- Hubert Walas
In a Gallup poll published this year, only 28% of respondents said they were satisfied with the way US democracy works. In a Pew Research survey, 72% of respondents agreed with the statement that the US used to be a good example for other countries, but no longer is. 81% of those surveyed by the Institute of Politics and Public Service believe that democracy in the United States is under threat.
Now this American democracy must make a choice: who will lead it for the next four years. This comes at a time of massive turmoil in different parts of the world, as well as internal unrest - a huge polarisation that seems to be a huge problem for the world's greatest superpower.
Donald Trump or Kamala Harris? How will the swing states vote? Pennsylvania, Michigan or Nevada?
The upcoming US elections will determine not only who will sit in the Oval Office for the next four years, but also what immigration policy will look like, who will get tax breaks, whether the US will continue to support Ukraine and how it will behave in the face of China's growing power. Meanwhile, American voters, while seemingly mobilised to vote, are increasingly disillusioned with their own democracy. How do we explain this contradiction, and what might be its political consequences? And why haven't Americans come up with better presidential candidates?
The negative Gallup or Pew polls mentioned in the introduction can be contrasted with the positive phenomenon of rising voter turnout. In 2020, more than 66% of eligible voters participated in the presidential election, a historic record. The 2018 and 2022 midterm elections (held in the middle of a presidential term) also had above-average turnout. So why are Americans voting but not enjoying it?
The roots of American disillusionment go deeper than just the political system. Other surveys show that Americans today do not trust the government or the media, have an increasingly negative view of capitalism and are pessimistic about the direction of their country. If we look at multi-year trends, we see that while the mood of the US public has fluctuated, there has been an unprecedented deterioration over the past two decades. We can even pinpoint when this process began: at the end of George Bush's second term.
First, the failure of military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq began to sink in with the American people. The myth of the omnipotent superpower that was supposed to carry the entire world order on its shoulders after the end of the Cold War was sputtering. Prolonged and costly military operations in distant parts of the world, reports of human rights abuses by American soldiers, and the lack of prospects for an end to these conflicts were shaking the dogmas of American foreign policy.
Secondly, it was at this time that the financial crisis was gaining momentum. It was in its wake that the truth about the economic situation in the USA became fully apparent. A country that was admittedly sustaining economic growth and multiplying its wealth faster than ever before, but was allowing the fruits of this success to be consumed only by the few. Over the past four decades, the wages of the richest 1% of Americans have risen by as much as 138%, while for the poorer 90% this increase has only been 15%. Taking inflation into account, they therefore earn less in real terms than they used to. Well-paid industrial jobs have been replaced by much less stable and lucrative jobs in the service sector. During the crisis, the US government saved major banks and companies from collapse, but ordinary citizens lost their homes and savings.
Thirdly, this is when the social media revolution begins, permanently changing the country's media landscape. Within a few months in late 2006 and early 2007, Twitter was launched, Facebook was made available to a wider audience and the first iPhone hit the shops.
This chain of events leads to a questioning of faith in American power and the strength of the existing economic model. And, in turn, is undermining confidence in media and political elites who have argued for years that the US is capable of intervening effectively in Afghanistan or Iraq, and that there is no alternative to US capitalism. These phenomena are compounded by the popularity of social media.
In most democratic countries, such deep voter disaffection with the political, economic and media system would lead to the emergence of a new force on the political scene. Under American conditions, however, this is impossible. Since the second half of the 19th century, Washington has been dominated by two parties: the Democrats and the Republicans. Their position is cemented by an electoral system in which the winner takes all, the enormous costs of political campaigning and the size of the country, which necessitates extensive structures in the individual states.
Therefore, transformations can only take place within American parties. And while their names do not change, their political agenda and electorate do change. For example, as recently as the mid-twentieth century, the Democrats were the party representing the conservative and not infrequently racist electorate from the south of the United States. But as the Democrats became involved in the civil rights movement and support for social change in the late 1960s, the Republicans gained the opportunity to win the votes of those who did not like these changes, whom Richard Nixon called the ‘silent majority’. This ‘shift’ of the electorate only strengthened the liberal tendencies in the Democratic party and the conservative tendencies in the Republican party.
Around 2008, the situation began to ripen for another shift. The first signs were the successes of the Tea Party or the popularity of the Occupy Wall Street protests, but on a party level this only became fully apparent during the 2016 primaries. On the Republican side, Donald Trump, who disregards every rule of American campaigning, won. On the Democratic side, the self-proclaimed socialist Bernie Sanders nearly won the nomination.
Trump's success began a process of rapid change within the Republican party. Although his victory was initially considered a temporary anomaly, it soon became clear that Trumpism would outlast Trump himself. For a simple reason: his win showed the Republicans the possibility of winning over a new electorate. Among disillusioned residents of the Rust Belt. Among conservative voters of Hispanic origin. Among young men, regardless of race. Among those who disliked US interventionism and would expect a more restrained foreign policy. Those who have lost trust in the US media and would sooner believe a conspiracy theory than the information on a TV. Who can no longer stand another politician spouting the same sentences prepared by PR specialists, over and over again. Those who are disappointed with the direction in which the United States has gone, and would like America to be great again.
Trump's victory, however, has not only set the stage for change in the Republican party, but has also made a similar process significantly more difficult in the rival Democratic party. Yet in 2016, Sanders' proposal proved too radical for Democratic voters. As a result, the primary was won by Hillary Clinton, and the continuation of this story is well known to all. Four years later, the main objective of the Democrats was not so much to set a new direction, but to defeat Donald Trump. That is why Biden won, whom the voters supported not because he offered a fresh new political agenda, but because his decades of political experience suggested that he knew how to bring America back to the pre-Trump era.
But Biden's presidency has left the Democrats at a crossroads. Those expecting the progressive changes once promised by Bernie Sanders may be disappointed. Those who would have preferred the party to remain more centrist are still uncertain about its future. Moreover, events such as the immigration crisis, which has been growing for several years, or the latest iteration of the Gaza conflict have made Democrats much more cautious about progressive policies today than they were in 2020.
It also seemed that 2024 would not bring much change to the party. Joe Biden, convinced that he was the only one capable of competing with Trump, decided to run for the highest office again, effectively discouraging other major candidates from entering the Democratic primary. And were it not for his disastrous performance in the June televised debate, it is likely that Biden would be the one representing the Democrats in the presidential election today. The need to replace a candidate a few weeks before the election gave an unexpected opportunity to Vice President Kamala Harris, who might have found it difficult to win the nomination had she had to face other candidates from her own party.
But what worked in her favour was a wave of enthusiasm among Democratic voters and donors, who had been worried for several weeks about the prospect of Joe Biden's defeat and now finally had a candidate who could fight for victory.
The example of the Democratic Party illustrates the important role of presidential primaries in the process of intra-party change. They are designed to democratise the process of selecting candidates. Since voters can only choose between a Democrat and a Republican (since thirds parties and independent candidates do not play a significant role), they should at least have the chance to pick these two from the wider group. In practice, however, it is the most committed voters of both parties, those with an above-average interest in politics and often with more radical views than the rest, who turn out to vote in the primaries.
As recently as April this year, around a third of Trump's potential voters said they were most likely to see other candidates on both sides in this election. Many Republican voters complained about the way Trump was running for president and were concerned about his statements about not accepting the outcome of the election. However, Trump quickly dominated the competition in the primaries and won easily. As a result, he is likely to win the votes of those who only a few months ago said they would have preferred another candidate. That is, if Trump can mobilise them.
Presidential campaigns in the United States are increasingly based on mobilising voters who are ready to vote for one candidate or the other, rather than convincing the unconvinced. The latter are estimated to number around 4%.
The apocalyptic mobilisation is working, as the turnout at the latest election show, but at the same time it is deepening the radicalisation of American politics. Voters say that their vote will be influenced primarily by economic issues, the immigration crisis or abortion rights, but in the end they will still go to the polls to save America from “the others”. Without necessarily being happy with who they are voting for.
So the process of transforming American politics may take a few more years. Even if Donald Trump wins in November, someone else will have to replace him in four years' time. Will it be J.D. Vance, who is currently his running mate? Not only does J.D. seem to understand what the policies of the new Republican Party should be, but he also has the support of key people around Trump: his son Don Jr, the influential media person Tucker Carlson, Peter Thiel or Elon Musk himself. Vance represents an undercurrent called the New Right, which brings together conservative intellectuals who want to give direction to the changes that Trump started in 2016.
For the Democrats, the change after 2024 will be more serious because whatever the outcome of the election, Joe Biden's presidency will end. Kamala Harris represents a younger generation of politicians (although she just turned 60) and a few years ago represented the more progressive wing of the party. Today, she is backing away from many of the statements she made then, or avoiding issues that could hurt her in the campaign. If she wins, she will have the chance to steer the party in a new direction. But it is her loss that could force an acceleration of the changes frozen by Biden's victory in 2020.
From the point of view of the rest of the world, the US election dilemmas are of enormous importance. Kamala Harris promises to continue Biden's foreign policy, but lacks his experience. She may also be constrained in some respects by Congress. At the same time as the presidential election, the House of Representatives and a third of the Senate are up for election. In the case of the Senate, the Republicans are likely to take control of the chamber. The Democrats have had a minimal advantage so far, but Joe Manchin of West Virginia, a state where Donald Trump won almost 70% of the vote in the last election, is not seeking re-election. In contrast, Jon Tester, a Democratic senator from Montana, may lose his bid for re-election. If the Republicans take control of the Senate, a potential Democratic administration will face difficulties in nomination policy - the upper house of Congress approves nominations for most key government positions, as well as ambassadors. It is also up to Congress to decide on budgetary issues. This could be crucial, for example, for further aid to Ukraine.
But an even bigger challenge for Ukraine's future could be Donald Trump's victory. Neither he nor his entourage have made any secret of the fact that his aim is to freeze the conflict in Ukraine as soon as possible and try to start peace talks. Even at the expense of forcing Kyiv to make certain concessions. J.D. Vance has explicitly suggested that Ukraine should give up its desire to join NATO. However, it is not clear whether Trump would succeed in this plan. This is because the plan is assuming that Ukraine will remain an independent state from Russia, albeit on a reduced territory. Such conditions are unlikely to be accepted by Vladimir Putin, who, even before the full-scale invasion began, indicated that Russia's goal was the subjugation of Ukraine (covered under the terms demilitarisation and denazification). The Russians, who are advancing slowly at the cost of huge losses, will not be willing to accept any scenario other than the capitulation of the Ukrainian side. The question then arises as to what the Trump administration would do if the plan for peace talks fails. Would Trump, as some of those around him have speculated, decide to dramatically increase pressure on Russia? Would he be able to do so if isolationist politicians in the House of Representatives opposed him?
It is the issue of Ukraine that most sharply divides the two candidates on foreign policy. Instead, Trump and Harris agree on support for Israel (although Harris places more emphasis on the issue of human rights in Gaza) and the need to respond to the threat from China and the need to prevent Beijing from invading Taiwan - although Trump takes a more hawkish stance here, proposing 60% tariffs on all products imported from China. In addition, Trump is proposing 10 or 20 per cent tariffs on all other products imported into the US, which could not only lead to higher prices in the US, but also hurt US exports if other countries impose their own tariffs in retaliation.
Kamala Harris has a slight lead in national polls. However, it is important to remember that in the US system, the electoral vote is decisive, and although the Democratic candidate beat Trump twice in the popular vote, he still became president in 2016. In most cases, the candidate who wins a state wins all of its electoral votes. And only in a handful of states is Harris's or Trump's lead so small that it is impossible to predict in advance who will win. It is in these swing states that the presidential campaign is taking place. The candidates have focused almost all their attention on Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan, North Carolina, Georgia, Arizona and Nevada. And since the final outcome in these states could be decided by a few or tens of thousands of votes, we can probably expect attempts to challenge the outcome, as we saw in 2020. The greatest danger for the United States, therefore, is a scenario in which one side does not believe that the other's candidate could have won because of mistrust of the government and the media and doubts about the proper functioning of democratic processes.
We will find out very soon whether this adverse scenario will indeed materialise.
