- Hubert Walas
Balkan troubles.
The Balkan cauldron is boiling again. Border barricades, military threats, and armies on high alert. Images of the wars of the 1990s immediately come to mind. In recent months, relations between Kosovo and Serbia have become heated again. So much so that Europe, still in shock at the events in Ukraine, has begun to fear the outbreak of another major military conflict. Is there such an eventuality? Let's take a look at what lies behind the recent tensions between Belgrade and Pristina and if there is a potential solution for them.
Balkan Troubles
The Balkan Peninsula - an area with an incredible historical legacy and otherworldly landscapes - blue water with mountain peaks rising from the sea bays. Virtually the entire peninsula is characterised by a mountainous terrain, which inevitably contributed over the past centuries or millennia to a mosaic of cultures, religions and nationalities. With the advent of the era of nation-states, this unique diversity of the Balkans' was to contribute to the start of a period of conflicts, wars, and disputes, which in some places continues to this day.
For years the Balkan region was characterised by little national consciousness. However, in the nineteenth century, with the ousting of the Ottoman Empire from these areas, which had previously controlled the peninsula for several hundred years, and the growth of ethnic awareness and local nationalisms, the situation became increasingly unstable. The Balkans plunged into uprisings, conflicts and wars, in effect receiving the infamous badge of the Balkan Troubles.
The 1990s brought another extremely bloody chapter of the last 200 years of Balkan unrest. For ten years, the north-western part of the peninsula was engulfed in the war on national, ethnic and religious grounds. Almost everyone turned against each other, and each side committed horrific crimes. Yet, although nothing is black and white about the Yugoslav wars, we must note that the bloodiest of these was the Bosnian War, which was triggered by an independence uprising by Bosniaks, mostly Muslims, against Yugoslavia, controlled by Orthodox Serbs. The civil war ensued included concentration camps in which, according to some estimates, up to 100,000 Bosniaks died. To this day, the Serbs more or less deny these figures. Still, the fact remains that the Serbian genocide in Bosnia was the first European war event to be formally classified as genocide since the military campaigns of Nazi Germany. Many of the key individuals from the former Yugoslavia who committed it were subsequently charged with war crimes and convicted, including Radovan Karadzić and Serbian General Ratko Mladic.
The threat of a similar purge was also looming for the Muslum people living in the south of Serbia - in Kosovo. Kosovars are ethnic Albanians and Muslims but inhabit an area considered core by Serbs because of the Orthodox religious sites there, among other things. After the slaughter of the Bosniaks, NATO countries feared a similar scenario during the war between the Serbs and Kosovo insurgents. When it was reported in January 1999 that 45 Kosovo Albanians had been killed during the Racak massacre, the NATO political command considered that the conflict could only be resolved by introducing a military peacekeeping force. The Alliance issued an ultimatum - which included Yugoslavia allowing 30,000 peacekeepers into Kosovo, an unlimited right of passage for NATO troops into Yugoslav territory and immunity for NATO and its agents from Yugoslav law. The whole thing formed the so-called Rambouillet Agreement. Belgrade, however, refused. NATO, despite the lack of full support from the UN Security Council due to the veto of Russia and China, decided to intervene militarily. And thus, air strikes began, targeting primarily objects of strategic value. More than two months of air raids and bombardment of, among others, the capital Belgrade, resulted in the withdrawal of Yugoslav troops from Kosovo and the entry of NATO forces into the region - known as KFOR or Kosovo Force, which are still there today. The NATO air raids left their mark on the Serbs and their perception of the international balance of power.
The Yugoslav wars essentially ended back in the previous millennium. But, for Kosovo, its finale was independence, which, after nine years of UN and EU supervision, Pristina achieved by seceding from Serbia in 2008. Since then, Kosovo's independence has been the subject of deep dispute, above all with Belgrade, which continues to recognise Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia.
This is even though the territories currently controlled by Pristina are fairly mono-ethnic. The population of 1.8m inhabitants is overwhelmingly made up of ethnic Albanians, i.e. 90%, with Serbs accounting for about 5% of the population. However, the northern part of the country is where ethnic Serbs dominate. And this is where we approach the bone of contention.
Belgrade's policy of not recognising Kosovo also translates on a local scale, where ethnic Serbs living in northern Kosovo do not recognise the authority of Kosovar institutions. One catalyst for these tensions is the dispute over car number plates. Pristina, in an attempt to consolidate its control over the problematic region, has called on the Serbian minority, who still use the old Yugoslav plates, to change them to new Kosovan plates. The issue has been dragging on for a long time, but Pristina's ultimatum has brought a new wave of tensions, protests and threats. Europe, shocked by the outbreak of war in the east, has begun to fear another conflict, this time in the south of the continent.
With this very general historical outline behind us, let us answer the question: are these fears justified? Is a Kosovo-Serbian war a realistic scenario? For the sake of reassurance, it should be noted at the outset that no - it is improbable, but let’s look at the whole puzzle a little closer.
Sitting on three stools
The decade of Yugoslav wars is still firmly embedded in the memories of the people of the region. It is no different for Serbs, and the emotions that often accompany these memories are regret and anger at the West for bombing the country, especially it's capital. It is also an injustice that the Serbs see in the assistance of the Western powers that deprived Serbia of Kosovo and Metohija, the two regions that make up the Republic of Kosovo.
When asked about the national interest of the country, most Serbs will answer that the primal Belgrade interest is territorial integrity, which includes the entirety of the current Republic of Kosovo. On the other hand, for the last 20 years, Serbia has been penetrated by economic influences, above all, the European Union and the prospect of membership in the Union. However, the countries and institutions of the West are the leading guarantors of Kosovo's independence. And so these two conflicting interests have defined Belgrade's politics in recent years and allowed the man who was best able to capitalise on the aforementioned sentiments of the majority of Serbian society to come to power.
Aleksandar Vucić, as he is referred to, only back in 2008, formed the extreme nationalist, anti-Western, anti-EU and pro-Russian Serbian Radical Party. However, when Vucić realised that to come to power, he also needs a pro-Western electorate, he pragmatically changed his approach. The narrative towards the EU has softened, but Vucić's pro-Russian and often anti-Western tendencies have not disappeared and come to the surface when the political climate demands it. To ensure the neutrality of Western countries, Vucić's Serbia is sticking to the European path, which means declaring a desire for EU membership. The majority of the Serbian elite is in favour of Belgrade's EU membership. At the same time, however, Belgrade is increasingly moving away from the West by narratively moving closer to Moscow and Beijing, which support the Serbian campaign of non-recognition of Kosovo. This attempt to sit on multiple stools at the same time is proving particularly difficult during the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine.
So, what is Serbia's position towards the war? On the one hand, Belgrade supported the UN resolution condemning the Russian invasion; but on the other, alongside Belarus and Turkey, Serbia is the only European country that has not imposed sanctions on Russia.
Moreover, Belgrade is trying to take advantage of the favourable international situation, precisely the alienation of Moscow, to conclude new, economically beneficial agreements. To the disapproval of Western leaders, Vucić signed an agreement with the Kremlin in May, for another three years of Russian gas supplies. Natural gas is Moscow’s heavy lever on Belgrade, as Serbia imports as much as 80% of its gas from Russia. The two countries also cooperate closely militarily. In recent years, Serbia has bought or received, among other things, fighter jets, tanks or air defence systems from Russia. Cooperation has developed to such an extent that Moscow has opened a defence ministry office in Belgrade.
But it seems an even more critical aspect of the Russian-Serbian friendship is the common ideological and historical underpinning. The current leaders of Russia and Serbia are united not only by historical affinity but also by a vision of statehood that promotes strong nationalist tendencies, says Aleksandra Tomanic, executive director of the European Fund for the Balkans.
The instrumental use of the Orthodox faith is not insignificant either. Moscow seeks to fuel pan-Slavic orthodox nationalism and exploit divisions wherever it can. It has supported Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik in his threats to secede from Bosnia and is spreading disinformation to reinforce Kosovo Serb hostility towards the government in Pristina.
Russia's attack on Ukraine only added fuel to the fire, inciting extreme nationalism among pro-Russian Serbs, bringing back memories of death and destruction among survivors of the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s. Russia's explanation of the invasion to the Serbian public was simple - since NATO bombed Belgrade, it has no moral right to speak out about Ukraine. NATO talks about the territorial integrity of Ukraine, but what about the territorial integrity of Serbia? And such an explanation in Serbia often finds fertile ground.
There are plenty of reasons why this logic is flawed, including the manner in which Kosovo gained independence, the ethnic divisions, or the events that preceded the NATO intervention, and so on. The topic is so vast that it would take up a whole separate section, so we will not go into it further.
Still, it can be argued that the Kremlin is skilfully playing up Serb sentiment for its own benefit. At a time when Moscow doesn't have many allies, especially in Europe, Serbia is a valuable resource. But here, too, there were moments when Belgrade may have felt betrayed. In 2014, Putin compared Kosovo's independence, achieved in 2008, to the situation of Crimea after its annexation, thus, in a way, he supported Kosovo's independence in order to gain recognition of Crimea's Russian status. Such words from the mouth of the closest ally came as a shock to Belgrade.
In the background lurks China, which also plays a vital role. Serbia is the largest recipient of Chinese investment in the Western Balkans, with more than 60 active projects in the country. The Serbs also place military orders in China for air defence systems and drones, among others. Beijing recognises Serbia as one of the critical entry points to Europe in its Belt and Road project, which amplifies Belgrade's ambitions. At a time when Belgrade is under pressure from the EU to comply with sanctions against Moscow and from Russia not to close its doors, Beijing becomes even more essential and represents a third way.
While it suits the Serbs to work more closely with Russia and China when, in addition, these succour Serbian international policy goals, it is somewhat problematic that Belgrade's total exchange with Beijing and Moscow is five times smaller than Serbia's exchange with the European Union. Overall, the EU accounts for 60% of Serbia's trade and, despite Chinese investment, for 63% of the country's foreign investment, at 19 billion euros. Brussels, by no means, has white gloves when it comes to dealing with Belgrade. The integration process is a mess, but Belgrade, by antagonising Western countries with its approach to the Russian-Ukrainian war or by threatening Kosovo, is de facto undercutting the crucial branch on which it sits.
The case with Kosovo is simple. Pristina's entire international policy boils down to one thing - getting full international recognition. Most notably from Serbia. As the Kosovars in practice, do not have an army of their own, they have to rely almost entirely on NATO and the aforementioned KFOR for their security while at the same time conducting diplomacy to gain international recognizance.
Suicide mission
Taking all this into account, is a war between Kosovo and Serbia a realistic scenario? Nothing can be ruled out, but the chances of this eventuality are very low. Both sides cannot afford it. Kosovo, de facto, has no army. Serbia has an army but does not have the resources to wage it. Above all, a Serbian attack would almost certainly be met with a response from NATO, which, in light of events in Ukraine, has become more proactive. “The NATO-led KFOR [Kosovo Force] mission is closely monitoring and ready to intervene if stability is threatened, in line with its mandate," - this was NATO's position in a statement issued by the mission on 31 July 2022, when tensions erupted. By contrast, Serbia's potential patron, the Russian Federation, is bleeding on the Ukrainian steppes, so the chances of Belgrade's support in a hypothetical conflict are illusory. It is clear that Belgrade would be committing diplomatic and economic suicide with such a move.
In general, we are not dealing with anything new. Conflicts on the Pristina-Belgrade axis have been going on for years, periodically erupting. Most observers agree that these are predominantly driven by Belgrade to build internal political strength. Kosovo acts as a 'rally round the flag effect' for Belgrade, that is, when faced with a critical issue, society is expressing deeper support for state leadership. By periodically raising tensions and then extinguishing them, Vucić presents himself as a defender of Serbian interests in a theoretically hostile environment for Serbs.
The problem is that such a policy causes increasing frustration in the West. While geography and statistics prove that it is the West, not Russia or China, that provides the most straightforward path to Serbia's economic development. It should be noted again that Brussels also has its homework to do here since years of deceiving the Balkan countries have led to a decline in trust towards the Union. The most recent example was a disrespectful attitude on the issue of candidate status for North Macedonia. The Union had conditioned this possibility on Skopje changing the country's name to North Macedonia. However, when Skopje did so, the Union, specifically France, still vetoed the start of talks with further conditions.
What about the Serbia-Kosovo conflict? Is there a potential solution? It is a complex topic, but a potential compromise is presented by Natan Albahari, a Serbian politician, via the European Council on Foreign Relations. It would be based on the so-called 'two Germany' model. This would include Serbia recognising the de facto independence of Kosovo but would not recognise it de-jure and would not sign or ratify such independence. On the other hand, the Kosovo authorities would allow the formation of the Association of Serbian Municipalities (ASM), a semi-autonomous community of ethnic Serbs, which would operate according to Kosovo law, but with competencies as yet undefined.
The normalisation of relations would help both Pristina and Belgrade, for whom, in such a scenario, the prospect of European Union membership would become real. With current strained relations with the West and Vucic's aggressive rhetoric, this seems impossible.
