- Łukasz Gacek
Following Xi Jinping's rise to power in 2012, China has entered the implementation phase of the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation. The plan is to complete this by 2049, when the 100th anniversary of the proclamation of the People's Republic of China will be pompously celebrated. The construction of this 'prosperous, democratic, civilised, harmonious and modern socialist state' is intended to mark a definitive break with the trauma of the past century, when China suffered collective humiliation at the hands of Western powers. In pursuit of their fundamental goal, they emphasise the need to reform the system of global governance, which clearly illustrates their ambition to shape the norms and principles that underpin the modern international system. How do they intend to do this? Are they going to create a Chinese brave new world for us?
Chinese tabula rasa
China, like Asia as a whole, was an almost blank slate for the Western world for a long time - a tabula rasa. Asia was associated with something foreign, often hostile. It is no coincidence that this is how the Greeks once referred to the hostile Persian Empire. In ancient times, overland trade routes, such as the famous Silk Road, carried goods between East and West along their entire length, but merchants took turns passing goods on to each other. The lack of direct contact meant that knowledge of each other was severely limited. As a result, it was not until the great geographical discoveries of the 16th and 17th centuries, when maritime routes took precedence, that Westerners began to arrive in China on a regular basis, first, the Portuguese, followed by the Dutch, English and French, interested in overseas trade and the prospect of access to new lucrative markets. The Middle Kingdom also became the site of lively Catholic missionary activity. As a result of these relationships, a wealth of information about this mysterious and fascinating world began to reach Europe on a regular basis.
According to the latest findings of Chinese scholars, Chinese civilisation was born 5,800 years ago in the areas around the Yellow, Yangtze and West Liaohe rivers. It should be remembered, however, that Chinese writing monuments, in the form of fortune-telling inscriptions on bulls' shoulders and tortoise shells, only date from the 14th century BC. From these we learn of the earliest documented Shang dynasty, which began its reign in the 18th century BC at the earliest (1766-1122 BC / 1556-1046 BC). However, historiographical records from later centuries deal with what happened earlier. They mention the semi-legendary Xia Dynasty and the mythical Demiurge Emperors, the founders of Chinese civilisation. However, excavations do not provide us with any information on this subject.
Although the abundance of water provided a stable food supply, the frequent flooding of the rivers led people to see themselves as objects of nature. From ancient times, the Chinese had developed principles that defined the basis for the harmonious functioning of humans in the natural environment. Chinese cosmology was based on the belief that there is a cosmic order that is the source of all existence and a principle that governs all events in the universe. In the eyes of the Chinese, the universe was the equivalent of an organism, whose individual parts make up an ordered whole.
Chinese life was determined by geography. China was a continental state. Thus the world was defined through a territorial prism, using terms such as 'everything under the sky' (tianxia) or 'space surrounded by the seas' (sihai). Chinese mythology referred to a vast land with China in the centre, surrounded on four sides by the sea. Beyond these were foreign lands called haiwai, or what lies beyond the seas. China's history clearly showed limited interest in overseas expansion and exploration. The policy was more inward-looking. That’s why for more than two thousand years, from the Qin dynasty (221-206 BC) to the fall of the last dynasty, the Qing (1644-1911), China's rulers invoked the mandate of heaven to legitimise their own rule and confirm their country's central place in the world order. This was despite the fact that they never built a truly global empire. The concept of Zhongguo, or the Middle Kingdom, was not merely geographical. From the beginning, it referred to China as the cultural, political and economic centre of the world. China's foreign policy was primarily aimed at neutralising the threat of 'barbarian' invaders from the north, first the Xiongnu tribes and later the Mongols, Juragans and Manchus.
Chinese civilisation drew profusely from the influences of other cultures, and adapted selected elements to give them a Chinese character while positioning itself as an important centre of trade, integrating various markets while the interactions with the outside world for centuries took place via the Silk Road. Only the European expeditions to Asia in the age of great geographical discoveries shifted the focus to the seas. Until the 1840s China lived in the belief of its own superiority, surrounded by tribal states. The expansion of European powers led to a dramatic change in the Chinese conceptualisation of their own country as a nation, one among other similar entities with ‘parallel histories’. China was no longer an indivisible whole. At the end of the 19th century, China was torn apart. Foreign powers divided Chinese territory into spheres of influence, competing with each other for concessions and privileges in market access. China was relegated to the status of a semi-colony. The decline of imperial China in the nineteenth century, and at the same time the end of the sinocentric order, radically reduced its influence in the international space. We talked more about this recently in our episode.
The resolution of the civil war in China after the Second World War led to the defeat of the Kuomintang and the victory of the Communists. As a result, in 1949, the Nationalists found refuge in Taiwan, where they continued the tradition of the Republic, while on the mainland the Communists proclaimed the People's Republic of China. Almost overnight, the Communist Party rejected the international system based on Western values and placed itself outside the mainstream of world politics. It was not until more than twenty years later that China began to modify its position somewhat and integrate into the previously rejected international order. Crucial was the change in China's representation at the UN in October 1971, when the Republic of China (Taiwan) was replaced by the People's Republic of China, and later the normalisation of China's diplomatic relations with the United States in January 1979.
With Deng Xiaoping's initiation of a policy of reform and opening up to the world, China gradually began to integrate into the mainstream international system by becoming a member of major international economic organisations, including the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. The existing international system began to be seen as a structure that opened up new opportunities for it and in which it should actively participate.
It was the need to find itself in the new post-Cold War reality that led China to emphasise national stability and the need to strengthen territorial integrity. It resulted in “defensive diplomacy”, which emphasised the principles of hiding one's capabilities, biding one's time and not taking a leadership role. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc, China reoriented its foreign policy and firmly established a vision of a 'multipolar' world.
Aware of its own limitations, China has not frontally challenged the existing international order. However, by becoming a major stakeholder in this system, it has actively engaged in its reform.
The biggest milestone turned out to be the joining to the World Trade Organisation in 2001, which meant full integration into the global governance system and a starting point for engagement in international and regional trade construction and rule-making. Mostly since then, but also before, China has been the biggest beneficiary of the existing system, reaping the benefits of globalisation. By assuming the role of a free rider, it has not borne the costs of providing public goods, but has reaped significant benefits. The 'free rider' nickname was already used to describe China’s position in the global system, by the US President Barack Obama.
And China's leaders were well aware of that. They knew that global public goods such as the maintenance of world peace, the stability of the international monetary system and the promotion of sustainable development were extremely costly. They therefore preferred a selective approach, avoiding taking on too much responsibility in many areas. On the economic front, they called for participation in the global market, while being flexible and subject to its rules and standards. China was willing to accept obligations, but with the caveat that they should be commensurate with its level of development and capacity. This is reflected in the apparent dichotomy of China's identity, which wants to act as a developed country at times and as a developing country at others, depending on the circumstances.
A concrete example of this approach can be seen in the attitude of the international climate regime. At the Conference of the Parties in Sharm el-Sheikh in 2022 (COP27), it was decided to set up a fund to cover "loss and damage" in developing countries particularly affected by the damage caused by climate change. China supported this, while pointing out that it was itself experiencing the negative effects of climate change. Despite their earlier stated desire to take a leading role in the climate regime, they then stressed that as a developing country they were under no obligation to provide financial assistance to poor countries. They argued that developing countries should make their contributions "on a voluntary basis".
Still it was the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 that constituted an important turning point for China in terms of its position in the international system. This was seen in Beijing as an expression of the decline of Western powers, especially the United States, and the weakening of their position in the global system. China saw an opportunity to redefine its role in shaping the future order. The relative strength of the Chinese economy during the global recession seriously challenged the belief in the hegemony of neoliberal economics. China argued that the crisis exposed flaws in the international financial system and its governance structure. As a result, they began to demand that the voice of developing countries be strengthened within these structures. It can be argued that since then China began to openly challenge international norms and to present multilateralism as a useful means of pushing for a fairer international political and economic order.
This trend was reinforced by the coming to power in China of the fifth generation of leaders, led by Xi Jinping, heralding a departure from the 'defensive' strategy of China. The formula of 'staying in the shadows' has been modified in favour of displaying 'capabilities' in solving global problems. The opening slogan of this generation's rule became the Chinese Dream, linked to the achievement of two centenary goals. Let’s recall - the centenary of the Communist Party of China and the centenary of the People's Republic of China. These goals were to build a moderately prosperous society by 2021 and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation by 2049.
In November 2012, the following words came from Xi Jinping's mouth: ‘Everyone has an ideal, ambition and dream. We are now all talking about the Chinese Dream. In my opinion, achieving the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation has been the greatest dream of the Chinese people since the advent of modern times.”
The Chinese Dream has become an affirmation of China's growing power aspirations and a clear message that China intends to actively engage in shaping international norms. This is evidenced by the promoted formula of ‘superpower diplomacy with Chinese characteristics’, which Chinese policymakers believe should be more proactive and responsive to the international community's expectations of China. China has made it clear that it still wants to uphold the existing international system, from which it benefits greatly, but will seek to ‘reform and improve’ it.
The main leitmotif in Beijing's narrative became the formula of building a ‘shared future for all mankind’, which exposed the principles of integrity and interdependence in the modern world. The evoked interdependence of relations between states is driven, in Chinese vision, by economic globalisation.
The declaration of the changing approach, and at the same time China's response to the world's growing interdependence, was - you guess it - the One Belt and One Road initiative, proposed in 2013 and promoted as a form of practical cooperation based on mutual benefit. At first glance, it can be seen as a development strategy to promote trade connectivity and cooperation between countries along the land-based 'Belt' and the maritime 'Road'. But this is too narrow an understanding. In fact, it has become something much broader. As an important foreign policy tool, the initiative has given China the ability to shape international norms and standards. This is evidenced by the actions of China's leader, Xi Jinping, who has articulated the need to reform an unjust system of global governance and called for a stronger voice for developing countries.
In a speech marking the 50th anniversary of the PRC's UN membership, Xi Jinping said that ‘China will stay actively engaged in reforming and developing the global governance system [...], China will continue to stand together with other developing countries and firmly support greater representation and say of them, especially African countries, in the international governance system.'.
Still, recognising the impossibility of comprehensively transforming the Western-led system of global governance, China is seeking to modify it to serve its national interest better, not to change it. To this end, it is seeking to increase its influence within existing institutions such as the United Nations, the G20 and the International Monetary Fund. Where existing institutions prove insufficiently responsive to their interests, they are beginning to create their own competing versions - one example is the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which has created an alternative to the Asian Development Bank. Established in 2016, the AIIB has $100 billion in capital and over 100 members, including many of the US's closest allies such as South Korea, Canada, Australia and many European countries.
What’s more, China's emphasis is on strengthening the representation of developing countries in the organisations it creates. Following Beijing's logic, the low effectiveness of the international economic mechanism centred on the G7 is pointed out. Instead, engagement with the G20 and BRICS, which is presented as an expression of the growing voice of emerging economies, is positively assessed.
This led Xi Jinping to articulate China's aspirations to lead the reform of the global governance system, which, for the first time, was so strongly expressed at the 19th CCP National Congress in 2017.
“Both China and the world are in the midst of profound and complex changes. China is still in an important period of strategic opportunity for development; the prospects are bright but the challenges are severe. All comrades must aim high and look far, be alert to dangers even in times of calm, have the courage to pursue,reform and break new ground, and never become hardened to change or inactive.”
He also stressed that China's modernisation offers a new option for those who want to accelerate their development while maintaining their independence. He expressed his openness to sharing "Chinese wisdom" and "Chinese solutions" to the problems facing humanity.
Paradoxically, in the Chinese view, the cornerstones of the formula for building a 'shared future for all mankind' are the concepts of 'democracy' and 'partnership'. The concept of democracy is peculiarly interpreted through the prism of “consultation”, which is treated as an important means of exercising international governance. By 'consultative' democracy, at least narratively, China means equality among sovereign nations regardless of the type of regime (authoritarian or democratic), increasing the voting power of developing countries (which they themselves wish to include), and rejecting the domination of any single state or group of states.
The authorities in Beijing argue that they have developed a more enlightened form of democracy with their 'new type of party system'. According to this scheme, not only the Communist Party but also the other eight 'democratic' political parties are involved in initiating decision-making processes in China. They are presented as external advisers through the platform of the People's Political Consultative Conference. China has begun to take practical steps to promote this idea abroad, emphasising that they are providing the world with Chinese ideas on contemporary party politics and offering a new model for global political progress. In doing so, they are challenging the Western world by attempting to redefine the formula of democracy and use it to describe their own model of governance. They have chosen to call themselves democracy rather than changing the practices that lead to that goal. In fact, they have offered an entirely alternative understanding of what democracy is.
By advocating this 'consultative' democracy in inter-state relations, China is also emphasising the superiority of its own political model. In doing so, it discredits Western democratic regimes by portraying them as chaotic, confrontational, inefficient and oligarchic. The second notion of partnership, on the other hand, refers to the building of international partnerships based on dialogue, non-confrontation and the absence of alliances. In Beijing's view, these partnerships are an alternative to the alliances created by the United States. China promotes it instrumentally because it does not impose obligations and allows partners to cooperate despite ideological and systemic differences.
And so, today, it is clear that China is on the offensive, openly stating that it wants to "actively participate in and lead the reform of the global governance system". This is reflected in the outcome of the 20th National Congress of the CCP in 2022. While the motto of Xi Jinping's first term as Party General Secretary and President of the PRC was the Chinese Dream, and the second term was 'New Era', the slogan of the third term has become 'Chinese-style modernisation'. This can be read as a veiled criticism of Western neo-liberal globalisation. Faced with unprecedented challenges, China declares that it is now in a position to offer the world more opportunities than the crisis-ridden Western world. China-style modernisation' is intended to provide developing countries with an example of how to modernise themselves, and to make them realise that there is an alternative choice.
Xi legitimises this vision with statistics he cited during his speech at the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party in 2022:
“In the past decade, China’s GDP has grown from 54 trillion yuan to 114 trillion yuan to account for 18.5 percent of the world economy, up 7.2 percentage points. China has remained the world’s second largest economy, and its per capita GDP has risen from 39,800 yuan to 81,000 yuan. It ranks first in the world in terms of grain output, and it has ensured food and energy security for its more than 1.4 billion people. The number of permanent urban residents has grown by 11.6 percentage points to account for 64.7 percent of the population. China’s manufacturing sector is the largest in the world, as are its foreign exchange reserves. China has built the world’s largest networks of high-speed railways and expressways and made major achievements in building airports, ports, and water conservancy, energy, information, and other infrastructure.” - Xi told the party members in 2022.
Xi Jinping also pointed out that the world is undergoing 'great changes not seen in a century', referring to key challenges mainly related to climate change, the phenomenon of terrorism, recession and the industrial revolution. It seems that China intends to treat these 'great changes not seen in a century' as a catalyst rather than an obstacle to achieving the main goal of the great renaissance of the Chinese nation. They are making it clear that they can reap tangible benefits from properly managing the changes in the world. This is also the starting point for Beijing's new initiatives: the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, the Global Civilisation Initiative and the Global Artificial Intelligence Management Initiative. These vividly illustrate China's ambition to steer the discourse on global governance, as well as to promote its own narrative and present indigenous solutions to the global development agenda in selected areas.
China understands that in order to continue its rapid growth it needs to integrate with the world. But they are also aware that this increases the risk of unwanted liberal values infiltrating the Middle Kingdom. Chinese leaders are therefore looking for ways to make the international system more like their own. It is the countries of the Global South that today represent the ground on which China sees an opportunity to pursue its goals and gain discursive advantage. The ability to tell its story not only consolidates domestic support, but also attracts allies among developing countries. However, proposed initiatives on global development, security and civilisation, and calls for a more open and inclusive world that emphasises the importance of diversity and the progress of all humanity, seem to confirm that China is dressing up in new clothes the ideas we already know well. This shows that for several decades China has failed to propose a new formula for cooperation with the outside world, especially with developing countries, but is playing the same cards. This suggests that the declared active assumption of responsibility for global affairs will be limited. China's relatively selective participation in global governance is largely due to its limited ideological resources. It is difficult for China to develop a universal message that would be accepted unreservedly in all parts of the world.
Still, far bigger issues are internal, threatening the domestic legitimacy of the regime. The style and methods of governance, where the law is defined by the Communist Party, which has been in power since 1949, set the general framework. And since the 1970s or Mao’s death, CCP has provided China with steady, often very fast, level of progress. But now the problems start to pile up. First is urban overpopulation. China now officially has more than 1.4 billion people, 70% of whom live in urban areas, representing a 60% increase in population over the past 70 years (from >600 million in 1949). One consequence of this is the unemployment, which is particularly acute among young people just entering the labour market. To make matters worse, China's population is ageing rapidly. There are 300 million people in China over the age of 60. As a result of the rapidly declining fertility rate and the 2+1 policy, there are now 5 Chinese of working age to support every retiree. By the middle of this century, this will fall on the shoulders of just 2 young people. This is particularly striking given that at the start of the new millennium there were 10.
Moving on - the massive influx of people from the countryside into urbanised areas is rapidly changing the urban landscape. When Deng Xiaoping launched his reform policies, fewer than 200 million people lived in urbanised areas, compared with 1 billion today. This inevitably leads to social stratification. In addition, the development gap between regions and between urban and rural areas is widening. In other words, the eastern coastal areas are developing disproportionately faster than their counterparts in the interior. Deng once called on the Chinese to get richer, ultimately leading to a break with the principle of egalitarianism popularised during the Maoist era. Instead, uneven development means that some people are getting rich much faster than others. The number of new billionaires is now growing faster in China than anywhere else in the world. China boasts that it has lifted 700 million people out of poverty. But it has not solved the problem of growing income inequality. The GINI index, which ranges from 0 to 100, describes the inequality of income distribution in society. The higher it is, the greater the inequality. A value of 40 and above is generally considered alarming. China's GINI is currently 47.
Environmental issues are no less challenging. Rapid economic development since Deng Xiaoping initiated his reform programme has been closely correlated with an increase in the demand for energy, sourced mainly from fossil fuels. The energy mix was dominated by coal, characterised by low energy efficiency. A consequence of the burning of fossil fuels and deforestation, the progressive concentration of greenhouse gases, mainly carbon dioxide and methane, became an increase in average surface temperatures. No wonder, as China has for years prioritised economic growth over environmental protection. However, constant environmental disasters have not only destroyed natural resources and damaged the economy, but have also begun to pose a serious barrier to rebuilding the country's power. Today, China is the world's largest emitter of carbon dioxide (CO₂), sulphur dioxide (SO₂), nitrogen oxide (NOx) and fine particulate matter (PM). The consequences can be seen with the naked eye. Air pollution in China causes about 1.6 million premature deaths per year. 20% of arable land is contaminated. While desertification, directly threatens areas inhabited by a staggering 400 million people. Simply speaking - more than ¼ of China's land area is desert or areas subject to desertification. This is accompanied by a progressive water deficit. Per capita water resources are currently nearly three times lower than the world average.
Still Beijing is trying to counter this by betting big on renewables. In 2023 alone China accounted for 58% of the world's new renewable capacity additions. From wind and solar alone, they added 216GW and 76GW respectively. This is more than the rest of the world combined. As a result, the value of total installed capacity from renewables in China is now higher than from coal, and so green energy is now driving the growth boom. China is the world's largest investor in green energy and a major exporter of low-carbon technologies. Of course, boosting the development of alternative energy sectors does not solve all environmental problems, but it does show the direction in which China wants to go.
But this is not the end of the problems. China's economy is now on the brink of deflation. Debt levels are rising at an alarming rate, approaching 300% of GDP. China is also experiencing a major slump in the property market, with the risk of insolvency for major property developers. In particular, the collapse of the largest real estate behemoth - Evergrande, is a hiccup. This could mark the beginning of a recession in the coming years. In addition to these problems, others are emerging as a result of unbridled consumerism and the relentless pursuit of money. This in turn leads to a sense of alienation, moral and spiritual emptiness and a loosening of family ties, as the Chinese are increasingly experiencing today.
And so the fragmentation of global governance reflects the growing demand for new rules and approaches. It is therefore not surprising that China, too, wants to make its mark on this map. They are making attempts to reform the international governance system guided by their own interests. Although the Chinese violate many ‘Western rules of conduct’, especially concerning human rights, this can be seen not only in terms of threats but also opportunities, specifically as cooperation with China in solving pressing problems of modern civilisation, such as climate change or pandemic diseases, seems indispensable. Concerns may arise regarding how China intends to make normative interpretations and how it wants to shape the nature of multilateral organisations. Objectively, however, it is difficult to imagine the Chinese model being applied on a wider scale. Solutions that work internally remain difficult to graft onto the outside in a simple 1-to-1 relationship. Nevertheless, being the world's second largest economy, it is only natural that, bearing increasing responsibility, China expects an adequate seat at the table for its position. The challenge for the Western world will therefore be to create a space for them that, on the one hand, does not challenge the existing liberal-democratic order and, on the other hand, makes this governance mechanism more representative by including the voice of developing economies, while also responding more effectively to the new challenges of the modern world.
Summary
After the Maoist and Deng Xiaoping reform periods, China under current Communist Party leader Xi Jinping is gradually emerging from the shadows. Spectacular economic growth and potential in other areas have prompted Beijing to abandon defensive diplomacy, guided by the slogan of "hiding its capabilities", and move towards offensive action characterised by greater assertiveness in affirming ambitious goals.
The current international order emphasises the primacy of liberal-democratic values and norms. In contrast, China offers an alternative vision of the world, emphasising an authoritarian form of governance in which state power determines whose interests win and whose lose. Xi Jinping today calls on China to take a leading role in reforming global governance. And everyone should be aware that he is calling for that reform of existing institutions to better reflect Chinese interests. He is challenging those elements of the order that are identified with Western values, and it is no coincidence that he is directing his message to countries in the global South that can help strengthen China's voice on the international stage.
However, in addition to the aforementioned "assertive opening to the world", which corresponds to the realisation of the goal of a great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, China now faces problems of much greater magnitude than those of a decade or two ago. The 'free ride' is finally over, the unofficial trade war with the US and the European Union continues, and internally China is being consumed by structural problems such as aging demographics and financial market problems. Meanwhile, economic success has been the foundation on which the 'Chinese model' has gained legitimacy both internally and externally, particularly in the global South. This is why it is so urgent for the Chinese to develop new drivers of economic growth that will determine China's competitiveness in the future.
It remains to be seen how Xi Jinping's China will integrate with the outside world, what kind of international order it expects, and whether it can come up with an attractive formula for cooperation that has a chance of becoming universal.
