannot come into force before all 27 Member States voluntarily surrender their right of veto. The EU Treaties would have to be changed. These too would require a unanimous decision by all EU countries. In some states referendums would have to be called.

Berlin can nevertheless, and crucially, find the advocates of such a direction for the EU in Paris. France has long called for a "strategic autonomy" for Europe, but previously this enthusiasm was generally toned down by the calculated government of Chancellor Angela Merkel. On the subject of a new grand European strategy, Emmanuel Macron may now find it much easier to talk with Olaf Scholz, the new German chancellor.

In the new German government, the French hope to find a partner to change the European geopolitical vector, something Paris plans to do during its six-month leadership of the EU which began at the start of 2022. France's goal will be to move from the EU as an economic union of nation states to the Union as a total sovereign power deciding its own strategy and security policy. However, this doesn’t mean that there are no differences between Paris and Berlin. Where Macron speaks of European "strategic autonomy," Scholz prefers "strategic sovereignty.” Not a small difference. Germany does not want strategic autonomy if it means a hard cut off from the United States.

What the German Chancellor and the French President have in common, however, is a plan for a stronger executive against the insubordination of EU Member States in matters of law. This important assumption is also contained in the German coalition agreement and it’s not difficult to guess that the authors mainly had Hungary and Poland in mind here. The common German-French front can also be seen in the approach of both capitals to the policy of the Russian Federation. Macron, who seems sceptical of any direct threat from Russia, said at a recent meeting: "We must avoid any useless tensions." Scholz echoed with an equally succinct statement: "It is clear to all of us that there is no alternative to de-escalation."

Yet what matters, as always, are concrete actions. And here we see a continuation of Berlin's soft approach which is one of the main reasons for the first in decades threat of full-scale war between two major European states: Russia and Ukraine. It recently came to light that Chancellor Merkel's government was blocking arms sales to Ukraine, meanwhile running supplies to Egypt which has been criticised for human rights abuses in Yemen. Added to this is the Nord Stream gas pipeline saga which removes one of Kyiv's last levers vis-à-vis Moscow, the Brotherhood gas pipeline. Although one of the coalition partners, the Green Party, is against the project for a controversial pipe laid on the bottom of the Baltic Sea, the leader of the coalition, the SPD, is the party which started the Nord Stream project in 2005. The then Chancellor Gerhard Schroder is from this very party and he is now mainly known for sitting on the boards of the Russian energy giants, Rosneft and Gazprom, the latter of which is the operator of Nord Stream. Now, Schroder's successor, Olaf Scholz supposedly is calling for another "reset" with Moscow.

Another well-known figure from the SPD is Martin Schulz. It was Schulz who was one of the first Germans to call for a European federal state. Already in 2017, at the party conference of the SPD, he called for the creation of a "United States of Europe” and that this should happen by 2025.

Schulz told delegates that he wanted EU member states to sign up to a "constitutional treaty" that would commit the bloc to taking steps towards a federal Europe. He continued: "Such a constitutional treaty will have to be presented to the member states and those that do not accept it will automatically have to leave the EU.” It should be noted, however, that the view on this issue is not consistent in Germany. Alexander Dobrindt of the CSU even called Schulz a “European radical” for the previous statement. "Someone who wants to create a United States of Europe by 2025, who wants to dissolve the nation states within the next seven years, and who wants to expel from the EU anyone who does not submit to this dictate, must be called a European radical.”

The motivations driving the new German government are clear. At a time of growing US-Chinese duopoly, European leaders see the need to consolidate resources in order not to be left behind. Today, Europe is on the straight path to becoming the world's biggest open-air museum. In terms of dry numbers, the Union often exceeds, matches or marginally falls behind China or the United States. However, its organisational system means that its coherence is shattered by the interests of individual states. This system worked well as a glue for the healing wounds of post-war Europe and for economic prosperity during the world's last unipolar moment. But at a time when terms such as hard-power and realpolitik are returning to the dictionary, the Union remains toothless and ineffective and this is being exploited by players with shorter decision-making chains and more centralized centers of power.

Evolve or Die

Nearly 500 years ago Europe invented the most effective form of political organisation in history: the nation state. Through a series of wars and conquests, this form of political organisation spread like a virus, so that by the 20th century it was the only way to organise politics - eliminating empires, city-states and feudal systems. Because nation-states did best against other nation-states, other political systems faced a difficult choice: become a nation-state or be adopted by one. Until the end of the 20th century, the only way to get a seat at the table was to be a nation state. The same is true now - the European Union, unless it undergoes a major transformation, will be heading for collapse, according to the maxim “evolve or die.” Europe seems to be the last area, after the USA and China, with such a concentration of human, economic and ideological capital that remains fundamentally divided and decentralised in terms of the overall shape of its strategy. Despite the fact that Europe has no geographical barriers greater than those dividing individual US states or provinces in China.

The idea of a federation of European states has a long and rich history. Since the Middle Ages, many scholars have advocated the unification of Europe. The idea of a European federal state was first mentioned in the 19th century by, among others, Napoleon Bonaparte at the end of his life in exile on the island of St. Helena. This concept was further described in 1831 by the Polish professor Wojciech Jastrzębowski in his text "About the Everlasting Peace Between the Nations.” The phrase "United States of Europe" was, in turn, first used by the French writer Victor Hugo during his speech at the International Peace Congress in Paris in 1849. This did not help much, as in the following century Germany and France fought 3 wars against each other. In 1946 Winston Churchill repeated the call to "build a kind of United States of Europe.”

William Fulbright, an American professor, notes in his 1948 text that historical experience suggests that the impulse towards federalisation is greatest immediately after a devastating war. After the Napoleonic Wars, a certain degree of unification was achieved by the Holy Alliance, until the revolution of 1848. Then, after the First World War, Briand and Herriot, in their effort to prevent another war in Europe, proposed a new pan-European project and a federation of states. Another major conflict led to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community and eventually the European Union. At that time, the motivation, apart from preventing another devastating war on the Old Continent, was also the impending threat of the Soviet Union that hung over Europe.

In his analysis, Fulbright presents also an interesting description of the challenges that the unification-seeking Europe has to face. Let us remember that the American wrote his text in May 1948, not so long after the end of the Second World War and before the introduction of the Marshall Plan.

The first and fundamental problem that would have to be overcome in order to create a European federal state is national sentiment which stems from prejudices, fears and animosities deeply rooted in Europeans through patriotism and historical experience. It seems that this argument is still valid despite the creation of the European Union. Although post-war animosities have largely faded, distrust between European nations still remains.

The second obstacle is the fear of the power of a resurgent Germany. Let us remember that Fulbright wrote this text just after the Second World War. Germany has long been reborn and, after two defeats in the 20th century, it now presents itself as a pacifist nation, which can be proved by the relatively weak military power of Germany in relation to the strength of its economy. Germany is the leading powerhouse of the Union, but its 22% share of GDP does not significantly dominate the rest of the countries. Yet mistrust of Germany is still a problem that could hinder the unification of Europe. Suffice to say, when it comes to security, the eastern flank of the EU trusts the Americans, who are thousands of kilometres away, far more than the neighbouring Germans.

The third problem, according to Fulbright, was the Soviets' temptation to unite Europe as they saw fit, in a style similar to Napoleon, the Kaiser or Hitler. The Soviet Union, as we know, no longer exists. However, the Russian Federation, reborn on its ruins, despite having much less potential than the European Union in every aspect except military, is trying to play in the same league as the Soviets. And this one aspect alone is enough for Moscow to succeed in this game to a large extent.

The fourth obstacle is the language barrier, which impedes the free exchange of ideas and information. This problem was greater in 1948 than it is now. Today, English is spoken by at least 50% of citizens in every country in the Union, and in some countries the figure is as high as 70%. This of course excludes countries where English is the official language. It is paradoxical, however, that the homeland of a language that has the potential to unite the Union has recently left the Union.

The fifth problem is dangerous political ideologies. Fulbright notes in his text that fascism and communism continued to have their adherents in Europe after the war. Although we cannot speak of these movements as extreme as they were 70 years ago, the ideological division of Europe does indeed exist. There are societies leaning towards a more liberal view of the world, as well as those with a more conservative approach to life, but it seems that these divisions are no greater than those in the various states of the USA.

The sixth and seventh problems are religious and cultural differences, which “are often stronger than blood ties.” This too continues to be the case. Europe remains a cultural mosaic, which undoubtedly is also one of its values.

The USA, a beacon for the United States of Europe?

Fulbright also makes an interesting comparison between the problem of European integration and the situation before the unification of the USA. We can recall, writes Fulbright, the many efforts at union which characterised the relationships of the thirteen American colonies prior to their independence. Today the achievement of a Constitution and a Federal Government in 1787 appears to have been an easier task than the present one of attaining a federation in Europe. But the record will show that not only was the ratification process of the American Constitution a contentious one, but the Federal Government of 1787 was preceded by a loose confederation, which in turn was preceded by tenuous congresses and unions from earlier times. The impelling threat from the Indians and then the dangers from the great powers of France, Spain and England were as powerful factors in the unification of the United States as were domestic economic needs and social impulses.

We often hear that the problems of European unification cannot be compared with those of the US federation. No doubt the unification of the USA was much easier than the unification of Europe. But nevertheless it should not be forgotten that all the difficulties that Europe is now facing were to some extent present in the colonial states before federation. There were boundary problems, currency difficulties, tariff disputes and many other issues that had to be adjusted before unification could be achieved. There were differences of language, religion and social institutions. In the United States, the issue of slavery could not be resolved at the outset and eventually had to be purged in a bloody civil war. Slavery was no small obstacle to unity.

Even in the self-sufficient provincial economy of 1776, with its slow means of communication and limited power of mass destruction, “I doubt” - the American points out - “that the necessity of federation was as obvious to the citizens of that time as it is to the Europeans of today. If the Dutchman of New York and the Englishman of Connecticut, if the Frenchman of Louisiana and the Spaniard of California, if the Swede of Delaware and the German of Pennsylvania could be molded into a single body politic, living together in harmony and striving for common national purposes, then there is every reason to believe that the Frenchman of France, the Englishman of England, the Dutchman of Holland, the German of Germany, the Spaniard of Spain and all their neighbours, if given the right conditions, can unite for a reconstructed and strong Europe.” The Fulbright analysis, although now nearly 76 years old, still contains much truth.

What then are the chances that a United States of Europe will come into being in the near future? In a word, very limited. Europe remains thoroughly divided. The South is struggling with economic problems and the continuing issue of mass migration; France is looking for opportunities to use the EU's potential to implement global policy according to its own interests; Poland, Sweden, Finland, Romania and the Baltic States fear for their security in the context of the Kremlin's increasingly aggressive policy and place their hopes above all in the United States, while Germany continues to place priority on mercantilism and skillful maneuvering with the biggest global players - the USA, China, and Russia - to strengthen its own economic power.

In order to come into being, the United States of Europe needs a common, fundamental value that unites all nations. Equality in a superpower competition with the USA or China is too abstract an argument for the average European to be a rational reason for the rejection of sovereign rights, for example in security policy, that every nation currently enjoys. All the more so because now, as on the European chessboard, nations are again beginning to fear for such fundamental rights as security and independence. Berlin rightly assumes that the initiative to unify and reform the Old Continent must come from its strongest state. The problem is that in many aspects, Germany's policy divides the Union more than it unites it. Above all, this must change, so that the United States of Europe goes beyond the realm of the abstract.

Sources:

https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/ampel-koalitionsvertrag-kommen-jetzt-die-vereinigten-staaten-von-europa-a-3eaacdca-dbd4-4bda-bc21-74c0587b3cf4
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