- Hubert Walas
Against a repeat of history.
The war in Ukraine is a moment of transition. The security architecture in the region, and the world as a whole, is changing rapidly, and various international actors are trying to turn this to their own advantage, including Poland. Warsaw is carrying out an unprecedented military build-up programme worth over $130 billion. The target cost of which could be as much as three times that amount. There is no doubt that a large part of this move is being driven by Russian imperialism, but the project also has a double bottom. A large army and close cooperation with the Republic of Korea could be Warsaw's wider plan to form a new bloc of states in the centre of Europe, trying to escape its semi-peripheral status vis-à-vis the West. How does Poland want to do this?
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What’s all the fuss about?
Let’s start with the numbers. What’s all the fuss about?
The government in Warsaw is in the process of implementing more than 20 significant procurement programmes for the Polish Armed Forces. Most of them originate from the 'Technical Modernisation Plan', a document defining the modernisation of the Polish army between the year 2017 and 2026. Nevertheless, in fact, the vast majority of the orders have been announced in the last few months only. These programmes are at various stages of advancement, but the Polish Ministry of Defence declares its intention to acquire them all.
The list covers the entire spectrum of state-of-the-art systems needed on the modern battlefield. Starting with aircraft, the list includes the world's best multi-role aircraft, the American-made F-35 or the Korean FA-50, designed to replace the Soviet MiG-29s. These will supported by the F-16s already present in Poland.
The helicopter base would be reinforced with almost a hundred American Apache AH-64s and more than 50 aircraft from the British-Italian conglomerate Agusta-Westland. Plus drones - Bayraktar, Reaper, Gladius or Warmate.
Watching developments in Ukraine, Warsaw also wants to have the best artillery forces in Europe. This would certainly be the case after acquiring nearly 500 launchers of H142 HIMARS rocket artillery or nearly 300 K239 Chunmoo - Korean equivalents of HIMARS. Whereas Nearly 400 Polish Krabs and Korean K9A1s would form the core of the self-propelled artillery.
The fist of the ground forces, however, would be tanks. More than 350 US Abrams and eventually up to 1,000 Korean K2 or the Polish variant of this tank K2PL, supported by more than 1,000 Borsuk and Rosomak combat vehicles. In addition, the Poles already have more than 200 Leopard 2 tanks.
The airspace is to be controlled by the Vistula, Narew and Pilica systems, based on American Patriots, British CAMMs and Polish Piorun and Grom systems, respectively. Reconnaissance is to be provided by French satellites, Swedish AWACs and Polish FlyEye drones. This will be complemented by the Miecznik missile frigates, built in consortium with the British.
These are just the major orders or planned aqusitions, which already exceed USD 130 billion. But that is not all.
This equipment must be used and maintained by an army of soldiers - up to twice the size of the current one. Poland currently can deploy about 150,000 soldiers, including the territorial defence forces. By 2035, this figure is expected to rise to 300,000.
Now knowing the output, let us ask. Why? What is it for?
The reasons are many. The first is history.
Why?
Poland has paid a high price for its weakness over the past 300 years. Institutional weakness, and consequently military weakness, led to a loss of self-determination for almost 200 years, with a brief interlude of freedom in the interwar period. It led to whole generations living under partitions of various kinds and in conditions of servitude to the interests of other nations. It also led to the deaths of millions in the face of uprisings, deportations, and wars fought in the hope of regaining freedom and agency. During this period, many nations between Berlin and Moscow and further east suffered a similar fate.
This sometimes hopeless struggle came to a happy end in 1989, when Poland became the first country in the Soviet bloc to hold free elections and get back on its feet. Once again.
Although the Poles themselves, and I, the author of this script, am one of them, do not often realise it, yet the last 30 years have certainly been the best period for the nation in the last 400 years. Perhaps even in its entire history. Although Poland has not been without its problems, the country has come out of its misery to achieve economic growth second only to China's during this period. The Polish economy, along with other Central and Eastern European economies, is on its way to catching up with Western Europe. Until recently, millions of Poles emigrated to the West to take up the most menial jobs. Now it’s Poland that is often the destination of economic immigration.
In a word, Poland had the time and capacity to build capital, the opportunity it had not had for the last few hundred years. But the threats remained. Other countries in Central and Eastern Europe also have a similar success story and also face similar threats.
While the first of the two main causes of Polish tragedies in the last few centuries - German imperialism - has been widely suppressed. The second - Russian imperialism - has thus undergone successive incarnations. We could see the first movements of the transformed Russian imperialist hydra already in 2008, during the invasion of Georgia.
In the years that followed, the Poles and the rest of the region warned loudly against Moscow's policies - which, as everyone already mentioned, were ignored in the West. However, concrete steps to improve Poland’s own military capabilities were neglected. Polish leaders seemed to place all their hopes in NATO and American military omnipotence.
While a high degree of confidence in the capabilities of an alliance is fundamental to the functioning of any collective, this was an irresponsible action - given the rapidly destabilising security architecture in Europe under the influence of the Kremlin's actions. Collective defence requires collective commitment, especially from a country in such a place in the world and with such historical experience. Meanwhile, not even the Russian annexation of Crimea or the fighting over the Donbas has mobilised successive ruling camps to decisively and rapidly expand the capabilities of the Polish military.
Even if, in the event of a Russian invasion and the activation of NATO's Article 5, the Americans and the rest of the Alliance were to act immediately to defend Poland, the war would continue on Polish territory for the first days, weeks and, according to some, even months. Thousands of people would have died, and the country would have been ruined. Suffice it to say that on 24 February 2022, Ukraine had a much stronger army than Poland, and a potential Russian raid on Warsaw from the Belarusian border could have ended much worse than the Russian offensive on Kyiv, which ultimately failed.
It took Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine to shake up Polish policymakers and lead to the launch of procurement programmes. Most of those mentioned at the outset have already moved to implementation after 24 February 2022.
So, although there are many reasons for a massive increase in the potential of the Polish army - more on this in a moment - the fundamental reason is to avoid history repeating itself. Many of its moments: the partitions at the end of the 18th century, unsuccessful uprisings, or the carnage that World War II brought to this region.
While such arguments are difficult to refute, and there is, in principle, a social consensus on the need to strengthen the Polish Armed Forces, the policy and implementation of the Polish Armed Forces Modernisation Plan have been met with criticism.
The Criticism
Modernisation of the Polish military is well overdue. This is the main accusation. There have been many signals over the past two decades that the issue should be taken seriously, but it took a full-scale war on Poland's eastern border to force Warsaw into action. Poland wants to increase its capabilities in the short term dramatically. This puts Warsaw in a weak negotiating position with potential contractors and drives up the price. The price is also being driven up by the war in Ukraine itself, which is creating demand for all kinds of munitions and military technology, while global supply is severely limited.
Poland, therefore, having, in principle, a good strategic understanding, made no use of this fact and did not start its own force modernisation earlier. The result is billions of dollars more in costs and long times of delivery. And all this with an aggressive Russia in the east.
One consequence of the hectic pace is the lack of time for a multi-dimensional analysis of the needs of the Polish armed forces - it is hard to talk about such an analysis when programmes worth billions of dollars are announced one after the other within the space of a few months. As a result, some purchase decisions, such as the decision to buy FA-50 aircraft or plans to buy nearly 100 very expensive American Apache helicopters, are often questioned by military analysts.
Perhaps even more important case, is the degree of Polish industrial presence and technology transfer in the overall modernisation process. Some of the orders will be manufactured in Poland to some extent, but the fact of suddenly buying equipment, often “off the shelf”, naturally has a negative impact on the development of the domestic defence industry and creates an outflow of capital from the country.
Finally, can Poland afford such a massive army? The spending of $130 billion - the equivalent of Ukraine's national GDP - is only the procurement part. Analysts estimate that procurement accounts for only 30% of future maintenance and upkeep costs. Thus, the total cost of current arms programmes over the next 30-40 years could reach up to half a trillion dollars. And let us not forget that we are talking about a medium-sized European country. That is also why Warsaw's announcement that it will increase its defence spending to 4% or even 5% of GDP - the highest level in NATO - is not just a short-term measure but a commitment for decades.
In addition to the financial issue, there are concerns that modernisation will not be able to cope with Poland's demographics. With one of the lowest birth rates in the world, increasing the number of soldiers in the army from 150,000 to 300,000 is troublesome, to say the least.
That said - can Poland afford such an effort? The best answer - given Poland’s history - would be that Poland cannot afford not to make that effort. But, the implementation process itself could have been much better.
Partners
Now that we know the main reason why Poland is building one of the strongest armies in Europe, and leaving aside economic fundamentals and implementation, let us look at the structure of foreign partners. Returning to the overview from the beginning of the material, we can quickly identify 3 trends.
First, the dominance of the Anglo-Saxons, especially the Americans.
Second, the near complete lack of European partners.
Third, South Korea.
And they all interconnected.
The Americans are traditionally seen in Poland as the most crucial allies, which is historically rooted in similar interests in the Old Continent. The Americans have always opposed the German-Russian rapprochement, which is the vital interest of Poland as well. Moreover, among NATO members, Washington has by far the greatest capacity and motivation to come to Poland's aid should Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty be activated.
Western Europe also has an industry ready to provide Warsaw with the needed capabilities - the French and Germans in particular. Nevertheless, the years of pre-war rapprochement between Berlin and Paris and Moscow deepened the Polish mistrust towards German and French capitals, especially on such a sensitive issue as security. The policies of Berlin and Paris at the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine only deepened this distrust.
Warsaw feared a scenario in which, if it were Poland, which Russia attacked, the supply of spare parts for German tanks or French helicopters, for example, could be sanctioned by French and German interests rather than Polish ones. This could take the form, for example, of imposing peace on the Poles against their will. Reports of such proposals to the Ukrainians widely circulated in the media, especially in the first months of the war.
A third player - South Korea - fit the puzzle perfectly. I t was the alternative Warsaw needed.
While the Americans may have common security interests with Poland, they are not necessarily interested in transferring key technologies to Poland or in lowering the price when the customer is desperate to buy the product. The Koreans, on the other hand, have seized the moment to make an offer that is not only often more economically feasible but also opens up new opportunities for Warsaw.
The Koreans are not only offering to transfer technology and the perspective of Polish variants of the K2PL tank, for example, but it looks they also want to establish a permanent military industry bridgehead in Europe with the Poles which could eventually compete with the German and French arms industries.
Apart from Poland, there are many potential customers, in particular - Ukraine. But also, for example, Romania, which shares many interests, or the Baltic states. South Korea is, therefore, both a bargaining chip for Poland in its talks with the Americans and an alternative to European partners, which could become its competitors.
The target
Thus, in the short to medium term, the Polish army is to be able to defend the country against Russia or, even better, deter Moscow from any aggressive moves. The aim is also to replace the loss of military equipment that Warsaw has handed over in large quantities to Ukraine.
Nevertheless, a powerful army could provide Poland with the basis for projects that go beyond the most basic objective of defending its independence. Some see this as a first step towards realising the idea of an Intermarium - a bloc of Central and Eastern European states with similar interests, seeking to counterbalance the economic dominance of Berlin and Paris and the military dominance of Moscow.
The idea is not new. But so far, Warsaw has little to offer potential partners, even though they might have considered such a route for the region. This may now change. Poland’s military buildup will create an army that may even exceed its needs. Therefore, Warsaw could offer to extend its own security architecture to countries in the region that seek deterrence against similar threats.
The ultimate goal would be to create a bloc that would speak with a common voice in Europe and the world. There is no doubt that Poland's most important partner in such a project would be post-war Ukraine, which would also be a regional military power in its own right. The Baltic states also share a similar interest. Romania and Moldova, free of Russian influence, cannot be ruled out either. Belarus would also be key in the event of the fall of the Lukashenko regime.
Belarus is another reason for the need to modernise the Polish armed forces. The news about the Wagner group is one thing, but if the regime in Minsk collapses, instability could spread to Poland. A civil war could also break out, and Warsaw would want to support one side or the other, most likely in alliance with Ukraine. To do that, you surely need a big enough military stock.
Warsaw is already quietly implementing the measures described above. The most important is, of course, close cooperation with Ukraine in the military, economic and social spheres. But other initiatives are also underway.
At the beginning of June, Polish President Andrzej Duda presented his Lithuanian counterpart Gitanas Nauseda with a proposal for the deployment of Polish troops in Lithuania. The Lithuanian described the proposal as "very interesting". A Polish military contingent is already stationed in the Latvian town of Adazi. Poland also wants to support Moldova - a country constantly penetrated by Russian influence. Chisinau recently received from Warsaw six planes with weapons for the Moldovan police.
Poland, therefore, wants to become an entity that is not only a security recipient but also its donor.
But while supra-regional cooperation on security issues between Warsaw and the regional capitals is conceivable, it cannot be sustained long-term without an economic setting based on technological development. And in this respect, Germany’s dominance is unquestionable. Poland's GDP is nominally six times smaller than Germany's. Given that the creation of a consolidated bloc of states east of the Oder river is not in Berlin's interest, it can be assumed that the Germans will suppress any attempts at consolidation. And to counter this, Germany simply has much greater financial capacity than Warsaw.
In this context, the issue of South Korea is relevant once again. When discussing the prospect of Intermarium, the economic argument was usually the logical end of the discussion - the project simply has no economic basis without the Germans. For a while, Warsaw hoped that perhaps the Americans, without looking at the Germans, would make a wave of investments in the region that would ensure economic development. But this has never happened on the required scale. Although the US company Intel is opening a semiconductor assembly and testing plant in Poland worth almost $5 billion, Intel's more important and four times more expensive factory will most likely be built near the German city of Magdeburg. The same is true of Tesla's choice of location for its Gigafactory - Poland was considered, but the final choice was Berlin. With such investments, Germany can always offer investors bigger subsidies and concessions than Poland. Intel in Magdeburg, for example, is expecting up to $10 billion in subsidies from the Germans.
Meanwhile, Korea, as one of the world's economic powerhouses, competes with German manufacturers in many areas, such as the automotive and arms industries. Seoul could therefore act as a kind of technological accelerator for the new bloc, without having to look to the Americans. Korea and Poland are not only cooperating on a multi-billion dollar military contract. The Korean conglomerate LG has Europe's largest battery factory near Wroclaw, while Poland's energy transformation is to include a nuclear power plant built in partnership with Korea's KHNP. Warsaw and Seoul are also discussing cooperation in the automotive sector, including electric cars. The president of the Polish Investment and Trade Agency (PAIH), Paweł Kurtasz, said that 14 investment projects worth €3.9 billion were currently underway in cooperation with South Korea. These would result in the employment of 5,500 people if they came to fruition.
This naturally leads to points of contention on the Berlin-Warsaw-Seoul triangle. These can already be seen today, for example, looking on the energy market. The Germans are pushing ahead with their strategy of phasing out nuclear power, while at the same time criticising Polish plans to build nuclear power stations with, among others, Korean participation. We should also mention a dispute between the American company Westinghouse and the Korean KHNP over using Westinghouse’s nuclear technology. Both companies are to build nuclear power stations in Poland.
In summary, the trilateral convergence of interests between Poland, Korea and the Central-Eastern European countries could be described as follows. Poland reforms and modernises its armed forces, using Korean technology, among others. Then extends a medium-sized security umbrella over the countries of the region, probably supported by the battle-hardened Ukrainian army. Seoul provides the region with technology and investment, offering an alternative to Germany's hitherto monopolistic position in the region.
For Central European countries including Poland, the aim would be to escape subcontractor status in the German supply chain and break the glass ceiling of being in an economically and technologically peripheral position compared to Western Europe.
For Korea, the obvious impetus would be to enter the European market in a big way and provide its industry with a magnitude of orders for decades.
All this is happening with the tacit encouragement of the Americans, for whom a solid wedge between Germany and Russia is a desirable arrangement. Some would argue that the US even supports such plans. Washington is establishing the permanent headquarters of the Fith US Army's Corps in Poland - until now, Germany was the site of the most easterly permanent American stationing. The US is also the largest supplier of arms to Poland, and two of the three nuclear power plants are to be built in cooperation with the American company Westinghouse. In addition, there is the aforementioned Intel plant and billion-dollar investments by Microsoft or Google.
The fact that the entire group of states in the region share a common history and often common oppressors is also inevitably important for the project's success. Which, again, converts into a common worldview. The consolidation of this area is a somewhat structural and historical phenomenon, as was proven by the centuries-old project of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.
Still, a desire to bring the medieval colossus back to life in a new reality can be described only as a utopia. The most likely scenario is an informal coalition of states speaking with one voice on security issues and key development branches. Coordination of the bloc could occur through existing formats such as the 'Three Seas Initiative', the 'Bucharest Nine' or the 'Lublin Triangle'. On the other hand, the 'Visegrad Group' is unlikely to be relevant and will lose importance as the Budapest government is close to Moscow. The same might be the case with Bratislava, which increasingly drifts towards Russia.
Moreover, Ukraine's admission into NATO structures would potentially further strengthen the prospects of such an initiative. The new bloc, whatever it might be called, would not be in opposition to the European Union. Given Brussels' strong support in the region, this is rather out of the question.
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The unprecedented modernisation of the Polish armed forces is, therefore, a multifaceted event. At the most basic level, it is intended to help defend the country against the real threat of aggression from the Russian Federation. Although Moscow is bleeding in Ukraine, in the event of a cessation of hostilities and a change in the international situation, it has the opportunity to reconstitute its forces in the foreseeable future, thus continuing to pose a threat to Poland and the region.
On the second level, Warsaw, in partnership with the Koreans, wants to create an armaments base in Europe that could compete with the French, German or Italian military centres. It would feed off the growing demand for military equipment in Europe and the rest of the world caused by the unstable international situation. However, its main customers would be Poland and Ukraine.
Finally, the military power, arms industry and technological know-how provided by the Korean cooperation would allow Poland and other countries of the region to form a bloc of states in Central and Eastern Europe with similar intentions, challenging the region's semi-peripheral position vis-à-vis Western Europe. Of course, this is not about weakening ties with the West or breaking the EU treaty but about changing the relationship status from that of a junior partner to the equal one. Of course, there are a thousand reasons why this plan could fail, but this seems to be the strategy that Warsaw is currently pursuing.
