- Tomasz Rydelek
The Middle East in the shadow of the war.
The Middle East cauldron never stops boiling. The multitude of nations, faiths, and cultures results in endless conflicts of interest creating decades of instability. The war in Ukraine is yet another source of fuel for the Middle Eastern fire. Many countries of the region see the European war as a potential opportunity to strengthen their position in the regional or even global game. War, however, presents an equally great risk of descending into another round of civil unrest. What is really at stake in the Middle East?
The New Generation
The war in Ukraine has put Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in a very uncomfortable position. Both countries are considered traditional US allies in the Middle East. However, the reality is much more complicated. Since Barack Obama's presidency, relations between Washington, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi have been in crisis.
Arab leaders took very badly to Obama's support of the Arab Spring protests, the reduction of U.S. military involvement in the Middle East, and the signing of the 2015 Nuclear agreement with Iran. All of this led Arabs to lose confidence in U.S. security guarantees and begin looking for alternative partners. This process was not reversed even by Donald Trump's presidency, which brought a temporary thaw in Washington's relations with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.
The leaders of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, Mohammed bin Salman and Mohammed bin Zayed, despite the fact that there is a considerable age difference between them (24 years), are representatives of the same political generation: new Arab leaders, who want to break away from the status of America's "vassal state" and - using the wealth of natural resources - conduct an independent foreign policy that juggles between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing.
From the perspective of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, the war in Ukraine is not a Ukrainian-Russian clash, but an American-Russian one. There are even claims across the Gulf that the war in Ukraine is the first hot conflict in a broader US-China struggle that will determine a new world order. Regardless of how the war in Ukraine is perceived, the Arabs in no way feel obligated to unequivocally support either Ukraine or America. Especially since both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have gained much in recent years from their cooperation with Moscow and Beijing.
In 2016, when the price of oil was below $50 per barrel, the OPEC countries, in consultation with Russia, agreed to reduce oil production, thereby driving up prices. This is how the so-called OPEC+ format was created, which still exists today and has a key influence on the formation of global oil prices. At the same time, the scale of Saudi and Emirati investments in the Russian economy began to grow. Military cooperation also began to be discussed. Unable to obtain certain types of armaments from the Americans, the Arab monarchies began to consider buying Russian gear. It was also thanks to Russian mediation that the Emirates re-established diplomatic relations with Syria and became one of the main supporters of Assad's rehabilitation and Syria's return to the League of Arab States.
The situation is similar with China. Although economic cooperation between Beijing and Riyadh and Abu Dhabi is based mainly on imports of energy resources to meet the needs of China's faltering economy, recent years have seen increasing investment in other areas, such as high-tech industries. Between 2010 and 2020, trade between the Saudi Kingdom and China increased from $42 billion to $72 billion, and between the UAE and China, from $14 billion to $50 billion. Also by 2020, China became the main trading partner of both Saudi Arabia and the Emirates with countries being central to China's Belt and Road project. We can also see the beginnings of military cooperation between China and the Gulf monarchies. For example, U.S. intelligence believes that the Saudis, in cooperation with the Chinese, are conducting an advanced ballistic missile program.
In recent years, Arabia and the Emirates have used their relations with Moscow and Beijing as leverage in dealing with Washington. For example, when Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman came under criticism after the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi at the Istanbul consulate and Congress began pressing President Trump on sanctions, MBS traveled to Beijing to meet with Xi Jinping and promised to invest $10 billion in China. This cooled the mood on Capitol Hill and raised fears of a recalibration of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's foreign policy and Riyadh's increasing cooperation with Russia and China at the expense of its alliance with the US.
The current war in Ukraine is first and foremost an opportunity for Saudi Arabia and the UAE to increase their own political independence by continuing their policy of maneuvering between the US, Russia, and China.
Not surprisingly, when Russia attacked Ukraine, neither Saudi Arabia nor the United Arab Emirates rushed to condemn Russian actions. As early as late February, when oil prices crossed the symbolic $100 per barrel barrier, officials from President Joe Biden's administration began calling Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, the two most important players in the OPEC cartel, asking them to increase oil production. However, neither Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman nor Abu Dhabi's heir to the throne and de facto leader of the UAE, Mohammed bin Zayed, wanted to talk to the U.S. president. Through their advisors, both leaders gave the Americans only a brief message: any decision on increasing oil production can only be made in the OPEC+ format, meaning with Russia's participation.
It was only in early June that the KSA and the UAE agreed to increase production and, in July and August, bring to market 248,000 more barrels of oil than OPEC planned last year. However, there can be no talk of any rift between the Gulf and Moscow, because the decision to increase production was made in the OPEC+ format, and so with Russian approval. Moreover, analysts stress that 248,000 additional barrels are not enough to bring down oil prices, which the US is so keen on.
However, it would be a mistake to assume that Riyadh and Abu Dhabi sympathize with Russian aggression against Ukraine. Both of these Arab countries see the Ukrainian war as a geopolitical game in which they are trying to win as much as possible for themselves and since they together control 21% of world oil reserves, they have a very strong hand in this game. The current "neutrality" of the KSA and UAE towards the war in Ukraine may turn out to be only temporary. If the Americans were willing to make far-reaching concessions to the Arabs, the latter could reduce their cooperation with Russia within OPEC+ and increase oil production by much more than 248,000 barrels, which would calm the situation on world markets.
However, the list of Arab demands to Washington is very long and contains many controversial points. First of all, the KSA and the UAE are counting on increased American military assistance in protecting Saudi and Emirati oil installations from Houthi attacks, as well as a stricter course towards Iran (especially in the context of the return of the US to a deal with Tehran). There are also demands for special protection for Arab investments financed in Russia. The Saudis also want to limit US criticism of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and therefore want Joe Biden, who called Saudi Arabia a "pariah" during his election campaign, to come to the Kingdom in person and declare his support for the Crown Prince. The Emirates also have their own special demands and the main one is to agree to the sale of F-35 aircraft to the UAE. Indeed, the sale of 50 F-35 aircraft to the Emirates was one of the conditions for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the UAE and Israel, the so-called Abraham Agreement. However, the agreement was blocked by the Biden administration due to the growing cooperation between Abu Dhabi and Beijing.
The Americans approach Arab demands with a great distance and consider many of them difficult to meet. In this situation, the Americans are making efforts to return oil from Venezuela and Iran to the world markets. However, it is possible that in the long run, especially if the war in Ukraine continues, Washington will have to make concessions to Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.
Sultan in Crisis
Turkey's attitude towards the war in Ukraine is ambiguous and full of mutual contradictions. In the very first days of the war, President Erdogan condemned the Russian invasion, but at the same time refused to join in on rounds of anti-Russian sanctions.
On February 28, Turkey closed the Black Sea straits to Russian warships, but continued to allow Russian military aircraft to fly "from" and "to" Syria through Turkish airspace until late April. At the same time, despite the delivery of more Bayraktar drones to Ukraine, Ankara continues to push for peace talks and offers the Ukrainians and Russians Turkish mediation. However, when the possibility of NATO enlargement to include Sweden and Finland arose, Turkey began blocking accession talks.
Turkey sides with Ukraine, but at the same time does so in a way that does not antagonize Russia. Soner Cagaptay, one of the leading experts on Turkish politics, calls Turkey's stance "pro-Ukrainian neutrality."
Turkey has increased cooperation with Russia in recent years, but no one in Ankara treats Russia as an ally. The Turks are still looking for partners to checkmate Russian actions in the Black Sea, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. In this situation, Kyiv becomes a natural partner for Ankara. However, Turkey does not want to take actions that could provoke a sharp reaction from Moscow. Nearly half of Turkey's gas demand is covered by imports from Russia. Turkish tourism, which generates about 11% of Turkey's GDP, also relies heavily on Russians, who make up about 1/3 of foreign tourists to Turkey. Additionally, Russia, although weakened by the war in Ukraine, is still able to undermine Turkey's position in Syria, the Caucasus, and Libya.
The Turks are even less eager for a confrontation with Russia, as their country is itself going through serious political and economic perturbations. Inflation in Turkey has reached almost 70%, and the Turkish lira has suffered successive drops and last year, the Turkish currency lost 44% of its value. Turkey is also increasingly feeling the burden of hosting nearly 4 million Syrian refugees living in the country. The poor economic situation in the country is causing a decline in support not only for the ruling AKP-MHP coalition, but also for President Erdogan. According to the latest poll conducted at the beginning of May, as many as 62% of Turkish voters believe that the ruling team is most responsible for Turkey's economic problems. And next year, parliamentary and presidential elections will be held in Turkey. The opposition has not had a better opportunity to challenge Erdogan who has ruled Turkey for nearly 20 years.
Despite their plight, the Turks, like the Arabs, believe that the war in Ukraine could prove to be an ideal opportunity for them to increase their own role in the global balance of power, especially after Helsinki and Stockholm began seeking entry into NATO. Turkey has blocked accession talks with Finland and Sweden, and President Erdogan has been unwilling to receive delegations from the two Nordic countries in Ankara to discuss Turkish concerns. However, this does not mean that Ankara is saying a definitive "no" to Alliance enlargement. Erdogan is playing a sophisticated game in which, in exchange for agreeing to NATO enlargement, he is trying to gain concessions from his Western partners.
Above all, Ankara wants sanctions to be lifted from the Turkish armaments industry, the dispute over Turkey's purchase of Russian S-400 air defense systems to be resolved, Turkey is to be reinstated into the F-35 program, and the sale of modernized versions of F-16 aircraft to the Turks are also to be back on the table. Additionally, Ankara hopes that NATO's position on the Kurdish issue will be unified. Turkey, which has been in a civil war with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) since the 1980s, is extremely negative towards any Kurdish organizations operating both inside and outside Turkey. Kurdish national identity is seen in Turkey as a threat to national security.
Although all NATO countries consider the PKK a terrorist organization, they have been much more lenient towards other Kurdish organizations such as the US-backed Civil Protection Units (YPG) fighting in Syria. Over the years of war in Syria, the YPG has gained sympathy from many liberal circles in the West, especially in Sweden. This is totally unacceptable to the Turks, who equate the YPG and the PKK.
Turkey's behavior on NATO enlargement is a gambit. Potentially, the Turks can force, especially out of the Americans and Swedes, specific concessions. On the other hand, the Turks can very easily overbid. In recent days, President Erdogan has threatened, among other things, to launch a new military operation in Syria. The Turkish attitude is a source of constant frustration in Western capitals, which perceive Ankara's conditions as mere blackmail. This causes reluctance in making concessions to Erdogan, especially at a time when he is fighting for his political future with just over a year left until elections in Turkey. If NATO considers Erdogan's conditions too high, it may postpone the enlargement of the Alliance until after the Turkish elections in the hope that Erdogan's government will fall and the opposition will come to power.
Iranian Dilemmas
Iran has openly supported Moscow since the beginning of the war in Ukraine. On the very second day of the invasion, President Ibrahim Raisi had a phone conversation with Putin, during which he accepted the Russian explanation of the invasion being a "legitimate response" to the West's disregard for international agreements and NATO expansion. The authorities in Tehran sympathize with Moscow for several reasons.
First of all, Russian-Iranian relations have expanded significantly since 2015. The two countries have worked closely together in Syria, leading not only to Bashar Assad's retention of power, but also to the authorities in Damascus recapturing much of the country. In recent years, the two countries have also begun to strengthen economic ties. Thanks to Russian support, in late 2021, the member countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization agreed to change Iran's status from "observer" to full "member," a process that is expected to be finalized within the next 2 years. In addition, work is also in its final stages on a Russian-Iranian agreement on 20-year strategic cooperation, which is a kind of road map setting the direction for the development of relations between Moscow and Tehran.
Tehran's support of Russian aggression also stems from some twisted historical analogies. From Iran's perspective, strengthening NATO's eastern flank is a provocation just like U.S. military bases in Iraq, Turkey, and the Persian Gulf. The Iranian government views the ouster of Yanukovych and the protests in Ukraine in late 2013 and early 2014 as another "color revolution," which it believes, like the 2009 Green Revolution in Iran, was sponsored by the West.
Be that as it may, there are fears in Tehran that the war in Ukraine could negatively impact talks on a U.S. return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the Iran nuclear deal, and the lifting of U.S. sanctions that President Trump imposed on Iran in 2018. Talks on this issue have been ongoing in Vienna since early 2021, and any progress has been very slow. Before the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the U.S. and Iran seemed close to an agreement, but when Russia invaded Ukraine and Western countries slapped sanctions on Moscow, the Russian delegation in Vienna (also a party to the agreement) demanded written guarantees from the Americans that Western sanctions on Russia would not adversely affect Russian-Iranian cooperation.
Therefore, the Russian stance has led to the suspension of further talks in Vienna. Moscow fears that lifting sanctions from Tehran will lead to Iranian oil and gas flooding the market, which could have dire economic consequences for the Russian economy.
The Iranians remain between a hammer and an anvil. They are anxious for the sanctions to be lifted, but they do not want to enter into a new agreement with the USA bypassing Russia. The Iranians fear that the Americans, by concluding a new agreement, would insist on adding regulations on many controversial issues that the original deal did not cover, such as support for pro-Iranian militias in the region or Iran's ballistic missile program. That is why the Iranians have been pushing, since the beginning of the talks with the Biden administration, that the goal is only to return to the original Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and nothing more. However, for that, the Iranians need the Russians.
The Russians understand that prolonged obstruction of talks on the Iranian deal could negatively affect Russian-Iranian relations which Moscow cannot afford at the moment. Therefore, it is doubtful that in the following months, the attitude of the Russian delegation in Vienna will be as categorical as in February. Russia will certainly try to prolong these negotiations to the limit, but this will not be at the expense of its contacts with Tehran.
Especially since the Iranians themselves have some doubts about the legitimacy of the agreement with America. There are fears in Tehran that the next U.S. president might pull out of the deal as Donald Trump did in 2018. Such a scenario is all the more likely, because the JCPA was never approved by Congress and in reactivating it, President Biden cannot count on Congressional support. It seems that the Iranian authorities are still not completely convinced about the sense of the agreement with the US.
The Russians hope that eventually Iranian doubts will prevail and there will be no Washington-Tehran agreement and Iranian oil and gas will not return to world markets.
Israel and the Syrian Triangle
In the Ukraine-Russia war, Israel sides with Kyiv but, like Turkey, shies away from taking aggressive action against Moscow. Israel has neither joined the sanctions imposed on Russia nor begun shipping arms to Ukraine.
Indeed, good relations with Russia are of strategic importance for Israel's national security. With Moscow's tacit approval, the Israeli air force can freely attack Iranian targets in Syria without fear of Russian S-400 systems deployed in southern Syria. Not only that, but the Russians most likely regularly exchange intelligence with the Israelis about Iranian activities in Syria and Iraq.
Admittedly, Israel could break this tacit agreement with Moscow and attack targets in Syria without Russian consent. From the perspective of Israeli interests, however, this would not make much sense. Russia is positively aligned with Tel Aviv and most often takes Israeli interests into account in its Middle East decisions. In addition, the Russian presence in Syria allows Assad to continually maneuver between Moscow and Tehran. This is also to the benefit of Israel, which cannot allow Syria to become completely dependent on Iran.
The Russians have sent signals to the Israelis several times in recent weeks warning against attempts to change the current status quo. In early May, a Hamas delegation visited Moscow, and two weeks later, Russian anti-aircraft defenses fired on Israeli aircraft as they returned from an attack on targets inside Syria.
All of this makes it highly doubtful that Israel, even with Russia weakened by the war in Ukraine, will take more aggressive action that could undermine the Russian position in Syria.
Arab Spring 2.0
Although most Middle Eastern countries try not to get involved in the war in Ukraine, the war is significantly affecting the Middle East. Most notably through a sharp increase in food prices, which has been felt in the regions most dependent on food imports. The Middle East is one such region. A good example here is the case of such a basic commodity as wheat. Russia and Ukraine together account for about 1/3 of world wheat exports.
Egypt is the largest wheat importer in the world, and imports from Ukraine and Russia used to meet more than 70% of its demand. However, when the war in Ukraine broke out, wheat prices jumped by 60% and Egyptian inflation rose from 5% to nearly 15%. A similar situation also exists in Tunisia, Iraq, and Lebanon among others. Mustafa al Kadhimi, Prime Minister of Iraq, estimates that the war in Ukraine will lead to a rise in food prices in his country by at least 40% compared to last year. We took a closer look at the food crisis situation in one of our recent materials.
Experts warn that rising food prices could lead to a deep economic and political crisis in the Middle East. Some note many similarities between the current situation and that of late 2010, and thus predict the outbreak of a new Arab Spring.
Despite the passage of more than 10 years since those events, the socio-economic problems that gave rise to the Arab Spring still remain unresolved. Most protest movements have been suppressed and power continues to be exercised in an authoritarian manner. Rising food prices and the general economic crisis could be the catalyst for a new wave of protests to sweep across the region again.
The most difficult situation is in Lebanon and Iraq. Baghdad still has not recovered economically from the civil war and the fight against the Caliphate. There are also growing divisions among the Shiite population, which is increasingly divided into two camps: nationalists and supporters of cooperation with Iran. The situation is even worse in Lebanon where inflation has exceeded 200% and the government no longer has the money to pay its current bills. Even food imports to Lebanon are now only paid for with ad hoc loans from the World Bank. The situation also looks bad in Egypt, where President Sisi who came to power in the wake of the 2014 military coup, is repeating many of the mistakes of Hosni Mubarak for whom the nail in the political coffin turned out to be the reduction of bread subsidies.
Middle Eastern countries see the Ukrainian-Russian war from a broad perspective: as an American-Russian or even an American-Chinese conflict. Individual countries are very reluctant to get involved in this war, because they have gained a lot from cooperation with Russia and China in recent years and now do not want to give this up. Instead, the Middle Eastern players are making their support for Ukraine conditional on concessions from the US or NATO. However, this gambit may turn out deadly. If the war in Ukraine continues and food prices continue to rise, countries such as Egypt, Lebanon, and Iraq may again face a wave of protests and social unrest resulting in a new Arab Spring.
