- Karol Wasilewski
Turkey Votes. Erdogan’s Last Dance?
Turkey occupies a unique place in the world, so its ambitions should be high.
This is a view shared by almost all Turks, including policymakers, regardless of the side of the political barricade. However, the strategy for realising the potential that comes with Turkey's location and the resources available is different for each faction. It is this vision of the future that Turks will be choosing in just a few days' time.
Will the elections end the 20-year rule of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the AKP party? Who is Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and what will a potential change of power in Ankara mean for the international community? Why are the Turkish elections being referred to as 'the most important elections of the year'? In this episode, we look at the future of Turkey.
Five-year campaign
Although the election campaign officially began just over a month ago, in a sense, it has been running continuously since the last elections, which took place in June 2018. Since then, Turks have been almost constantly anticipating the next snap elections, announced time and again in press leaks from the 'Ankara political halls'. Turkey's bad situation heightened expectations. To illustrate it, it suffices to look at two pieces of the state.
Firstly, the economy. Since 2018, its condition has been defined primarily by two trends. First - the systematic decline in the value of the Turkish lira. Just before the 2018 elections, its exchange rate against the US dollar was 4.93, today it is four times higher at around 19.51. The economy was also being battered by rampant inflation, with a reading of nearly 190% at its peak in 2022, according to the independent ENAG centre.
The second area worth taking a closer look is foreign policy. As a result of Ankara's adventurous actions in the international arena, carried out particularly intensively after the 2016 coup, Turkey became an isolated state. It had bad relations with its Western allies - both the United States, which sanctioned it in 2020 for purchasing the S-400 air and missile defence system from Russia, and the European Union. Brussels threatened it with sanctions for, among other things, its provocative policies towards its members: Greece and Cyprus, but also for Turkey's 'migration blackmail' in February 2020, when its officials, said they would open the borders to refugees in order to force the EU to support their policy towards Syria. Turkey began to be treated as a 'foreign body' in NATO - it was pointed out as a state that was breaking up the Alliance's cohesion for internal political interests, the most recent manifestation of which was the blocking of Finland and Sweden's membership. This was supposed to be used by Erdoğan to show voters that he was the one dealing the cards even at such a high level. As a result, discussions - unimaginable only a decade ago - about whether Turkey should be expelled from NATO have entered the mainstream.
Turkey was also in conflict with the most important states in the Middle East, most notably Saudi Arabia, which initiated an informal economic boycott against it, and the United Arab Emirates, which sought an agreement on security matters with Greece, thus realising the nightmare of Turkish strategists. Increasingly, Turkey's prowess in international relations was to be demonstrated by its good relations and ad hoc agreements with Russia - a country with which it shared a vaunted 'multipolar international order' as the best possible architecture for international relations - and visionary projects, such as the 'Asia Anew Initiative’, which was to strengthen Turkey's position on the Asian continent. Still, its fruits are yet to be seen.
But, it would be wrong to say that Turkey has only failed in its foreign and security policy. Its successes include, above all, its intervention in Libya, where it changed the face of the civil war; its 'drone diplomacy' and support for Azerbaijan in the so-called 'Second Nagorno-Karabakh War'; or its balancing act between Ukraine and Russia, which resulted in the success of the Grain Deal. Problematic for Erdoğan and his party, however, was that while these triumphs enhanced the prestige of the state in international relations, they did not translate into the lives of Turkish citizens. The same could not be said of the failures - they all generated costs that ultimately reflected negatively on the livelihoods of citizens. In recent years, it has become increasingly clear to Turks that Tayyip Erdoğan's dream of power and strutting his stuff on the international stage comes at a cost.
Under these circumstances, two additional scourges that fell upon Turkey proved to be even more problematic. The first was the COVID-19 pandemic, although Turkish politicians, in line with their traditional instincts, also saw it as an opportunity rather than a threat. Its manifestation included 'coronadiplomacy', whereby Turkey tried to curry favour with countries in need by sending them masks and other sanitary measures. However, the relatively low economic aid packages showed that things were not going well in the state's finances. This impression was not even improved by ambitious visions in which government propaganda convinced citizens that Turkey would be the 'new China' in a post-pandemic world due to changes in global supply chains. Later, these promises evolved into Turkey as the 'Germany of the East'. Although some Turks still believed in these visions, the resignation of Berat Albayrak, Erdoğan's son-in-law, from the post of Treasury and Finance Minister in November 2020 indicated that the pool of optimists was steadily shrinking.
The second scourge was the massive earthquake that struck Turkey and Syria in February this year, killing more than 50,000 Turks and another 8,500 Syrians, according to official figures. The natural disaster became a huge political problem for Erdoğan. It bore a striking resemblance to the situation in 1999 when Turkey was hit by an earthquake that killed some 18,000 people, while those in power were preoccupied with political disputes rather than preparing the state for the disaster to which it is constantly exposed being located in such a seismically active area. Incidentally, they were criticised by Erdoğan at the time.
The 2023 earthquake and its effects have raised questions about the rationality of spending in the state - the scale of these doubts is best illustrated by the fact that in 2022 Turkey spent more on defending the value of the Turkish lira than on adapting the state's infrastructure to the expected natural disaster. Overall, according to many Turks, the state's response to the disaster was late, and sluggish and thus undermined confidence in Erdoğan's basic argument for a presidential system. After all, it was supposed to be a guarantor of the smooth running of the state, subordinated to a strong decision-making centre. In the meantime, it turned out that the presidential system - with its inherent drive to centralise all processes - negatively translated into the state's agility and ability to respond in a crisis situation.
All this has caused a number of Tukrish people to start asking dangerous questions from the point of view of the president and his political party. What do we get out of the dream of greatness in foreign policy if the state cannot take care of the basic thing, which is the health and safety of its own citizens? Why waste resources on foreign military operations or space programmes if we are unable to mitigate the negative effects of more serious - and costly - threats closer to us? How can the state claim to be powerful when it cannot enforce building regulations against developers and often even publicly boasts about the amnesties granted to them?
It was these questions that conditioned the campaign ahead of this year's parliamentary and presidential elections.
"Spring will come again"
When the leaders of the six parties that form the core of the Turkish opposition announced on 6 March that Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu would be its candidate in the presidential race, the atmosphere in the staff was grave. The faces of all the opposition leaders - led by Meral Akşener, head of the nationalist Good Party - made Kılıçdaroğlu's presentation look more like the fulfilment of an unpleasant duty, rather than a demonstration of the confidence of the political forces with the best chance of taking power in the last two decades. This sentiment should not be overly surprising. Indeed, polls over the past month or so have consistently shown that Kılıçdaroğlu has the least chance of any of the potential opposition candidates in the race against Erdoğan. Mansur Yavaş, the mayor of Ankara, Ekrem İmamoğlu, the mayor of Istanbul, or Meral Akşener all had ratings that made it safe to assume that they would emerge victorious from a clash with Erdoğan. Kılıçdaroğlu, on the other hand, has consistently looked like a dream counter-candidate for the Turkish president for a long time - not only underperforming in the polls, but also without a charismatic personality that could electrify the crowds. Under the circumstances, one can assume that the announcement on 6 March was greeted with a sigh of relief at the presidential palace.
This assumption is all the safer because Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu is a 'tame rival' for the Turkish president. As a former civil servant and, since 2010, leader of the Republican People's Party, he has become known as a matter-of-fact bureaucrat, but certainly not as a dangerous political fighter. During his time as CHP leader, Kılıçdaroğlu lost every possible election. This is another reason why the Turkish president long regarded him as a harmless rival. Not even the 2019 local elections, in which the opposition 'took back' Istanbul and Ankara from the hands of the Justice and Development Party, changed this. These were painful moments for Erdoğan himself - after all, he held the office of mayor of Istanbul in the 1990s. In addition, there is a strong belief in Turkish politics that whoever wins in the former Ottoman capital later takes over the whole of Turkey. Nevertheless, they did not gain the political respect of Kılıçdaroğlu, who stood in the shadows and supported İmamoğlu and Yavaş.
There is every reason why Kılıçdaroğlu may have appeared to Erdoğan as an ideal rival. The opposition leader's lack of charisma, and his inability to excite voters seemed perfectly suited to the Turkish president's campaign plans. These included striking, somewhat familiar, yet refreshed tones. The AKP and Erdoğan proclaimed that a 'Turkish centenary' was coming, with the president showing off projects to prove it: a Turkish electric car, a Turkish tank, a Turkish fighter jet or a warship dubbed by the Turks as a light aircraft carrier, portrayed by government supporting media as a unique ship from which the crown jewels of the Turkish defence industry - drones - would take off. An ideal situation for which Kılıçdaroğlu will certainly not be able to find a counterbalance, And another reason to justify a sigh of relief in the presidential palace.
So why did the opposition decide to elect Kılıçdaroğlu? After hearing this description, it may sound like a suicide option for the opposition. How did it come to pass that, in light of the polls, Kılıçdaroğlu is likely to win against Erdoğan, according to some even in the first round?
Analyses of Kılıçdaroğlu's candidacy have forgotten one very important asset - that he is a politician capable of building uneasy coalitions. This was indicated by the - perhaps not very spectacular in terms of image, but ultimately very important politically campaign. Decade-long efforts to turn the CHP, a party perceived by some conservative voters as downright anti-religious and therefore unelectable, into a grouping more open to traditional views. This was also demonstrated by attempts to unite the opposition, carried out under extremely difficult conditions that included combining support from the nationalist Good Party with ad hoc support from the pro-Kurdish Democratic People's Party. The fact that Kılıçdaroğlu prefers to be a politician who builds rather than divides also began to be indicated by his presidential campaign. The slogan 'spring will come again', which includes a promise to get Turkey back on track, was soon joined by proclamations to the Kurds and a landmark declaration in which the opposition leader admitted that he was an Alevite, a member of a religious minority, treated by many more conservative Turks as renegades or even traitors. Kılıçdaroğlu's statements were intended to communicate to voters his basic proposition - to build a new community that draws strength from its diversity rather than fearing it. In response to the politics of polarisation and division that saw Erdoğan win every election after 2013, Kılıçdaroğlu, therefore, proposed the 'politics of love' that brought the opposition success in the 2019 local elections. In doing so, Kılıçdaroğlu exposed his core asset - which consisted of being the total opposite of Erdoğan.
The most important election of the year
Kılıçdaroğlu's difference from Erdoğan also contains a partial answer to the question of why various experts or media outlets - including Politico or The Economist - are calling the Turkish elections the most important of the year. This is because they expect that the opposition victory will mark Turkey's return to democracy, which will have wider implications for the world. Some observers hope that Erdoğan's downfall will mark the end of the careers of other populist politicians, such as Viktor Orban, and - as if by magic - end the phase of polarising politics. It would also supposedly strengthen the 'democratic camp' in its confrontation against authoritarian powers such as Russia and China.
While the stories about the magical global impact of possible Turkish democratisation can rather be put between fairy tales, the outcome of the parliamentary and presidential elections in Turkey will certainly have an impact on international reality. On fundamental issues, there is a consensus in Turkey. These include, for example, the belief that Turkey is a country with exceptional potential which, due to its unique geographical location, is predestined to play an important role in international relations. You can hear more about this in our material describing 'Neo-Ottomanism’ in Turkish politics.
However, the way this potential is utilised is what differentiates the two camps. Therefore, two visions of how to practise foreign policy will collide in the current elections.
Erdoğan's victory will almost certainly mean a continuation of the current course, which includes, among other things, a gradual disengagement with the West, rapprochement with authoritarian states, attempts to build a position in Central Asia and Africa, or praise for a multipolar international order, including the hope for less importance of the United States in the global security architecture. Kılıçdaroğlu's victory, on the other hand, will represent an opportunity for a new opening with Western allies, a more predictable and less provocative foreign policy towards neighbours, a less ideological approach towards partners such as Russia and China or, as the well-known slogan of Turkish diplomatic history goes, 'less adventurous foreign policy'. This does not mean that Kılıçdaroğlu's Turkey will be an easy partner or, as the Western media like to put it, a "good ally". Even after Erdoğan's eventual departure, the Republic of Turkey will still be a state deeply convinced of its great importance and firmly pursuing its own interests. At the same time, however, it will be more likely to abandon the 'megaphone diplomacy' idolised by the Turkish president, open to using traditional diplomatic methods and the arguments of its allies. Already, such a relatively small amount could result in Turkey's Western partners gaining the chance to arrange relations with Turkey anew.
However, this 'window of opportunity' may prove to be extremely short. The Turkish opposition is clarifying that its approach to its allies will not be submissive. It has indicated that it wants to resume accession negotiations with the European Union, whose informal death Turkey's European partners have somewhat accepted. It will also expect more help in solving the migration problem beyond the derogatory migration agreement. Looking at the future of Turkey's relations with its Western allies from this perspective, one can see that it depends on familiar factors: on the one hand, Turkey's expectations and willingness to verify them through negotiations, and on the other hand, the willingness of Western partners to understand the Turkish perspective and formulate a mutually beneficial offer of cooperation.
Election scenarios
So how might the forthcoming elections end and which way will post-election Turkey head?
The most likely scenario is an election catch-up between Erdoğan and Kılıçdaroğlu. If this scenario materialises, the two weeks between rounds will be very tense, and Erdoğan will use all resources to guarantee his victory. Nevertheless, his situation could be particularly difficult if the opposition wins the parliamentary elections. This may inspire Turks to believe that a second-round victory for Kılıçdaroğlu is possible. The votes of the Kurds and Generation Z will be particularly important.
Less likely is Erdoğan’s straight victory in the first round. But, there is a risk that polls underestimate him and voters may be convinced of his inevitable victory. Erdoğan may be aided by the difficulty of voters in earthquake-affected areas casting their ballots.
It was even harder to imagine a situation in which Kilicdaroglu wins in the first round. But the last-minute withdrawal of CHP politician Muharrem İnce from the presidential race makes this possibility more likely than before.
It is difficult to assess the likelihood of these scenarios due to problems with the objectivity of Turkish polls and issues of election integrity. For example, transparency is a big concern when pollsters do not disclose the methodology of their surveys and, in addition, are very often even involved in the political struggle.
Moreover, it has long been difficult to speak of Turkish elections as ones in which candidates have a level playing field - not least because of the huge advantage that the centre of power has in access to the subordinate media, or in relation to the financial resources to which it has access.
Doubts about the integrity of the electoral process itself, meanwhile, are linked to events during the 2017 constitutional referendum and the 2018 parliamentary and presidential elections. In 2017 the Supreme Electoral Council, already after the polling stations had closed, declared ballot papers that had not been stamped by it beforehand to be valid. In contrast, normally, they should have been declared invalid. This was explained later as respect for democracy and the voters, yet was a huge controversy because, according to the opposition, the number of these unstamped ballots exceeded the difference between the 'yes' and 'no' votes in the constitutional referendum at stake to accept or reject the presidential system. In 2018, observers' doubts were particularly raised by the vote in Turkey's south-east and, as it turned out, the unexpectedly good result of the nationalist coalition partner of the AKP. Therefore, some commentators argue that there is no point in getting excited about the May elections, as the outcome is predetermined anyway.
Other commentators argue that ceding power to the opposition would be less risky for Erdoğan than a political rebellion. Erdoğan realises that firstly: the opposition will not choose to bring him to justice. Second: differences within the opposition could lead to the rapid collapse of their rule. And thirdly, Erdoğan will still be the leader of the largest opposition party and will be hoping for a quick return to power. While there is a fair pinch of reason in these theories, it is not easy to imagine Erdoğan accepting such political degradation.
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Are we really watching Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's 'last dance'? If so, will it be a dance of victory or defeat? We will find out soon enough, but the real test of the old or new rulers will take place in the months and years to come, and we'll be here to watch.
