- Oskar Pietrewicz
Rasing The Alarm.
On December 30th, 2023, at the plenum of the Workers' Party of Korea, the North Korean leader rejected the goal of peaceful Korean reunification and described inter-Korean relations as hostile. He also ordered a steady increase in military capabilities to 'subjugate' South Korea in the event of a possible conflict. Kim's words have caused anxiety on the Korean peninsula. Two eminent scholars of inter-Korean relations, Robert Carlin and Siegfried Hecker, have gone so far as to suggest that Kim Jong Un has decided to embark on a course of war. As usual, the issue is complex.
Hostility or unity?
For 75 years, confrontation has dominated relations between the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Korean War of 1950-1953 not only took the lives of millions and caused destruction, but also perpetuated the division of the Korean peninsula. It led the Korean states to construct their subjectivities in opposition to each other and to take openly hostile actions against each other. In the years that followed, neither Pyongyang nor Seoul crossed the threshold of war. However, there were regular tensions, often resulting in many deaths. Between 1966 and 1969, for example, hundreds of soldiers on both sides were killed in regular border clashes.
In spite of the prevailing hostility, there have also been moments of rapprochement and dialogue in inter-Korean relations. The first meeting between representatives of the two Koreas took place in July 1972. The document they signed signalled a willingness to engage in dialogue for the reunification of Korea. It was based on North Korea’s leader Kim Ir Sen's Three Principles of Reunification, which had been promulgated a few months earlier. According to these principles, reunification should be achieved:
- independent of outside influences
- on the basis of national unity despite ideological and systemic differences, and
- by peaceful means through inter-Korean dialogue.
Although the 1972 agreement did not resolve the current disputes, it became the basis for talks in the following years. In particular, the so-called 'Sunshine Decade' of 1998-2008 and the inter-Korean rapprochement of 2018 have shown that dialogue, although difficult, is possible.
Recent developments, however, suggest that the coming months will be marked by increasing inter-Korean tensions. Much of the credit for this goes to Kim Jong-un, who has effectively abandoned the North's 1972 doctrine towards the South.
Hostility
On December 30th, 2023, at the plenum of the Workers' Party of Korea, the North Korean leader rejected the goal of peaceful Korean reunification and described inter-Korean relations as hostile and pointed to the need to prepare military capabilities to 'subjugate' South Korea in the event of a possible conflict. On the 16th of January, during a parliamentary session, Kim announced amendments to the North Korean constitution - he ordered to delete articles on reunification, reconciliation and Korean national unity, which shall be replaced by provisions defining the Republic of Korea as the North’s 'main enemy'. A few days later, the Unification Arch in Pyongyang, built in 2001 to symbolise Korean reconciliation, was demolished and the institutions responsible for inter-Korean relations were dismantled. Significantly, the North Korean leader rejected the possibility of dialogue not only with the current conservative authorities in the Republic of Korea but also with their possible liberal successors. In fact, he acknowledged that every government in Seoul - whether the ruling conservatives or the liberals - were in fact seeking to absorb the weaker North into the stronger South.
Kim Jong Un's words prompted two respected American researchers - Robert Carlin, a long-time CIA analyst and State Department official, and Siegfried Hecker, a nuclear physicist and former director of the Los Alamos Nuclear Centre - to make an alarming claim. Via the specialised 38North website, they argued that the North Korean leader had "made a strategic decision to go to war". Carlin and Hecker's views on a possible war breaking out on the Korean Peninsula went viral. However, such a stance seems highly questionable - as it is difficult to find convincing arguments that war would bring any positive outcome for the authorities in Pyongyang. Moreover, the focus on the prospect of war is a distraction from more likely and real threats. The mere fact that Kim Jong Un is unlikely to launch a suicide war does not mean that there is no cause for concern.
Kim's characterisation of inter-Korean relations as 'hostile’ is first and foremost a realistic assessment of how they have been for decades. Abandoning the idea of inter-Korean dialogue may indicate that the North has come to regard contact with the South as costly and reunification under a peace formula as dangerous. Indeed, reunification with a democratic and free-market South Korea would be a disaster for the authorities in Pyongyang, if only because of the loss of control over information. The seriousness of this problem is illustrated by the fact that the North Korean authorities have in recent years stepped up their crackdown on outside influences in society, including South Korean pop culture. Would the authorities in Pyongyang try to annex the South and try to extend control over another 50 million Koreans, given that controlling a population of 25 million in the North is already a challenge?
Regardless of the totalitarian nature of Kim Jong Un's rule, there is no denying the rationality of his actions. He must be aware that he would not be able to win a conflict with the US and South Korean armed forces, which have both nuclear and conventional superiority. Moreover, he would need to amass military resources and develop facilities close to the border with South Korea in order to prepare for a conflict. Meanwhile, according to reports from the US, UK and Ukrainian governments, the North has sent significant amounts of military equipment to Russia in recent months in support of its aggression against Ukraine.
We should not forget that intimidation is part of the logic of North-South relations. Pyongyang did not hesitate to threaten to "turn Seoul into a sea of fire" when it was still officially maintaining its unification rhetoric. Furthermore, in speeches to the party and parliament, Kim did not talk about an unconditional willingness to go to war. On the contrary, he stipulated that military action would only be taken in response to "provocations by enemies". While North Korea is used to blaming others for its problems, the fact is that it is not only its actions that have escalated tensions on the Korean peninsula in recent months. The government of South Korea's President Yoon Suk-yeol, who has been in office since 2022, has expanded the scale and scope of joint military exercises with the US, built up its own military capabilities and strengthened trilateral cooperation with the US and Japan. At the same time, it has stepped up its confrontational rhetoric towards the North. Therefore, North Korea's actions are not in a limbo.
Pushing the Americans off the Peninsula
The fact that Kim Jong Un is unlikely to be preparing for war does not mean that there are no other problems. Threats other than war are real and growing.
North Korea has a long history of using limited military provocations for various purposes. While during the Cold War, they were used to destabilise the political situation in the South, in recent years they have been used mainly to test the credibility of South Korea's alliance with the US.
The development of North Korea's military arsenal is particularly worrying. It expands the North's range of potential actions against the South and the US. In the past month alone, Pyongyang has tested new submarine-launched and land-based cruise missiles. The solid-fuel medium-range ballistic missile tested in January could pose a serious problem for US missile defence systems.
North Korea is also developing a long-range missile capability - the Hwasong-18 intercontinental ballistic missile, which can potentially hit targets on US territory. Last year, the North also demonstrated a smaller tactical nuclear warhead that could be deployed on multiple delivery vehicles. The North is also testing underwater drones that could potentially carry a nuclear payload.
North Korean drones have already flown into the Seoul area in late 2022, to the surprise of the South Korean military. North Korea is also developing reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities to “see” the US and South Korean forces. Having successfully launched its first military satellite last November, three more are expected to be launched this year.
The development of North Korea's nuclear and missile arsenal is primarily aimed at strengthening its nuclear deterrent. This is seen as a guarantee for the regime's survival in Pyongyang. The North also seeks to influence other states and the situation in the region through its nuclear and missile arsenal. In particular, it seeks to undermine Washington's credibility in the eyes of its allies.
The North wants to create a situation in which the US does not respond to a North Korean attack on the South for fear of a North Korean nuclear counter-attack on US bases in the region or even on US territory.
In addition to the development of its military capabilities, North Korea is also trying to make the most effective use of the international situation. Kim Jong Un has, on a number of occasions referred to the current global situation as a "new Cold War". The US-China rivalry and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which are part of this, provide a broader context for the North's activities.
In the reality of escalating great power confrontation and after the failure of talks with the US in 2019 Pyongyang saw rapprochement with Russia and China as the most reasonable option.
To meet Russia's war needs in Ukraine, the North supplies not only artillery ammunition but also missiles, including KN-23s based on the Iskander missile. Russia's use of these missiles in Ukraine provides the regime with an opportunity to test their value under combat conditions. In return, North Korea can obtain military technology from Russia, including space technology, political support in the UN Security Council and assistance in circumventing sanctions.
Relations with Beijing are equally important. The resumption of economic cooperation with China after the pandemic - which severely weakened the North Korean economy - is a guarantee of the North's economic survival. China, like Russia, votes against imposing further sanctions on North Korea at the UN and allows existing restrictions to be circumvented. The support of the two permanent members of the Security Council thus gives North Korea relative freedom to develop its military capabilities and escalate tensions in the region.
North Korea in the shadow of war
The scale of the benefits of maintaining close relations with Russia and China makes Kim’s regime eager to present itself as a useful, valuable partner to these countries. From the point of view of Russian aggression against Ukraine, not only are North Korean supplies of ammunition and armaments beneficial, but so is the focus of US attention on North Korea. Russia wants the US to be more concerned with the situation on the Korean peninsula than in Eastern Europe. Moreover, by developing relations with North Korea, Russia is also putting pressure on South Korea not to support Ukraine with ammunition.
For China, on the other hand, the value of North Korean activity is that it can complicate US assumptions about its defence in East Asia. In fact, U. S. planners have to consider the possibility of simultaneous military action in two separate war theaters, such as the Taiwan Straits and Korea, including the limited use of nuclear weapons. Such actions would pose operational challenges for the US and its allies in the region, even if not coordinated by Beijing and Pyongyang.
North Korea could also take actions below the threshold of war to undermine the credibility of the US alliance, which is also important to China and Russia. Limited conventional or missile strikes on the inter-Korean border could be used to test the US and South Korean response. The North can assume that the US will refrain from a firm response in the event of an escalation, fearing not only a nuclear response but also potential Chinese involvement should the situation escalate dangerously into full-scale war.
A muted response from Washington to a North Korean provocation could shake the confidence of US allies - both in East Asia and Europe - in the value of US security guarantees.
However, the fact that North Korea's actions are to the benefit of Russia and China does not mean that it is under their control. The authorities in Pyongyang treat the two neighbours as instrumental, sometimes going so far as to take hostile action against them. In 2021-2022, for example, North Korean hackers stole information from a Russian missile company. Pyongyang’s relationship with Beijing, on the other hand, is marked by deep mistrust, which is why Kim Jong Un has increased cooperation with Russia in the past year - to signal to Xi Jinping that he is not exclusively dependent on China and can also count on Vladimir Putin's support.
North Korea has many options for limited attacks on South Korea. According to the South Korean government, from the end of the Korean War in 1953 until the end of 2022. The North has carried out 1119 local provocations of various kinds against the South. About 50% of these were at sea, 45% on land and 5% in the air. The risk of incidents or even border conflicts is all the higher now that North Korea violated the 2018 Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures on the inter-Korean border last November. Yet, before that the South suspended part of the agreement. Among other things, it provided for the suspension of some military exercises near the demilitarized zone and the activation of border incident prevention procedures.
In early January, shells were fired at the disputed maritime border with South Korea near the islands of Yeonpyeong and Baengnyeong, foreshadowing the events of the following months. This time the South responded immediately with shelling on the North Korean side and there were no casualties. However, it is worth remembering that the situation in this area has sometimes been much worse. In 2010, for example, North Korea first sank a South Korean ship (46 sailors were killed) and then shelled Yeonpyeong (four people were killed).
A major escalation could take place in the spring, with South Korea's annual manoeuvres with the US scheduled for March and the South's general election in April. North Korea could also step up hacking and intelligence activities in the South, for example, to steal funds, military operational plans or even to organise terrorist attacks. An additional element of escalation could be further missile tests and possibly a nuclear one.
Finally, Kim Jong Un may decide to gradually escalate tensions in view of the US presidential elections in November. This would be a situation similar to the one in 2017. - At that time, in order to strengthen its negotiating position ahead of talks with Donald Trump's administration, the DPRK conducted several missile and a hydrogen weapons test. Given the likelihood of his victory in this year's election, the North may be preparing to return to negotiations with the new administration.
However, it is doubtful that these would include denuclearisation - talks on this failed in 2019 and North Korea has since expanded its arsenal. Kim may be willing to engage in dialogue with Trump under the pretence of discussing nuclear weapons but with the aim of gaining concessions in exchange for de-escalating the U. S. alliance with South Korea, or sanction reliefs. Talks with the Americans could also serve to strengthen Pyongyang's position in its relations with China and Russia.
The North's adoption of an openly confrontational line towards the South is a further justification for the possibility of various types of aggressive action below the threshold of war. By radicalising its stance, Pyongyang is signalling to Seoul that it would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons against the South Koreans in a potential conflict. In the short term, it is unlikely that South Korea, under pressure from its northern neighbour, will relax its cooperation with its US ally and abandon the expansion of its military capabilities. In the longer term, however, the North's actions may raise division among the political elites in the South, or at least that’s Kim’s vision of such policy. Therefore, the main force of Pyongyang’s influence on the political processes in South Korea is not to be an invasion, but threats backed by the development of nuclear and missile capabilities.
In summary, the initiation of full-scale aggression by North Korea is highly unlikely. Starting a war would solve none of Kim Jong Un's problems. The danger is therefore not that the North will deliberately start a war, but that it could happen as a result of an exaggerated escalation triggered by regular provocations below the threshold of war. Maritime border violations, exchanges of fire in the Demilitarised Zone, missile tests, the use of drones or cyber attacks - responding to these threats will test the credibility of the South Korea-US alliance. They will face the difficult task of striking a balance between a necessary and firm response to North Korea's actions and refraining from a response that the authorities in Pyongyang would interpret as a prelude to imminent war. That is why the US may be willing to establish channels of communication with the North. This would reduce the risk of misunderstandings in the event of an uncontrolled escalation. The Biden administration is said to have made more than 20 proposals for talks with North Korea - each of which has been rejected. This shows that Kim Jong Un is not currently interested in negotiating with the US. The question is whether he will change his mind - and if so, on what terms.
