- Tomasz Rydelek
Primakov doktrine.
In September 2015, planes from the Russian Air Force began landing at the Hmeimim airport in Latakia, Syria. This is how the Russian military intervention in Syria began. Western analysts, claiming that Moscow still suffers from the "Afghan syndrome," were shocked to see reports of Russian soldiers arriving in Syria, mired in civil war. Even as the Russian Air Force began to slowly tip the situation in favor of Assad, some commentators continued to argue that the Russian intervention in Syria was a completely ill-considered move, influenced by the conflict with the West over Ukraine. However, every move of the Kremlin on the treacherous sands of the Middle East was well thought out. The intervention in Syria was not a "Copernican revolution" in Russian foreign policy, but only an implementation of the so-called Primakov Doctrine, which has guided the Kremlin's foreign policy since the late 1990s.
Russian Kissinger
In 1953, 24-year-old Yevgeny Primakov left the walls of the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies. It was here that the future minister of foreign affairs of Russia learned about the intricacies of Middle East policy and the Arabic language. Primakov was a good student, but not an outstanding one. His grades were average, and his knowledge of the Arabic language - as he himself mentioned years later - was very limited. There was no indication that Primakov would become the golden child of Russian diplomacy. Shortly after graduation, Primakov became a Middle East analyst and in the 1960s a correspondent for the Soviet newspaper, Pravda. The journalistic activity, however, was only a cover for the intelligence activities that Primakov carried out in the Middle East on behalf of the KGB.
Primakov's analyses quickly caught the attention of high-ranking officials in the Kremlin, as already in the late 1960s he had become Moscow's special envoy for the Middle East and was sent to places where - for various reasons - Soviet diplomats could not reach via official channels. It was Primakov who negotiated with Saddam Hussein, Mustafa Barzani, Yasir Arafat, and Anwar Sadat. It was also Primakov who, in the 1970s, at the personal order of Brezhnev, held secret talks with the Israelis on the resumption of diplomatic relations that had been severed after the 1967 war. Soon the world of great politics opened up to a young and ambitious diplomat. In the late 1980s, Primakov became one of Mikhail Gorbachev's close associates. In 1991, he became the head of the Foreign Intelligence Service, i.e. the heir of the KGB. Five years later, Primakov was promoted again and became the head of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
In January 1996, when Primakov moved into the building located at 32-34 Smolenskaya-Sennaya Street in Moscow where the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is located, Russia was in a state of political decay. The country was still in a deep economic crisis and Russia's driving force in the international arena was only a shadow of the former power of the USSR. The USA, as the only world power, independently shaped the international order, such as by intervening in Kuwait and Iraq in 1991. Moscow's authority in the post-Soviet space looked no better - just 8 months after Primakov took power, the Russian army was forced to retreat from Chechnya.
Primakov's predecessor as the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Kozyrev, tried to pursue a pro-Western foreign policy and play for rapprochement with the US. Primakov's takeover of the position of foreign minister meant an end to Kozyrev's policy and a 180-degree turn in Russian foreign policy, as Lavrov said years later, "Russia has abandoned the path of our western partners and started to forge its own path."
Primakov's Doctrine - Gerasimov's Concept
Primakov argued that a unipolar world in which there is only one global center of power, i.e. the USA, runs counter to Russia's vital interests. Moscow should fight American influence with absolute determination and work towards the creation of a multipolar world in which there will be several global centers of power. However, Primakov was aware that Russia was unable to compete with the US on an equal footing. Therefore, he proposed that Russia should ally with China and India in the game for a new, “multipolar world.” If such a Triple Alliance were actually created - as Primakov argued - Russia could take the role of an "indispensable player" who could effectively torpedo Washington's unilateral moves on the international arena. Thus, Primakov's Doctrine was based on three basic pillars:
- Ensuring Russian domination in the post-Soviet space and gradual expansion of its influence to the areas of Central Asia and the Middle East.
- Stopping NATO's expansion to the East and taking steps to weaken the United States, the North Atlantic alliance and the USA’s non-NATO allies.
- Partnership with China and India.
According to Russia, while the unipolar world - one with a single global power center - is almost devoid of the risk of a global conflict, but it is characterized by enormous chaos and instability, which is reflected in smaller, local conflicts, such as the war in Yugoslavia or Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. In turn, the multipolar world - requiring coordination of actions by superpowers - according to Primakov, would put an end to chaos and bring about "peace based on consensus." It can be said that Primakov, to some extent in this doctrine, referred to the so-called "Concert of Powers," that is the geopolitical system that prevailed in Europe after the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the main principle of which was to maintain the balance of power in Europe and prevent the emergence of a European hegemon.
Thus, in the second half of the 1990s, the "Primakov Doctrine" was developed. Russia at that time, however, was too weak to implement it. Soon Primakov himself went on to "political retirement" when in 2000 he withdrew his candidacy for the presidency of the Russian Federation and Vladimir Putin won the elections. This, however, did not end the "Primakov Doctrine." On the contrary, Primakov became a close associate of Putin and the rest of his administration, and especially Sergei Lavrov, who in 2004 became the new head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The relationship was so close that at one point Primakov began to be called "Putin's godfather."
With the reconstruction of the Russian economy and the restoration of the authority of the central government, Putin's Russia ceased to be a passive observer of world politics. The first clear signal of the implementation of the "Primakov Doctrine" was the Georgian war, during which Moscow showed that it was the dominant force in the post-Soviet space, thus exerting the first pillar of the "Primakov Doctrine." It determinedly opposed, if the only potential, attempts to expand NATO's influence to the East, and this by also implementing the second pillar.
Soon after - against the background of Georgian experiences - Russia began a thorough reform of its armed forces - the so-called Serdyukov-Shoygu reform. In 2013, an article by General Valery Gerasimov, chief of the Russian general staff, was published in the Russian press, presenting the basic assumptions of hybrid war and the idea of permanent conflict. Initially, Gerasimov's text went unheeded. It was not until a year later that it began to be massively distributed in the West when Russia invaded Crimea and Moscow's actions in this war seemed to be taken straight from Gerasimov's article. In the West, the sensational-sounding term "Gerasimov's Doctrine" was coined and introduced as the main driving force of Russian foreign policy. The problem, however, is that the so-called "Gerasimov's Doctrine" is not a "doctrine", but only a "concept" of introducing Primakov's doctrine at the operational level. This distinction is very important because while Primakov's doctrine defines the long-term goals of Russian foreign policy, Gerasimov's concept only provides the tools to achieve these goals.
Damascus in Need
Before the dust in Donbas settled, the reformed Russian army launched another operation to present the Primakov doctrine in full splendor. In September 2015, planes from the Russian Air Force began landing at the Hmeimim airport in Latakia, Syria - this is how the Russian military intervention in Syria began. This was a surprise to many because before 2015 there was a common belief that the Kremlin was still suffering from the so-called "Afghan syndrome." While Moscow was acting more and more boldly in the post-Soviet space - in Georgia and Ukraine - few people believed that the Russian army was capable of conducting military operations several thousand kilometers from its home territory. Meanwhile, the "Syrian escapade" was in fact a classic application of the Primakov doctrine and the implementation of all three of its pillars.
Before 2015, the Kremlin clearly feared that Assad's fall could destabilize the entire region and increase the importance of Islamist groups. Russia's fears were all the greater, because around 7,000 fighters from Russia and the former Soviet republics were active in the ranks of the Islamic State alone. These people could have tried to carry the "black flags of the Caliphate" to Central Asia and the Russian Caucasus, thus weakening Moscow's "soft underbelly" - penetration of this region could turn out to be all the easier since around 10% of Russia's population is Muslim. Therefore, from Moscow's perspective, the intervention in Syria was not an offensive operation, but a defensive one aimed at securing Russian interests in the post-Soviet space, or Primakov’s first pillar. However, the fight against the Islamic threat was not a priority for Moscow in the "Syrian operation" - it was an attempt to checkmate the United States and prevent it from the unilateral resolution of the Syrian conflict, or Primakov’s second pillar. This goal has been achieved exceedingly well. The US, despite the alliance with the Kurds, which was severely damaged during the Trump presidency, has a very limited field of action in the Syrian theater of struggles. Equally important, thanks to efficient diplomatic maneuvers, Moscow almost completely excluded Washington from peace talks, which are to determine the shape of post-war Syria - the decision about the fate of this country will probably be made within the framework of the so-called Astana format - the Moscow, Tehran, Ankara triangle.
Moscow's actions in the Syrian theater focused on a multi-level weakening of US power in the region and were not limited to direct actions aimed at America itself, but also included attempts to break up American alliances. The best example is Turkey, which, aware of the imminent defeat of the Syrian rebels, very quickly agreed to negotiate with Russia. Thanks to effective maneuvers by Russian diplomacy, the Turks bought Russian-made S-400 missile systems, which not only led to a diplomatic crisis on the Ankara-Washington line, but also to the imposition of sanctions on the Turkish arms sector. The intensification of cooperation between Turkey and Russia also sparked a fierce discussion within NATO itself about Ankara's credibility as an ally. This is typical for the Kremlin: acting to weaken US and NATO structures. Exactly, as Primakov stated in the second pillar of his doctrine.
The smashing of the Syrian rebels, however, has never been the pinnacle of Russia's ambitions in the Middle East. Since 2015, Moscow's actions have clearly indicated that Russia treats Syria as a kind of "window" to the Middle East, as a "platform" for further expansion of its influence in the region. Syria has become a "stage" for the Russians to present to Arab countries what Russian "political and military" support looks like in practice. Thus - for the first time since the collapse of the USSR - the Arabs began to again include Russia in their political calculations. Actions taken in Syria have allowed Russia to strengthen relations with many countries in the region. It was all the easier as Syria became a battlefield where not only Washington and Tehran's influence clashed, but also, Ankara’s, Riyadh’s, Abu Dhabi’s, Doha’s, Cairo’s and Tel Aviv’s. By engaging in the Syrian war, Russia gained an invaluable starting point in contact with these countries, and this, given the remarkable skill of Russian diplomacy, has brought about great results.
The best example is the aforementioned Turkey, which Russia's actions in the region have brought to the margins of NATO. However, Turkey is not the only example. Russia's "expansion" to the Middle East has also weakened the ties between the US and its non-NATO Arab allies. For example, in energy policy, Russia began to cooperate closely with the Saudis, creating the so-called OPEC+ format, under which it was decided several times to reduce oil production, thus trying to raise the price of this raw material. Russia also tried to expand its influence in the region by encouraging the Arabs to buy Russian weapons. In 2019, a $2 billion contract was signed with Egypt for the supply of 24 Su-35 fighters, while Qatar and Saudi Arabia expressed interest in the potential purchase of Russian S-400 systems. However, America successfully blocked most of these deals. All because of CAATSA (Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act), the US law of 2017 that allows the US president to impose sanctions on countries that cooperate militarily with Russia - it is on the basis of CAATSA that the US imposed sanctions on Turkey.
In its game, Russia has not forgotten about the third pillar of Primakov's doctrine - that is, rapprochement with China and India. By rapidly expanding contacts with Arab countries, Russia has made it difficult for China and India to expand economically in this region of the world - which is especially important from the perspective of Beijing and its Belt and Road initiative, in which the Middle East plays a key role. Moscow, however, does not want to block Sino-Indian expansion in the region, but only wants to increase its own benefits from this expansion. The Syrian intervention has also given Moscow another powerful lever in its relations with Beijing. On the side of the insurgency is the Turkistan Islamic Party, founded by the Uighurs, of whom 5,000 are said to operate in Syria. Beijing fears that they may start terrorist activities in the Xinjiang province in the future. Moscow will be happy to help China fight this threat, but it will not be free of charge.
Not Only Syria
The success of the intervention in Syria encouraged the Russians to take other bold steps to show that Russia has become an "indispensable player" in the Middle East games. For example, when Turkey sent its soldiers and Syrian mercenaries to Libya to help the government in Tripoli, Russia supported the other side of the conflict, i.e. Marshal Haftar. Numerous troops of Russian mercenaries from the proxy Wagner Group and several Russian planes appeared in Libya. The Russians dug into the strategic Sirte-Joufra line in the central part of the country, blocking the march of pro-Turkish forces in Benghazi and Tobruk. Russia has also signed an agreement to build a new naval base in Sudan, capable of receiving Russian nuclear-powered submarines. The facility, although quite small, as there will only be about 300 soldiers, will be Russia's first permanent military base in Africa since the end of the Cold War. The facility will also give the Russian Navy access to another strategic basin - the Red Sea.
Both of these activities, the intervention in Libya and the construction of a naval base in Sudan, fit perfectly into the second pillar of Primakov's Doctrine and bring Russia closer to the idea of a multipolar world. Incidentally, it is worth mentioning that the Middle East is not the only area in which Russia successfully applies the principles of the Primakov Doctrine. In late 2020, Russia intervened during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, effectively blocking further progress by the victorious Azerbaijani army and preventing the Azeris from taking control of the strategic Lachin corridor that was occupied by Russian peacekeepers. In this way, Moscow has shown that it continues to dominate the post-Soviet space (Pillar I) and will not allow Turkey to diametrically change the political situation in the Caucasus in any way (Pillar II).
Syria became the theater where Russia presented Primakov's Doctrine in all its glory. By intervening on the side of Assad, Moscow outplayed the US and - at a low cost - became a player whose interests in the Middle East must be taken into account by everyone else. Syria, as a "microcosm of Middle Eastern rivalry," has become a "platform" for Russia, thanks to which Russian influence is freely spreading throughout the region. The Syrian intervention and the increase in US-Chinese rivalry have brought Russia much closer to its ultimate goal - the creation of multipolar world order. The Primakov Doctrine has served its purpose. Russia has gained all the greater importance in Middle Eastern politics as it is trying to pursue a policy that is as 'impartially' as possible - it does not allow itself to be forced into regional divisions, such as Shi'ite-Sunni, Israeli-Arab, or Saudi-Iranian. It is a great merit of Russian diplomacy, which - despite the support given to Assad - was able to maintain friendly relations with forces hostile to Damascus, such as with Turkey, Israel, or Saudi Arabia. In exchange for tightening relations with these countries, Russia is trying - as much as possible - to take into account their interests in its Syrian policy, for example by not blocking Israeli bombings against the forces of Lebanese Hezbollah and the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
However, the resources at its disposal are limited, and this peculiar "policy of balance" may at some point turn out to be unsustainable, for example in the face of interstate war in the Middle East. It seems that this is where the boundary of the "Primakov Doctrine" lies - Russia is able to penetrate the Middle East with a wedge, but is unable to impose its own solutions on the countries of the region. The resistance of America itself to Russian actions in the Middle East is also growing stiffer. In 2015, the Americans were completely surprised by the Russian intervention in Syria and did not quite know how to deal with the Russian expansion. However, this situation has changed over the years. In 2017, Congress passed the CAATSA law, which limited Russian arms exports to the Middle East, despite the fact that a few months earlier, Arab leaders were lining up for Russian military equipment. In 2019, the so-called Caesar Act, which imposed severe sanctions on Syria and successfully blocked the country's reconstruction for at least several years. In practice, this means a significant increase in the costs of the Russian intervention and forcing Moscow to provide extensive aid to Assad, who, despite winning the civil war, led the country to the brink of economic collapse.
There is also an open question whether cooperation with Moscow, by countries such as Turkey or Saudi Arabia, is due to Russia itself or maybe an attempt to play Washington with the help of Moscow. Russia - despite undoubtedly tremendous successes in the region - can feel the truth of the saying popularized by former MI6 agent John le Carré: "You can hire an Arab, but you can't buy him." Thus, Russia intervening in Syria to quickly force the rebels and Kurds to negotiate and then federalize the country, encountered fierce resistance from Assad, which it was unable to crush.
Russia will undoubtedly continue its Middle Eastern policy according to the rules laid down by Primakov. However, the question is whether this will ultimately lead Russia to the introduction of multipolar world order or whether it will inadvertently drag it into the Middle East’s divisions and end in a fiasco similar to the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan.
Tomasz Rydelek
Sources:
• D. Trenin, What is Russia up to in the Middle East?, Polity, 2018
• E. Rumer, The Primakov (Not Gerasimov) Doctrine in Action, CEIP, 2019
• A. C. Lynch, The Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy in the 1990s, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, nr 18, 2002
• S. Charap, E. Treyger, E. Geist, Understanding Russia's Intervention in Syria, RAND Corporation, 2019
