It is time for Intermarium 2.0 against Russia.

Donald Trump, JD Vance, and Pete Hegseth have been systematically dismantling the established global order in recent days, challenging the paradigm upon which an entire generation of European politicians had constructed their worldview. Despite numerous indications of impending change, their carefully cultivated geopolitical framework has rapidly disintegrated.

Is Ukraine's fate already sealed? While it remains premature to draw definitive conclusions, it is unequivocal that increasingly sinister storm clouds are gathering over Kyiv—and by extension, Europe. Meanwhile, Brussels is convening urgent consultations, desperately seeking an antidote to an illness that has been manifestly evident for years.

In this turbulent context, it is imperative to strip away political illusions and confront reality with unflinching clarity. Should Russia be treated with unwarranted leniency, it is certain that the next phase of its imperialistic campaign is merely a matter of time—particularly if it perceives weakness or an opportunity to test NATO's security guarantees. Which sovereign state will become the next target? Geography demonstrates a brutal calculus—the nearby states, especially the smaller and most vulnerable ones like the Baltic Republics, stand at heightened risk.

Therefore, in this pivotal moment of fundamental geopolitical transformation, all those most threatened by Russian imperialism and motivated to arrest its expansion must forge an ironclad alliance. Intermarium 2.0, the Baltic-Carpathian Alliance, the Northern League— choose your nomenclature, but the objective remains singular: to definitively halt Russian expansionism. What might such a strategic coalition entail?

Before delving into the analysis of the proposed format, let us commence by examining the current situation. Recognizing that observing the entire geopolitical landscape can easily lead one into an endless labyrinth of nuances, we shall focus on the most critical variables that fundamentally determine the broader context. Let us proceed systematically.

Ukraine

The nation is suffering across virtually every domain of state functionality. Kyiv struggles to withstand Russia's onslaught, with quantitative and equipment-based disadvantages (resulting from Western supply weaknesses) forcing Ukrainian forces to retreat—particularly toward the Pokrovsk direction. Conversely, Ukrainians have impressively developed their domestic defense industry, and their military remains the most robust and numerous on the continent, excluding the Russian force. Kyiv remains critically dependent on American and/or European assistance.

Russia

For over a year—coinciding with the significant deceleration of American support for Ukraine—the Kremlin has been ascendant. Gradually advancing, though without dramatic breakthroughs, the country's economy operates in a wartime mode, with an apathetic society accepting the costs associated with the Ukrainian invasion. Simultaneously, contrary to Kremlin propaganda, devastating equipment losses (more significantly) and human casualties (to a lesser extent) suggest that Russia cannot perpetuate this conflict indefinitely. With appropriate Ukrainian support, estimates indicate Moscow may have resources for an additional one to one-and-a-half years of conflict.

United States

America is undergoing a comprehensive redefinition—both internally and externally. Numerous labels might be applied to this policy, but whether termed isolationism, deglobalization, or offshore balancing, the outcome remains consistent: the Trump administration seeks to divest itself of the "Ukrainian problem" with utmost expediency. Hitherto, the question has been the extent of this divestment—whether through the initially proposed approach of compelling the aggressor (Russia) toward a settlement from a position of strength (or utilizing a spectrum of capabilities to alter their stance if they refuse), or through a more rapid disengagement. Currently, it appears that despite initial pronouncements, Washington is pursuing the latter strategy, blurring the fundamental narrative of aggressor and victim by engaging with Putin from a position of " mandate of heavens" granted by the American military-industrial complex.

China

Beijing observes the entire confrontation from the periphery. As previously discussed, the Chinese will adeptly navigate both a fragile peace and conflict continuation. Both scenarios appear advantageous from their strategic perspective.

Europe

Finally, we arrive at Europe. Amidst its disarray and internal chaos, Europe must, suddenly, mature to confront a problem it has systematically avoided for over a decade—if not since the Georgian invasion of 2008.

Herein lies a critical moment: Europe, anticipating (for 1.5 years!) the diminishing American engagement, could have done everything to assume leadership from the Americans and stand behind Ukraine, leveraging its existing economic-industrial might. However, 'Europeans' chose to passively observe American movements, as they were the sole possessors of tangible capabilities.

Three years! This was the duration Europe had to accelerate its military-industrial complex and confront Russia, especially given that it would not need to engage directly. On the continent's eastern frontier, a brave nation practically begged merely to receive sufficient assistance.

They receivedalmost none. The $145 billion in aid to Ukraine, which the Union boasts about, is pathetic. The cumulative GDP of European Union states in 2024 was approximately $18 trillion. Therefore, three years of GDP amounts to roughly $54 trillion. Consequently, the Union has invested a mere 0.3% (!) of its Gross Domestic Product in supporting Ukraine over three years. Embarrassing. Today, European politicians—in light of the paradigm shift by the new American administration—oscillate in a chaotic dance, with some barely restraining their tears.

We arrive at the core question: Why did Europe lost Ukraine? Why did it not prepare over the years? Why is Europe so fundamentally ineffective at identifying high-stakes problems and responding appropriately? The problem—and its answer—lie deeply embedded. Those following our analysis may recall the theses presented in the episode "Europe in a Darwinian Evolutionary Process". Contrary to Emmanuel Macron's famous words, it is not NATO experiencing "brain death", but the Union—with the Ukrainian war serving as its quintessential exemplar.

Ideally, the Union should have been invested in the most expeditious termination of the war, as it represents a significant economic, political, reputational, and social burden. Simultaneously, the collective's interest was never and is not the acceptance of forcibly altering state borders and governmental structures. In other words, supporting Ukraine was in the Union's interest, particularly given Ukraine's resistance and remarkable internal mobilization—a feat, interestingly, that likely no European nation could have achieved in 2022.

Certainly, a direct confrontation with Russia through Ukraine would have incurred costs, but with strategic management, these would have been negligible for 99% of its citizens. Presumably, the Union merely needed to collectively allocate 1% of its GDP annually for Ukraine. Then, today's counter would not read $145 billion, but $540 billion—over twice the current collective assistance from the Union and America combined. At a modest 2%, the amount would surpass an astronomical trillion dollars. At that point, the war could have been concluded within several months, becoming nothing more than a grim recollection.

Simultaneously, these funds could have been invested in developing its domestic military sector—thus achieving two objectives simultaneously. Primarily, it would repel Russian threats through Ukrainian hands while preparing for the chaotic world we currently inhabit.

This leads us to the European Union's key, inherent characteristic. While states terrified by Russian imperialism would likely enthusiastically support such a plan, geographic distance correlates inversely with enthusiasm. Why should we expend billions on a threat 2,000 kilometers away? Portuguese or Spanish citizens might justifiably inquire. By 2025, the Union had not achieved an internal trust level sufficient to treat all member state interests equitably. Regrettably, the largest Union states bear responsibility, having treated the project as a tool for national interest realization while gradually degenerating the project's fundamental idea.

Union states closest to Russia would be irrational to depend on any entity that has failed so repeatedly in security matters.
Therefore, as previously mentioned, we proposed the "coalition of the willing" concept—states sharing a specific interest and demonstrating significant determination in its realization. Multiple such coalitions might exist, but now is the time to contemplate one specific collective. The Cold Alliance, the Baltic-Carpathian Alliance, Intermarium 2.0, the Northern League—choose the name that resonates.

Unquestionably, with the collapse of the last branch sustaining the mythical "European" world, the complimentary journey ends, and real consequences must be confronted. In the worst scenario—continued apathy—this means war on European Union territory. Naturally, Portuguese or Spanish citizens can remain calm (they are not first in line). However, Romanians, Poles, Swedes, Finns, and especially the Baltic states? Certainly not.

Observing wavering alliance commitments from the United States—which, despite NATO, might ultimately "throw you under the bus" depending on situational "realism"—and witnessing Western Europe's massive apathy, showing no genuine interest in restraining Russians, the North-Central European region must take matters into its own hands without waiting for external intervention. The highest value—independence—hangs in the balance, and these are not empty proclamations.

Regardless of whether Ukraine is abandoned by Americans and the Union, the matter is of such significance that it cannot be left to chance.

Thus, the Baltic-Carpathian Alliance must be immediately established. Its objective would be straightforward: preventing potential war outbreak within its member states and the associated loss of sovereignty.

Who would comprise this modern-day Intermarium? The states most threatened by Russian imperialism—here and now, for only they will demonstrate the requisite engagement and sacrifice such a situation demands.

The "Carpathian" core of this alliance would be Poland and Romania—two states of substantial size by European standards, with a combined population of 54 million, representing approximately two-thirds of Germany's population. Economically, their economies measured by purchasing power parity correspond to roughly 50% of German GDP (PL $1.9T; RO $0.9T; DE $5.5T).
On the northern front, the most critical members would be Finland, possessing the longest border with the Russian Federation, and Sweden, which would be the next potential target in the event of an attack on the sparsely populated Finland. The pact would also serve Norwegian interests, as they border Russia in the Arctic Circle and compete with them in the Arctic region.

Adhering strictly to the "realist school" of thought, the pact should ostensibly bypass the Baltic States due to their dramatically limited combat capabilities and the extremely challenging defensibility of their territory. In other words, the Baltics would constitute a liability. However, it is inconceivable to maintain the region's independence if an integral part were metaphorically "offered to the lion." One might deprecate the influence of morality in international relations (the famous "values are not currency"), but abandoning the Baltic States would be, quite literally, indefensible. The Baltic States should be included in the Alliance, despite the geographical challenge their defense presents. The alliance's continued objective would be maintaining a balance where an attack would incur such prohibitive costs that it would never be calculable under any scenario. Without the Balts in this pact, war would be virtually inevitable, with the aggressor receiving a preliminary "appetizer" of encouragement.

Nevertheless, the Baltic States would need to multiply their defense expenditures—a process already underway, though currently insufficient.

Naturally, other potential members exist, located in the so-called "second line of attack," which would theoretically diminish their willingness to join the format:

• Denmark: A wealthy society, potentially threatened "only" by maritime landings and missile attacks.
• Czech Republic and Slovakia: These states possess natural barriers in the Carpathian and Sudeten mountains, and would require the fall of Poland and Ukraine. Currently, pro-Russian authorities govern Slovakia, reducing the likelihood of their participation. The pro-Russian presidential candidate in Romania, Calin Georgescu, who will likely become president sooner or later, also presents a contextual challenge.
• Moldova: Provided it could be purged of Russian influences and agents
• United Kingdom: Although London is geographically distant, it demonstrates relatively significant engagement in the Ukrainian war. Historically, the British have been consistently active in suppressing Russian imperialism in the maritime domain.
• Ukraine—a critical element we shall examine more comprehensively momentarily.

The core of the Baltic-Carpathian Alliance in the land domain would primarily comprise Poland (over 200,000-strong army) and Romania (approximately 80,000), along with Finland, Sweden, and Norway in the north—wealthy societies equipped with advanced military technology (especially Sweden), but less numerous—their collective military potential currently lower than Romania's (around 70,000). The Baltic states collectively possess approximately 30,000 troops. Collectively, this amounts to 400,000 military personnel today. For comparison, Russia is currently estimated to maintain over 600,000 troops in Ukraine, with total engaged personnel exceeding one million. Therefore, expanding conventional potential would undoubtedly be a necessity—which we shall address momentarily.

Technologically and militarily, the group is beginning to acquire arguably the most valuable effector: the F-35 fighter jet. Norway, Poland, Romania, and Finland are or will be its users. They are set to collectively possess nearly 200 such machines. Additionally, over a hundred Swedish Gripens and 80 F-16s complement this arsenal. Land forces would be based on Leopard 2, Abrams, and Korean K2 tanks. Further supplemented by artillery including HIMARS, K9, and Krab systems, combat vehicles like CV90, Borsuk, and Rosomak. Air defense systems such as NASAMS and CAMM-ER demonstrate that the group is already equipped with the most advanced military technology, with cooperation potentially amplifying its potential even further.

Economically, the region would command a Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) GDP of $5.2 trillion. Russia, by this metric, appears to have a more than 20% larger GDP of $7.1 trillion—though this is significantly influenced by the low ruble exchange rate. Nominally, the Pact states would possess a GDP of $2.7 trillion, approximately 30% higher than Russia's $2.1 trillion. Naturally, engaging Denmark, the Czech Republic, or especially the British would proportionally increase the collective's "potential," though realistically, their membership (particularly in the initial stage) would be unlikely.

The critical question remains: What would the established Alliance obligate its signatories to do? What would be its primary assumptions? At least several areas of cooperation can be identified, though their specifics are somewhat contingent on current events—primarily the situation in Ukraine.

1. Firstly, signatories should commit to allocating a significant portion of their GDP to defense. 5% represents the lower threshold, with 7% or even 10% (for the Baltic States) being more realistic. If Russia currently expends 7% of its GDP on armaments, states threatened by potential attack should not invest less.
2. Secondly, deep military-industrial cooperation would be implemented. Countries would declare that army modernization would be prioritized through the group's industrial participants, simultaneously providing an economic development stimulus for all collective members. Every crown, zloty, or leu should remain within the pact. A joint research and development center would be established, from which the entire collective would benefit.
3. Advanced producers (especially Sweden) would primarily benefit from the second point, with military technology transfer to less developed industries (primarily Polish and Romanian) occurring on a reciprocal basis.
4. Alliance armies would conduct continuous coordination (at a frequency higher than within NATO), facilitating convergence of best practices and intelligence data exchange.
5. Standardization of weaponry and ammunition among alliance members would enable more efficient logistics and mutual support in the event of conflict.
6. Creation of shared strategic infrastructure: logistical hubs and a common strategic reserve storage system.
7. Collaboration in space industry and satellite technologies to enhance the alliance's intelligence and communication capabilities.
8. Development of offensive capabilities, including ballistic missiles. The Alliance (specifically the Baltic States and Finland) would be in close proximity to two of the Russian Federation's most important cities. Russia must be deterred by the genuine threat of massive conventional destruction of these cities. A missile launched from Finland or Estonia would take mere minutes. The same applies to Königsberg.
9. Most importantly—the famous Article 5. The Alliance must treat an attack on one member as an attack on the entire alliance.

One might ask—why replicate provisions already contained in the North Atlantic Alliance? The issue is that NATO's Article 5 relies on the Americans. If Russians enter Estonia's Narva, everyone will look to the Americans. The problem is that if the Americans do not intervene, the entire alliance collapses, entering an unpredictable escalation model. Washington clearly signals that this provision cannot be treated as "ironclad". Conversely, if the Baltic-Carpathian Alliance states were "doubly" secured by Article 5, strategic ambiguity in the Kremlin would be reinforced. Moreover, the pact would support NATO's foundational principles—if, during a hypothetical attack on Latvia, the Intermarium 2.0 states immediately respond, they would "keep alive" NATO's Article 5, providing an opportunity for Americans and other members to come to assistance.

The Baltic-Carpathian Alliance must have the courage (backed by capabilities) to declare its principles. Based on a community of interests that clearly states: if one of us is attacked, it is certain that sooner or later, "I" will also be attacked. There is no cursed "engagement divergence" as with the Americans, because we are all deeply entrenched in this quagmire.

Against this backdrop, Ukraine and its potential status in the Alliance become critically important. Kiev's potential development paths are multiple.

Firstly, it is clear that the Alliance does not wish to enter a state of war with Russia, therefore immediate incorporation of Kiev into the collective is impossible. On the other hand, Ukraine as an entity possessing:

1. Significant combat capabilities
2. Aligned interests with the collective
3. Direct ability to degrade opponent capabilities

Ukraine cannot be omitted from this calculation. Much depends on how negotiations unfold and Kiev's willingness. Let us consider two most probable scenarios.

If Ukraine is compelled toward peace but physically requires respite, the Intermarium Alliance should establish close cooperation focused on information, intelligence, and technological exchange. Simultaneously, the Alliance would assist in rebuilding Ukrainian capabilities under preferential conditions, potentially financed through Ukrainian natural resources.

Should peace negotiations protract and Ukraine declare continued readiness and motivation to fight, the Alliance should consider allocating substantial resources to re-equipping Ukraine with available technologies and assets. This could similarly be funded through Ukrainian natural resource extraction. There is no easier method for Intermarium 2.0 states to achieve their objective than neutralizing Russians through Ukrainian hands (if Ukrainian will exists).

The Norwegian investment fund could theoretically provide a financing pathway. With a current valuation of $1.8 trillion, it represents the world's largest such fund. While the investment would carry significant risk, and the decision would rest with 5 million Norwegians, Kiev could potentially guarantee Norway an appropriate investment return after hostilities conclude.
What would be the primary purpose of this new geopolitical formation? Survival. This objective fundamentally differs from American administrative intentions (which can evidently shift significantly) and Brussels' internally fractured approach. Consequently, this group would have far fewer reservations about scenarios involving Vladimir Putin's removal from power. The Baltic-Carpathian Alliance's objective would be defending its own independence, currently threatened by the Kremlin's imperialistic policy. Therefore, if supporting Ukraine precipitated the Kremlin's collapse, such an outcome would be welcomed in Warsaw, Stockholm, and Bucharest.

One critical detail remains—nuclear weaponry. Despite its defensive positioning, the Alliance would engage in relatively direct confrontation with a nuclear power. Therefore, initial formulations must address this issue. Essentially, three potential solutions exist.

First—developing conventional offensive capabilities sufficiently robust to generate damage equivalent to nuclear weaponry.

Secondly, this could involve entering the American or French nuclear umbrella. Theoretically, this solution should appeal to Americans, as the alliance fulfills their objective of "greater European engagement". A potential discord exists in that the Alliance would prefer the war to continue (if Ukrainians desire it), while Americans seek peace at any cost.

Nonetheless, Americans would likely provide the group a "nuclear umbrella" because:

1. They remain interested in preventing atomic warfare
2. They are not eager for proliferation, and as group ties tighten, the nuclear program topic might emerge (particularly from Swedes and Poles)
3. This requires no physical American presence

Alternatively, the French could provide this service. The British are excluded, as Americans effectively control their arsenal. However, American guarantees must extend beyond current NATO declarations. The Cold Alliance should demand participation in the "nuclear sharing" program to a significantly greater extent than currently exists. Moreover, the foundational principles should incorporate strategic ambiguity regarding whether Americans or collective states would decide on weapons of mass destruction deployment—thus negatively impacting Kremlin calculations.

One must note an additional aspect. The Baltic-Carpathian Alliance would originate from a single primary assumption—the desire to protect collective independence against aggressive Russian imperialism. With collective engagement and coordination, the members' cumulative potential could create a scenario where any offensive Moscow attempts would incur such substantial losses that they would be economically unfeasible under any scenario.

Upon achieving this objective (which, beyond the Russian Federation's potential dissolution, would have no definitive end date), new possibilities would emerge for the group. With growing disillusionment toward the EU format, pact states would have an opportunity to create something innovative. The Union is fractured by divergent interests and potential disparities. Theoretically, Brussels should consider members' interests relatively equally, but naturally, larger entities gravitationally attract most resources.
To justify the German perspective—they might ask: if we are the largest and possess the most substantial economy, why should we dilute our interests by considering the needs of a state 3 or 20 times smaller than ourselves? In other words, potential dichotomy drives interest dichotomy.

The translation preserves the original text's strategic analysis, geopolitical nuance, and passionate argumentation while presenting the information in a clear, professional manner.

In Intermarium 2.0, one can observe a healthy balance. Firstly, the group is unified by a critical challenge in the east, while simultaneously offering a relatively egalitarian distribution. Its southern component provides the required—to put it bluntly—human mass and non-trivial economic potential, while the north contributes economic strength, robust institutions, and technological development. The original Intermarium concept, as we all know, originated with Marshal Józef Piłsudski.

In various periods, this model was based on different states, but their objective remained consistent—collectively erecting barriers against Russian imperialism in the east. Nevertheless, it was always a bloc positioned between Russia and Germany—extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea and optionally the Adriatic. Today, however, incorporating states and regions like Hungary, Slovakia, or the Balkans would be counterproductive. Cooperation continues within formats like "Bucharest 9", and that suffices. Conversely, the concept has historically overlooked Scandinavia.

Piłsudski's idea had the inherent problem of positioning Poland as the key node. On one hand, this was necessary because Poland was the region's largest player, but on the other, Poland—devastated and underdeveloped by two centuries of various partitions—would have been too weak a leader for many to seriously consider the concept. Simultaneously, concerns existed that if Poland were to grow in strength, smaller states would anticipate whether Warsaw might ultimately seek format dominance similar to Germany's approach in the EU, as it would tower over others in every conceivable aspect.

In Intermarium 2.0, Poland's potential—while still the largest—would be readily balanced by Swedish, Norwegian, or Romanian capabilities. In other words, we obtain a bloc of states with relatively comparable potential and converging primary security interests. Therefore, there is minimal probability of the situation constantly observed in the European Union—where German or French agency allows them to force agendas inconsistent with the rest's objectives.

The group's economic potential would be significant—nominally ranking as the world's "eighth" economy, positioned between Italy and France. In purchasing power parity, it would represent an entity comparable to Germany or Japan. Contemplating deeper cooperation, one might consider:

1. Intensified energy collaboration
2. A joint fleet
3. AI and space technology development

Should hostilities conclude and Ukraine stabilize its international position (currently challenging to imagine), the country would aspire to become an inherent alliance member. With the potential fall of Lukashenko's regime, Belarus should similarly be considered a potential participant. However, both scenarios remain a future melody.

Naturally, this does not imply the Baltic-Carpathian Alliance should reject key formats like NATO or the EU—quite the contrary. The objective is to take matters into their own hands and not rely on or await others, especially given the group's requisite potential to confront Russia competently and systematically. Will this be difficult and costly? Undoubtedly. But when addressing the most fundamental issues of national security and independence, no alternative exists.

Would large European states like France and Germany welcome such a format with optimism? While the security dimension would provide significant relief (nothing is more valuable than an effective buffer), developing deeper connections might be perceived as competitive, particularly by Berlin. Moreover, if cooperation were particularly fruitful and effective, it could potentially undermine the EU concept as Europe's preferred paradigm.

Conversely, the Cold Alliance should not replace any initiatives proposed by other states—particularly France or Germany. Furthermore, it should remain open to cooperation with additional partners. It is not a comprehensive solution to Europe's challenges, but precisely and solely a safeguard against potential Russian Federation attacks on its members.

The current challenge is singular—the Russian Federation. If Americans sacrifice Ukraine, the next targets are the potential Intermarium 2.0 states. Russians will not stop. Plans indicate mobilization of additional tens of thousands of soldiers, the entire military industry operates at full capacity, and authorities possess social legitimization to "fight the West" beyond mere rhetoric.
The mentioned Intermarium 2.0 countries can observe this, placing hopes in the European Union—which has demonstrated significant indolence over years—or in NATO, which is 100% dependent on Americans and therefore unstable. Alternatively, they can take matters into their own hands, ensuring their nations' security and future without waiting for others. Acting individually exposes them to significant risk, whereas a large, strong group of motivated states can sufficiently deter Russia. The trust built on this foundation could constitute a framework for something more substantial than a defensive alliance.

At the time of writing, Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson's chancellery released the following note:

"I have long repeated that Europe must take greater responsibility for its own security and increase our support for Ukraine. I believe there is currently momentum for Nordic-Baltic countries and Poland to continue moving forward and leading, both in terms of defense expenditures and support for Ukraine."

Previously, on November 28th, Warsaw and Stockholm concluded a "strategic agreement".

Therefore, the two largest economic members of this hypothetical alliance are already signaling readiness for greater cooperation. However, its scope should significantly expand and create foundations for something much more comprehensive.

The geopolitical slumber has long since concluded. The world of the second half of the 21st century demands mature and bold decisions—one of which should be the establishment of Intermarium 2.0.

Sources:

1. https://www.politico.eu/article/france-macron-emergency-european-summit-trump-defense-crisis-war-trump-putin-paris
   
2. https://x.com/SwedishPM/status/1890412912704889209
   
3. https://www.government.se/press-releases/2024/11/new-strategic-partnership-between-sweden-and-poland/