- Hubert Walas
Anglo-Saxon alliance.
Sometimes it is only in retrospect that we can notice the significance of certain events. At first glance, the new alliance between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia seems to make little difference. However, for Australia in particular, the new pact is of significant importance and may even be noted in the history books. AUKUS brings vital changes to the Indo-Pacific’s security architecture and Canberra itself may thus have made a strategic choice to be measured in decades.
United Against China
On September 15, the leaders of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia announced the formation of a new trilateral pact between their countries. AUKUS, the name of the new agreement, will focus on areas such as artificial intelligence, cooperation in cyberspace, and quantum technologies, in addition to, and perhaps most importantly, it will have a focus on underwater warfare.
Although not explicitly articulated - it is clear that the pact's goal is to contain China's rise in the Indo-Pacific region. UK Defence Secretary Ben Wallace told the BBC that China is currently conducting "one of the biggest military build-up campaigns in world history.” In addition to saying that, “the Chinese are expanding their navy and air force at an alarming rate and this is affecting regional security. Our partners in the Indo-Pacific want to be able to defend their position." China, of course, condemned the agreement, saying it undermines serious regional peace and exacerbates the ongoing arms race.
However, AUKUS has generated the most turmoil in Canberra, as the pact is critical to Australia's strategic posture. It will allow Australians to build nuclear-powered submarines based on American technology. This will make Australia the 7th country in the world to use this technology, after: USA, UK, France, China, India and Russia. The US is sharing top-secret submarine technology for the first time in 50 years. That's one of the reasons why some say it's the most important agreement between Washington, London, and Canberra since World War II.
The first victim of the new deal was France which lost its own contract to supply Australia with 12 conventionally powered submarines. The contract, concluded in 2016, is currently valued at $66 million. French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian described the breakup of the contract as, "a stab in the back.” In revenge Paris decided to summon its ambassadors from Washington and Canberra “for consultations.” Moreover, France and the European Union could find it a bit embarrassing that they were not privy to the emerging agreement as AUKUS was announced the day before the EU revealed its own new Indo-Pacific strategy.
The Anglo-Saxons Strike Back
One might ask what all the fuss is about? After all, the signatories to AUKUS maintain a close relationship and have long had deep cultural, economic, and strategic ties that date back to the British Empire. Yet AUKUS is a crucial event, perhaps even a historic moment.
Alliances are not equal and their importance is not indicated by the number of members or the number of high-level ministerial conferences. Their strength is evidenced by the willingness and ability of individual member states to deliver on the alliance, particularly in bad times. AUKUS is the answer to the challenge posed to Anglo-Saxon hegemony by China.
Canberra has been a firm ally of Washington for years. It took part in, from its point of view, senseless conflicts in the Middle East in order to make itself credible as a loyal partner of the USA. All so that the Americans would take Australia's interests into account in their geopolitical calculations. But the last decade has brought more questions about this cooperation. Australia's trade cooperation with Asian countries, particularly China, has grown stronger every year. All the major trade routes from Canberra's perspective led north towards the ports of Shanghai, Hong Kong, Busan, and Tokyo.
Meanwhile, in terms of security strategy, it tied its fate to a superpower outside the region and thousands of kilometers away. In 2016, when Canberra made its deal with Paris, the world looked different. China was a huge customer of Australian raw materials, and Chinese students were flooding Australian universities. Australians were allied with the Americans, but they were not obliged to acquire American technology.
Over time, however, that honeymoon came to an end. The "sitting on the fence" policy, that is, maintaining as good a relationship with China as with the United States, became unworkable. The ties between Australia and China began to deteriorate with each passing month. Since 2019, Australia has lost about $20 billion dollars to the trade war with China. In the past year alone, the two countries have filed complaints against each other with the World Trade Organization and high-level diplomatic relations have been frozen. China has imposed tariffs on key Australian exports hitting Australia's economy. When the Americans got serious about the China issue a decade ago, the Australians long refused to clearly declare themselves on either side. Now AUKUS is de facto choosing a side - the American side.
The decision of going with American military technology makes this clear. Purchase of strategic weapons must be correlated with a common interest with its supplier. In the case of a potential conflict in the Indo-Pacific region, where Australia and China would likely stand in opposing camps, this is most apparent. Australia does not have the capacity to confront China alone. While the Americans still maintain a strong will to defend their hegemonic status in the Indo-Pacific. France, on the other hand, has limited influence in the area and most certainly has no interest or ability to engage in a full-scale conflict against China. In such a case even the supply of equipment and replenishment for Australian submarines could be regarded by Beijing as a hostile act that Paris wouldn’t want to violate. Thus effectively forcibly keeping Australian submarines docked.
The choice of submarine technology to be possessed by Australia speaks volumes about its strategic direction. In 2016, the choice of French ships was more about modernizing the fleet than it was about preparing for a potential war. However, the last five years have changed much in the perception of Australian strategists. A kinetic conflict is by no means likely, but any serious state should prepare for the worst possible scenario. The decision to purchase specific military technology is usually the culmination of a national defense strategy that answers the question of what kind of war a country should prepare its armed forces for. In Australia, this discussion has been about whether to go along with the Americans into a fierce confrontation with China, or, to move in the direction of autonomous defense, but without being tied to U.S. strategic choices.
France was to supply state-of-the-art submarines powered by a hybrid diesel-electric engine. Based on the Barracuda-class submarine. These boats would be great for patrolling the Australian coastline, but further expeditions would be impossible due to the relatively frequent need for replenishment. The choice of conventional propulsion in 2016 was a signal to Beijing that Canberra just wants to secure its own space. Interestingly, the French Barracuda ships were originally fitted with nuclear propulsion. But for Canberra, the propulsion system was specifically changed to a conventional one, which in turn caused a lot of construction problems.
Nuclear-powered vessels are definitely a different story. They can stay underwater almost all the time, and in practice the only limitations are the weapons stockpile and food supply for the crew. This technology will allow Australian ships to reach the second and first island chains and enable them to participate in a potential blockade of China in straits such as Malacca or Sunda. Even in the event of peace, the new ships will allow the Royal Australian Navy to collect data in the South and East China Seas, patrol sea lanes, and carry out sea denial missions. Incidentally, China's submarine warfare and detection capabilities are significantly inferior to those of the United States. Therefore, the strengthening of Australia in this field is no accident, the US wants to dominate the Chinese under water.
The decision to buy nuclear-powered ships, which by definition are much more expensive, also means that Australia will buy fewer of them. Initially, probably only 8 units. However, the 12 ships supplied by France would still not be sufficient for an independent deterrent capability. It would be necessary to have at least two or three times as many ships. In contrast, the 8 vessels based on U.S. technology would not constitute a stand-alone deterrent force, but would be an integral part of U.S. power projection in the Indo-Pacific. Canberra's strategic choice is therefore to build the Royal Australian Navy as a complementary part of the US Navy. The Australian policymakers do not want to defend the vast continent autonomously, but as part of a grand American strategy of containing or even rolling back the Chinese. The ships are to be built at the Adelaide-based Osborne Naval Shipyard. It is highly likely that the Australian ships will be built based on either the U.S. Virginia-class or the British Astute-class ships.
All this makes AUKUS an expression of the will on the part of Australian decision-makers to take up a much more responsible and assertive role in the Indo-Pacific region by Australia where Canberra, in practice, adopts the American strategy for the Indo-Pacific. Thus most likely, as a result, finds itself at the "Point of No Return" - that is a situation in which one should continue the given strategic course at any cost because reversal is no longer possible. Therefore, from the perspective of Australians, this is a historic moment that evokes great disturbance and even anxiety. After all Australia is a society where 6% or 1.2 million people declare having Chinese roots.
Nuclear Divide
Added to all this is the status of nuclear technology in Australia. The state is a party to the Rarotonga Treaty, which establishes a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific. Canberra has also introduced the anti-nuclear law of 1999 which prohibits certain nuclear actions unless a federal approval is obtained. Additional nuclear industrial prohibitions exist under state legislation in South Australia and Victoria. That’s why Australia has no civilian nuclear power infrastructure beyond a 20-megawatt thermal research reactor at Lucas Heights.
By contrast, all U.S. Navy and Royal Navy ships use highly enriched uranium, unlike other navies with nuclear-powered submarines as those use much less enriched elements. This means that the fuel used in the Royal Australian Navy's new ships could potentially allow the creation of nuclear weapons. Plus Australia holds about 30% of the world's uranium reserves. Australian politicians, including Prime Minister Scott Morrison, have quashed this speculation, saying Canberra has no nuclear ambitions, but this fact alone creates a new variable in Beijing's calculations.
Nevertheless, the issue of nuclear technology is highly divisive in Australia. Autonomous production of nuclear submarines would require construction of military reactors on Australian soil, making these locations and host ports potential targets for nuclear attacks by the PRC military. This plus the fierce anti-nuclear movement in Australia means that most probably there will be no reactors. Instead, the reactor modules will be shipped to Australia in sealed packages from the US or UK and will later be installed on ships directly impacting RAN’s self-reliance.
Australia’s neighborhood is also concerned. New Zealand, despite being a member of the Five Eyes Alliance along with Australia, has already announced that it will ban the presence of Australia's nuclear ships in its waters in line with its current doctrine.
Back to the French, needless to say, they feel betrayed by the whole situation. The issue adds fuel to the fire in Paris' narrative of the "death of NATO" and lack of cohesion among allies. These accusations directed at the Americans are not without reason. Washington has given a clear signal that Australia is a much more important ally for the White House than France. The drama reinforces the Elysée Palace's perception of the United States' strategic abandonment of Europe, so one can expect another attempt at consolidation around the concept of Europe's strategic autonomy. If the American presence in Europe becomes weaker and weaker, France will reiterate its constant geopolitical motive, i.e. inviting Russia to talks about balance of power on the old continent. Which will certainly be at the expense of Central and Eastern Europe.
The undisputed winner of AUKUS is the United States. The Americans finally managed to pull the geostrategically crucial Australia to their side, which came after many years of trying. China is also not without merit. Beijing’s assertive policy has helped the Americans pull in Australia into the U.S. embrace. Is AUKUS a 'point of no return' for Australia? The future will tell, but there are many indications that Canberra has cemented its geostrategic choice for decades. Now, Australians must hope that in a clash with a title contender it is the current champion who will prevail.
Sources:
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-58564837
https://www.reuters.com/world/australia-says-it-was-upfront-with-france-over-submarine-deal-crisis-continues-2021-09-19/
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/debate/aukus-and-australia-s-nuclear-submarines
https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/the-aukus-nuclear-submarine-deal-unanswered-questions-for-australia/
https://geopoliticalfutures.com/daily-memo-us-uk-australia-forge-new-security-pact/
https://geopoliticalfutures.com/rolling-in-the-deep-of-the-indo-pacific
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/27/world/australia/australia-china-relations.html
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/how-can-australia-reset-relations-china
https://strategyandfuture.org/australii-point-of-no-return/?fast_micro_pay_cache=112edd4f17c5f516aca2eaf44f8a1b5f#fmp-premium-content
https://geopoliticalfutures.com/why-australia-spurned-france/
