- Hubert Walas
Turkey superpower.
Turkey's Grand Strategy - a Superpower in the Making?
Turkey has come a long way in the last 30 years. From a close ally of the United States, a country over which hung the shadow of the Soviet Union, to an assertive regional force whose aspirations trace back to the historic might of the Ottoman Empire. Does Ankara have a chance to become a full-fledged superpower?
A New Pole of Strength
Until the 1990s, Turkey's attention was focused mainly on domestic politics as well as the political and infrastructural modernization of the country. Loyalty to NATO and the threat posed by the USSR meant that no Turkish government considered any kind of expansionism. However, with the fall of the Soviets, the sense of being under threat also disappeared allowing for more assertive geopolitical plans. Today, Turkey recognizes the changing world order and is adjusting its grand strategy to the new conditions. Although Ankara is a NATO member and an ally of the United States, the Turks are preparing for Washington's diminished role and a multipolar world. Moreover, they themselves want to be one of the centers of power in the new world order.
Taking into account the material and non-material sources of power, it can be hypothesized that Turkey is the strongest state among its immediate neighbors. None of them, with a small question mark on Iran, is able to threaten Turkey in direct confrontation. This puts Turkey in a relatively secure geopolitical position when judged from the angle of maintaining the country's independence. However, Ankara faces other threats. The region of the Middle East and the Turkish near abroad has, for many years, been a place of proxy clashes between great powers and this has led to destabilization, occupation, and even the division of Turkey's closest neighbors. This also often results in the collapse of states and the proliferation of a whole range of unconventional threats - including terrorism, uncontrolled migration, local militias, etc. Therefore, Turkey's primary goal is to maintain stability in its near abroad.
And this was the strategy of the former foreign policy architect of Ankara, Ahmet Davutoğlu, the creator of the “zero problems with neighbors” doctrine. However, since 2016 and the failed coup d'état, Davutoğlu has been marginalized and Turkey's policy itself has become much more assertive. In the last 5 years, Turkey has participated in armed conflicts in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh. It also has significant military contingents in Qatar, Northern Cyprus, Syria, and Somalia.
For the President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the last five years have been a time for far more ambitious goals than just “no problems.” Such a policy and Turkey's participation in local conflicts has contributed to a divergence of interests with many players in the region - the USA, France, Israel, Egypt, and Russia.
In the Footsteps of the Ottoman Empire
All the conflicts to which Ankara is tied to in the Middle East have one common denominator - they take place in the areas of the former Ottoman Empire. Yemen, Libya, Syria, Nagorno-Karabakh, Ukraine.
Starting with the last state, it is in Turkey's interest that Ukraine remains independent and in particular, the area from the Crimea and the Dnieper delta to the Danube - meaning the Ukrainian coast. For Ankara, this is so important that in the event of a threat to Kyiv’s statehood, Turkey may want to support Ukraine militarily and establish a permanent presence at key points. The Kremlin's potential control of Ukraine deeply complicates the balance of power in the Black Sea region and again makes Russia the greatest maritime threat to Turkey. The territorial integrity of countries such as Romania, Bulgaria, and, above all, Georgia is also important for Turks. The latter country is the only buffer state separating Turkey from Russia, thus it can be assumed that another event like the war of 2008 would this time be met with a reaction from the Turks. An example of this was the war in Nagorno-Karabakh, where the Turks, together with the Azeris, and not the Russians, controlled the course of events. The conflict confirmed that it is impossible to establish a security architecture in the region without Turkey.
Here we enter the intricate specificity of the relationship that binds Moscow and Ankara. Both countries have many conflicting interests in the region, but they are able to approach each of them separately and only from the perspective of their national interest. In a word, mutual relations between Turkey and Russia are a festival of political pragmatism. They need and use each other. If both countries were to act alone, the Western powers would not allow them to achieve as much in the Middle East as they have achieved in the past 7 years. There is no alliance between Ankara and Moscow, nor even a strategic partnership. However, at the same time, their cooperation allows them to achieve real, geopolitical goals. Turkey may pursue a similarly pragmatic approach with Iran, which could potentially result in the formation of the Tehran-Ankara-Moscow axis. All three capitals have the potential to collectively push the Americans out of this part of the world and dictate their terms of the game.
The Libyan civil war is also part of a larger game, in which we have Turkey and Qatar on one side, as well as Italy and the United States, which support the GNA (Government of National Accord). While on the other, France, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Russia, who support General Khalifa Haftar. The rivalry results from Libya's key position in the region, which means that no one wants to lose influence in Tripoli. This conflict has divided NATO countries and complicated relations between members. Greece, Italy, France, Spain, and Turkey are members of NATO, but in Libya, they represent different factions. A dozen or so years ago, such a situation would have been unthinkable. For the European Union, Libya is potentially a pandora's box in the context of the influx of immigrants. The Turks are aware of this and are trying to play this card, moreover, they want to get favorable concessions from GNA by taking advantage of the fact that the Libyan government is against the wall.
The conflicts in Syria and Iraq, in which the United States played a major role, are one of the most important reasons why nationalist factions started to gain a voice in Turkey. Both Syria and Iraq are in the immediate vicinity of Turkey, so their destabilization has a direct impact on Turkey's situation. The Turks recognized the Americans' entry into their neighborhood, without Washington asking Ankara's opinion, as treating their country as a de facto colony. Among other things, this is where the cross-party consensus on gaining strategic independence comes from. The issue of the Kurds is also a serious split. Ankara considers the PKK, Kurdistan Workers' Party, and the YPG, People's Protection Units, to be terrorist groups as they pose a potential threat to Turkey's internal cohesion. Washington's support for these groups remains the main axis of contention between the US and Turkey. Nevertheless, Washington cannot afford to discipline Ankara hard on one issue or another, because without Turkey, NATO will have virtually no influence on the Middle East, and almost the entire south-eastern flank of the alliance will cease to exist. The Turks are ruthlessly playing this dilemma, as was shown by the dispute of interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. Therefore, a further assertive policy by Turkey on its south-eastern parameter can be expected. In an ideal scenario for Ankara, the Turks would like to remodel the ethnic landscape of northern Syria and northern Iraq using the Arabs. This would potentially take the form of a neo-colonization and cut off the Kurds in Turkey from the Kurds in Iraq. It would be a solution to the Kurdish question for Turkey.
Importantly, Ankara's agenda is largely based on ideological issues. Like Ataturk, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is a populist leader and staunch modernizer. However, the main difference between the two leaders is that Ataturk viewed Europe as a modernization model with its secularist format, while Erdoğan wants Turkey to return to its Ottoman roots which are based on the glue of the Islamic faith. Erdoğan sees Turkey as the leader of the Muslim world and leading a renaissance of Islam. All this is expected to contribute to the growth of Turkey's power. Therefore, it is not surprising that Erdoğan has restored the status of a mosque to the Hagia Sophia in Istanbul, even though it has recently acted as a museum. Turkey's main rival is Saudi Arabia. Just over a hundred years ago, in 1916, the Ottoman Caliphate was stripped of control of the two holiest cities of Islam, Mecca and Medina, which are today under Saudi jurisdiction. The Western powers contributed to this fact, which the Turks now consider being a betrayal by the Arabs. The problem is that the Arab world usually tries to unite against Turkey and Qatar, which is its main ally in the Persian Gulf. Many experts strongly doubt that the Arabs, i.e. the Semitic people, would agree to the domination of the Turkish people because of the historical events of the Ottoman Empire's rule over the Arabs.
First, Sovereignty
The Turks are focused on sovereignty, independence, and above all, against the Americans. This applies to every sphere in which the state operates - economy, energy, technology, and military. This includes the pursuit of nuclear capabilities - both in the energy sphere and, potentially, as in the past, nuclear weapons.
Starting with the military: Turkish arms spending has skyrocketed in recent years. Over the past two decades, Ankara has built a thriving arms sector that currently covers 70% of domestic demand and Turkey is expected to be self-sufficient in this area by 2053. Turkey has gone from being the 3rd largest importer of arms to being the 14th largest exporter. Since 2015, it has reduced arms imports by 48%, while increasing its defense budget by 86% in the last decade. Ankara also initiated the MILGEM program, which aims to produce its own marine corvettes and frigates. Turkey is also working on a modern tank and a 5th generation fighter jet. However, with the latter, it was forced to do so. Turkey's purchase of the Russian S-400 missile defense system led to a dispute with the US and a suspension of US arms exports to Turkey. Moreover, there was the removal of Ankara from the F-35 fighter program in which Turkey had invested billions of dollars. These are the costs of running a totally independent foreign policy and Ankara seems willing to bear them.
That’s not everything. The Turks want to go into space. As Turkish Minister responsible for the Turkish space program, Mustafa Varank, said "countries that do not make it to space, will not have a say on Earth in the future." The first step were the Turkish successes in the development of unmanned aerial vehicle technology. Turkey still relies on importing foreign technology, but the goal is clear - to achieve comprehensive technological independence. The aggregation of mental forces is supposed to serve this purpose. The Turkish Space Agency works closely with two of Turkey's most advanced R&D institutions: TÜBİTAK Space Technologies Research Institute and Robonik Mechatronics Technologies. The effects are still to be seen. Erdoğan announced that Turkey will send the first native-produced communications satellite into orbit in 2022, and the Turks want to send an unmanned ship to the lunar surface in 2023.
The foundation of all these plans will be access to cheap energy. Geography predisposes Turkey to the role of an energy hub at the meeting point of the European and Asian continents, a position which the Turkish elite wants to take full advantage of. Already, several pipelines of high importance for Europe's energy security run through Turkish territory. These include the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), and the Turkish Stream. The game of oil and gas deposits on the bottom of the Mediterranean Sea is also crucial. Ankara wants to gain control over offshore oil and gas deposits in the so-called Levantine Basin close to Turkish and Cypriot territorial waters. Here, the Turks face resistance from a coalition of 4 countries: Cyprus, Greece, Israel, and France, which are opposed to extraction from Cypriot territories. Moreover, Greece, Italy, Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, and Cyprus have signed bilateral agreements cooperating between their own exclusive economic zones. This coalition has also agreed to build the East Med gas pipeline which runs beneath the Mediterranean Sea connecting Israel, Cyprus, and Greece, while bypassing Turkey and thus hitting its interests. Nevertheless, the Turks have been lucky recently. Last year, the Turks discovered 540 billion cubic meters of natural gas in the Black Sea shelf. At present, Ankara imports virtually all of its gas needs, amounting to 50 billion m3 per year. For Turkey, the new discoveries are part of the solution to Ankara's long-term economic weakness, including its energy import bill to be paid in foreign currency.
In turn, having a strong fleet will allow Turkey to project its power over large territories, including the protection of its own and contested oil and gas deposits. It was the discovery of hydrocarbons in the Turkish periphery that was one of the most important implications for the operation and expansion of its navy. Turkey's naval strategy - Mavi Vatan, or Blue Homeland - has completely dominated strategic thinking among the Turkish military cadre and part of the political class. The idea assumes Turkish domination over the waters of the Mediterranean Sea and regaining in this region the primacy that was once held by the Ottoman Empire. However, despite developing its own capabilities, Turkey still has its limitations. Turkey has a larger navy than its main rival Greece, but joint exercises between Greece, France, Italy, Egypt and even Israel show that the balance of power is uncertain.
Coming back to the energy sector, another component of Turkish energy autonomy plans is a system of hydropower plants. The mountainous topography of Turkey, combined with a large number of rivers, allows the Turks to use this geographic potential for their own purposes. The plan envisages the construction of 22 dams and 19 hydropower plants, and most of these plans have already been completed. As a result, this could cause water shortages in the countries of the lower reaches of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers - Syria and Iraq.
The Turks also want to create their own system of nuclear power plants. So far, they do not have any, and the first is to be built by the Russians in Akkuyu in southern Turkey. This will be the first step towards Turkey's ultimate ambition of having its own nuclear weapons. Erdoğan has long said it is unfair that several nations with nuclear warheads dictate the rest of the rules of the game. Quote: “Several countries have missiles with nuclear warheads, not one or two. But they tell us that we can’t have them. This I cannot accept.” It is almost certain that sooner or later Turkey will attempt to possess nuclear weapons.
Empty Vault
Turkey's goal is to become a military, technological, and economic power with global reach. However, the superpower plans need stable financing and the Turkish economy is... in a dire condition. The exchange rate of the Turkish lira has been breaking negative records for a long time. In an attempt to keep its currency afloat, the government lost almost half of the foreign exchange reserves it had at the beginning of 2020 and the largest banks are on the verge of insolvency.
This is a big problem for Erdoğan and the entire AKP party. 2023 is supposed to be a grand year for Turkey. This is the centenary of Turkish independence, there is to be a round of parliamentary elections where the AKP hopes for a smooth victory, and these were to be achieved by the fulfillment of the goals first presented in 2013 as the Vision 2023 plan. The vision, however, turned out slightly different from reality. The plan assumed an increase in annual exports to $500 billion, but this will ultimately amount to a maximum of half of that. The unemployment rate was to drop from 11% to 5% in 2023, but the figure for 2021 is 12.9%. GDP per capita was expected to increase from $12,500 to $25,000 in 2023, however, it is currently even lower at around $10,000 per capita and here the decline in the value of the lira against the dollar is of importance. However, GDP per capita measured by the purchasing power parity has increased, but these values are not close to those predicted by the AKP. Ultimately, the party promised that the Turkish economy would be in the top 10 economies in the world, with top-class domestic industry and a domestic GDP of $2.6 trillion. And while the Turks have achieved independence in many sectors, the GDP plan has been a disastrous failure. Turkey's nominal GDP fell from $950 billion in 2013 to $761 billion in 2019.
Erdoğan's bold plans had to be well-financed, and in this area, the AKP miscalculated heavily and exposed the country to an economic crisis. This means that the parliamentary elections in 2023 will be a real test for Erdoğan's party. Until recently, the AKP enjoyed over 50% of support, but now polls show that the CHP, a secularist party founded by Ataturk, is getting closer to the AKP. Until the elections, economic survival will be a priority for the current government.
This makes it possible to explain Ankara's recent diplomatic changes. Turkey, fearing EU sanctions, is open to resuming talks with Greece regarding demarcation lines in the Mediterranean Sea in connection with drilling. Likewise, Erdoğan changed his tone towards France, although at one point he called Emmanuel Macron a thug. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has expressed its willingness to talk about a dispute of interest over issues relating to Syria, Libya, and the Eastern Mediterranean in general. Turkey will also initiate similar moves towards Egypt and the United States. Erdoğan is aware of the internal problems caused by the financial crisis and is trying to soften the international image of Turkey, at least until re-election in 2023.
However, even with political, strategic, and financial constraints, it is likely that Turkey's aspirations for greater global influence will persist. Despite his controversial rule, Erdoğan has had an indelible influence on how many Turks see the future of their country. Erdoğan's revisionism of the worldview, that is, Turkey as a rising global power, echoes strongly among citizens across the country's political spectrum. Although foreign analysts and policymakers do not yet classify Turkey as one of today's "great powers," Turkish political leaders and policymakers have no doubts about ranking their country's long-term potential as an independent center of power that has a decisive say in the Middle East and perhaps even beyond. There is no doubt that Turkey is on the way to increasing its importance in the international arena, but this path will not be easy and will lead to many disputes or even to isolation of the country. Nevertheless, it is certain that Ankara will want to independently decide its fate.
