- Filip Dąb-Mirowski
On Sunday, 19 May, helicopter Bell 212, carrying a delegation including Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Minister Hossein Abdollahiyan, crashed in mountainous terrain in northern Iran. Difficult weather conditions and dense fog made the rescue operation very difficult, with both local authorities and the media outdoing each other with conflicting information. Rescue teams finally reached the site several hours later, on the morning of 20 May, and confirmed the deaths of all nine passengers.
In the wake of Raisi's death, the attention of the commentariat has been focused on the reshuffle at the top of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the internal power game. However, the broader geopolitical aspect is equally interesting. Raisi was returning from Azerbaijan on a fateful trip. Why did he go there? What did he discuss with President Aliyev? Everything indicates that this was yet another episode in the unfinished saga of 'Nagorno-Karabakh'.
Mourning in Iran
Although the office of the president is not particularly privileged in the Islamic Republic of Iran, the disaster has come as a shock to the authorities for which they were not prepared. Any reshuffling of power structures while public opinion remains tense and Iran is playing a very dangerous game in the Middle East, with the prospect of another confrontation with Israel, complicates the regime's operations.
In theory, president is the second most important person in the state after the Supreme Leader and the head of the executive branch. In practice, his influence depends largely on the status of the individual in power, and on the support he has from internal interest groups. While the relatively liberal Hasan Rouhani was restrained in his reformist tendencies and gradually marginalised, Ebrahim Raisi, who was elected after him and held conservative views, had a real chance of becoming Khamenei's successor.
The late president was hated by much of society. Nicknamed the 'Butcher of Tehran' for sentencing thousands of political prisoners accused of treason to death in 1988, he became known as the advocate of a 'heavy hand'. From 2019, as head of the country's judiciary, he served as chief justice, which coincided with the outbreak of the first mass protests in years, which were violently suppressed. At first the protests were about the economic situation, then about the personal freedom of citizens. The elections of August 2021, in which Raisi won office, were boycotted by a large part of the population who feared that civil liberties would be curtailed.
These fears proved to be justified. In July 2022, the new government resumed the harsh enforcement of morality laws, which sparked months of protests after the death of Mahsa Amini, who was beaten for 'indecent behaviour'. Thus unsurprisingly, fireworks were set off in various Iranian cities to mark the news of Raisi’s death, making the authorities nervous. In this context, the mechanism of repression has lost one of its central figures, which could translate into public sentiment and encourage renewed unrest at the next opportunity.
Raisi was succeeded by Vice President Mohammad Mochber, a secularist who was responsible for a deal to supply Iranian drones to Russia. He remains in office for several weeks until new elections are held - these are planned for June 28. According to experts, the only viable candidate to succeed Khamenei after Raisi's death is his son, Motjaba. This imbalance could lead to accusations of trying to turn Iran into a hereditary monarchy and friction within the establishment, so the logical step seems to be the emergence of a new challenger who will absorb the Iranian elite for a while.
And so the world's media are full of reflections on the internal reshuffling at the top of the 'ayatollahs' state of power and the potential impact of the deaths of Raisi and Foreign Ministry chief Hossein Abdollahijan. Few, however, are examining the motives behind Raisi's trip to Azerbaijan. The accident occurred on the way back from a visit to the northern neighbour, where Raisi's Iranian delegation met with Azerbaijani officials led by President Ilham Aliyev. The occasion was the official opening of two hydroelectric power stations on the border river Aras -dams 'Qiz Qalasi' and 'Khoda Afarin'. Yet it was certainly not just a matter of courtesy on Raisi's behalf to attend the inauguration, but something more.
Azerbaijani-Iranian Game
The history of the construction of the Aras dams is rather messy. The original plans were drawn up in the days of the USSR. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the situation became complicated (new borders, lack of funds) and the Karabakh conflict further hampered any works and exploitation. Probably around 2007, Tehran reached a tacit agreement with Armenia (and separatist Stepanakert) whereby Iranian forces would secure the site of the dam, reservoir, bridges and irrigation system in the area of the historic Khoda Afarin Bridges within a 10km radius. A similar, equally discreet deal was then struck with Baku in 2016. However, the right conditions were not yet in place to unlock the full potential of the investment.
It was only after Azerbaijani troops took control of most of Karabakh's territory at the end of 2020 that both projects came out of the shadows and their expansion and completion began. Although the bulk of the work has been carried out by Iran, both countries stand to benefit, including by sharing the energy produced. Azerbaijan's power plants are mainly gas-fired and provide 82% of the country's electricity. More important than power generation (currently 270 MW, with the prospect of expansion to 500 MW), however, is access to water.
The geography of the South Caucasus means that Azerbaijan is forced to draw its drinking water from sources that are 75% outside the country (the situation improved slightly after the seizure of the entire Aras, including the Sarsang reservoir, in September 2023). Iran uses the Aras river to irrigate farmland in the north-west of the country (East Azerbaijan province). Dams are being built in Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Iran, and the issue of access to water and river regulation is a regular source of interstate tension. At the regional level, the construction of infrastructure on the river is accompanied by advanced road and rail works to become part of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the East-West Transport Corridor, through which goods will flow from Asia to Europe.
When the presidents of Iran and Azerbaijan meet at the border to inaugurate two, not necessarily new, hydropower plants, it is more than political courtesy and congratulating each other on successful infrastructure investments. In reality, it is about geopolitics, tying up one of the threads of a rather troubled history and stabilising the region. There is still no definitive answer to the question of what will happen after the resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh. For the time being, Iran has stopped going behind Azerbaijan's back, with Azerbaijan taking a share of the investment costs and recognising Tehran's right to decide Karabakh's status. The bone of contention remains Azerbaijan's cooperation with Israel, its ambitious pan-Turkic policy with Turkey and, strange as it may sound, the nationality conflict. Iran regards Azerbaijan as a rogue province, and Azerbaijanis are fond of their Iranian compatriots, leading the ayatollahs to fear (rather unjustifiably at the moment) that this could lead to internal destabilisation and national strife.
Most importantly, while Tehran has always maintained its position that Nagorno-Karabakh belongs fully to Azerbaijan, it does not tolerate the Turkish-Azeri desire to take over the so-called Zangezur corridor, which connects the Nakhchivan exclave to Azerbaijan. This is why in 2021, 2022 and 2023 the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps carried out military manoeuvres near the Azerbaijani border, demonstrating its readiness to intervene if Armenia were physically cut off from Iran. This also explains Iran's reasons for providing political and material support to the authorities in Yerevan. The rapprochement is intended to help Baku reduce tensions and weaken or break the Iranian-Armenian cooperation.
Pragmatic rapprochement
Ilham Aliyev is now playing a skilful game, the overriding aim of which seems to be to seize more and more Armenian territory in a way that incurs the least geopolitical cost. As recently as January 2024, he argued in one of his public speeches that Yerevan was an 'ancient' Azerbaijani city and that its handover to Armenia was unjustified. Such rhetoric is designed to provoke certain reactions and has little to do with a genuine desire to seize the Armenian capital. However, it clearly shows that regaining Nagorno-Karabakh is not enough to satisfy Azerbaijan's growing ambitions. It is also an excellent tool to put pressure on Armenian Prime Minister Nikola Pashinyan.
The apparent warmth of relations with Russia and Vladimir Putin, with whom Aliyev is eager to meet, can be seen in the same context. The personal relationships he is trying to build with other leaders are designed to win their favour. As it happens, both Iran and Russia are in semi-isolation, so they can appreciate this kind of gesture. By the same token, trying to entrap a stranded Armenia is the best way to force it into submission. The Armenians feel (not without reason) betrayed by the Russian Federation, which was their ally and guarantor of their sovereignty. At the moment of trial, it failed and its influence in the Caucasus was marginalised by the tandem of Turkey and Azerbaijan. In response, Armenia suspended its membership of the CSTO, the so called “Russian NATO” and it is possible that it will formally withdraw from it in the near future.
Prime Minister Pashinyan is doing all he can to avoid a resumption of the conflict. His stance so far - that is, distancing himself from the Republic of Artsakh - has kept Armenia from being drawn into open war with Azerbaijan, but the political position of the authorities in Yerevan remains unfavourable. The border dispute continues, despite Armenia's unilateral renunciation of its claims to four villages that remained under its control after the liquidation of the Karabakh quasi-state, which provoked a strong reaction on the streets of Yerevan. The Russians, who are fuelling anti-government sentiment, are doing everything they can to bring the government down and return politicians with pro-Russian sympathies to power. Baku agreed to Russian participation in the negotiations precisely because of the hostile relations between Moscow and Yerevan.
Some hope for Pashinyan is offered by the active attitude of the West, especially France, which is trying to fill the gap left by Russia, mainly in the military dimension (arms supplies and training). However, the only neighbour offering real help is Iran, which has recently stepped up its cooperation with Moscow, while keeping a close eye on Turkey and Azerbaijan. If a similar rapprochement were to take place with Baku, Yerevan would lose its last resort to preserve the country's independence. It would be forced to make far-reaching concessions.
Meeting at the Aras River
As evidence of the above, we can refer to a transcript of statements made by the two politicians, Ilham Aliyev and the late Ebrahim Raisi, on 19 May 2024 during official ceremonies at the Aras River, shortly before the latter's death. Each established a semblance of closeness, but the dissonance of views and policies was palpable.
Aliyev praised the unique intimacy of relations with Iran, based on brotherhood and partnership. He stressed the importance of cooperation for the stability and security of the region, arguing that no external states 'thousands of miles away' should interfere in 'our affairs'. He argued that Armenia had counted on the help of others, but had miscalculated and should not make the same mistake again.
- We shall not be divided! - he declared.
He criticised the OSCE Minsk Group, set up after the first Karabakh war, for having "frozen the conflict" instead of resolving it. This, he said, could only be done with Baku, with political and military means, but with respect for international law.
The rest of the speech was filled with assurances of fruitful and dynamic cooperation in the development of the border region's infrastructure, including the construction of a motorway and a railway line that will link the country to Nakhchivan and, more broadly, connect the entire region to the international transport corridors that have been under construction for many years. At the same time, he failed to mention that these links are being built mainly on the Azeri side of the border.
And so, Aliyev tried to sweeten the concept of the Zangezur corridor for Iran, describing it as part of the construction of an international transport route from which good money could be made. Using the example of infrastructure development (power plants and dams), he pointed out that cooperation produces better results than rivalry or hostility. He winked at Iran by trying to suggest that outside powers were interfering in the region's affairs, in a nod to the theocrats' anti-American rhetoric. At the same time, he smuggled in calculated domestic themes of a just war that must eventually be concluded by peace if Armenia shows reason.
Raisi, who spoke after Aliyev, was equally exuberant, celebrating cooperation and clearly calling for even greater rapprochement, but at the same time not allowing himself to be misled. He took up the economic theme, pointing to the benefits of construction projects for the provinces of East Azerbaijan and the region as a whole. He pointed to the deep commonality of history, culture, religion and the close affinity of the two peoples, but in his view it was Iran and the Supreme Leader who 'decided' to deepen relations with Azerbaijan.
Similarly, he added that Azerbaijan's development 'is our own development', referring to the aforementioned construction of new roads, mainly on the Azeri side of the border. In passing, he noted Iran's interest in the reconstruction of Karabakh, which was probably the publicly communicated price of further cooperation in this area. He also expressed the expectation that political cooperation would move to international forums such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and that Azerbaijan would show 'solidarity' on the Palestinian issue.
Raisi said:
- We have no doubt that the people of Azerbaijan despise the Zionist regime.
Of course, he was referring to the government in Jerusalem, with which Baku constantly cooperates. It is also suspected that Azerbaijani territory has been used for attacks on Iran.
Finally, he argued that any factor threatening the status of the border between the two countries could pose a potential threat to them. Iran would not want to worry about this; on the contrary, it would prefer the borders to offer hope for cooperation and political and economic development.
It is hard to escape the impression that Raisi has positioned Azerbaijan in the role of a younger brother who requires both help and some discipline. In fact, one could even say that the rhetoric used was paternalistic and possessive, in stark contrast to the common Azerbaijani notion of togetherness with the Turks ('two states, one nation'). Beneath the icing on the cake of encouraging rapprochement, Raisi made it clear that Iran would not tolerate Azerbaijan's cooperation with Israel and would not agree to a violent resolution of the Zangezur corridor.
There are no easy answers in the Caucasus.
Iran and Azerbaijan decided to ease tensions that had been building for several years by focusing on pragmatic cooperation in areas that would benefit both countries. The border meeting was the first of its kind, so it was highly symbolic for both countries. However, fundamental political differences remain and will take time to resolve.
Ilham Aliyev has sought to develop closer relations with the Iranian president, both at ministerial and personal level. The gradual 'softening' of Tehran through closer economic ties was designed to make Armenia move further backwards, force Yerevan to further concessions and make Iran agree on Azeri de facto takeover control of Zangezur. Contrary to appearances, Raisi could have been a grateful negotiating partner, having demonstrated his negotiating skills and willingness to compromise in international politics. It was during his tenure that the conflict with Saudi Arabia was ended and talks with the Americans on the JCPOA (nuclear deal) resumed.
This process was interrupted by the helicopter crash and Raisi's death. For how long? Iran's foreign policy ultimately depends on the decisions of the National Security Council and the approval of the Supreme Leader, but the president is an important piece in this puzzle at the level of bilateral contacts. A new candidate can revisit the issue in two to three months once he has taken office and chosen his coworkers.
If Azerbaijan wanted to achieve a political breakthrough before launching another military operation against Armenia in September or October, as it has done with extraordinary regularity in recent years, there may not be enough time to implement this plan.
What will Ilham Aliyev do? Will he wait or, emboldened by his successes, go for more? As always - there are no easy answers in the Caucasus.
Sources:
- https://jamestown.org/program/iran-completes-controversial-hydropower-project-on-aras-river/
- https://president.az/en/articles/view/65901
- https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/komentarze_595.pdf
- https://www.planetarysecurityinitiative.org/news/water-security-and-nagorno-karabakh-conflict
