The US (ultimately) pivots from Europe to the Indo-Pacific.

Asia First in the US grand strategy.

Just three days after the outbreak of the Russian invasion, when emotions were heating up, TIME magazine published an article by the Marathon Initiative founder Elbridge Colby titled "The U.S. Must Support Ukraine, But China Must Be Our Priority." This text was like a bucket of cold water for Ukrainians demanding an immediate and full response from the U.S. to the criminal actions of the Russians. If such an invasion had occurred in 2002, which was in many ways America's omnipotent moment, Washington decision-makers would probably have met Kyiv’s bold expectations. However, twenty years later, the strategic calculus is different. The Americans are officially pivoting to the Pacific, and Europe is finally being forced to take responsibility for its own security.

Strategy of Denial

Colby called for America's response to the war to be "sober and strategic." Nonetheless, his approach was by no means a lack of empathy for Ukraine, which is fighting for its life, rather it was a long-term and global perspective. Despite the onslaught, it was China, not Russia, that continued to pose the greatest threat to U.S. interests and thus to the global order set accordingly to Washington's interests. This conclusion, while painful from Kyiv's point of view, is argued later.

“The danger Russia poses, including to our NATO allies, is now very clear. But others have not gone away. We also must consider Iran, North Korea, transnational terrorists, and, above all, the threat of a China that seeks first hegemony over Asia and then global preeminence.”

In the face of these challenges, Colby concludes that the United States does not have the military capability to allow Washington to confront all these threats at once. The days when the US could patrol the whole planet with impunity and engage in all conflicts at will are over. The most glaring example of this policy was the utopian plans of the Americans that pushed them into wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which inevitably and directly contributed to the degradation of American power.

However, Some may say that the Americans, after all, have an alliance network whose potential far exceeds that of adversaries. In economic terms, this is undeniable, but militarily, de facto until now, only Washington has had military capabilities on par with its economic potential. In practice, the vast majority of allies, primarily members of the North Atlantic Alliance, have operated on autopilot, placing their entire security policy on the shoulders of the United States. The "end of history" mentality was also undoubtedly important here, which definitively died with the full-scale Russian war against Ukraine.

In practice, the extensive alliance network has cost Americans more than it has brought in direct benefits. A glaring example of this negative coupling was Donald Trump's blatant irritation with Germany's policies. Berlin, in Washington's eyes, undeniably benefited from the American security architecture, sending its export products across international waters patrolled by US aircraft carriers yet not contributing in any way to the maintenance of this order. What's more, the Germans made further efforts to maximize the yield from this situation by pursuing projects that, in the eyes of the Americans, directly harmed the order the US provided.

Now Colby is calling for an end to the policy of being in all places at once and focusing on the main threat: China. His argument is simple: Europe is a big market but much smaller than Asia, and its global share is steadily declining. Russia, the biggest threat to Europe, is only 1/10th of China's economic power, while the rest of Europe is much more significant in terms of GDP than Russia. This is in contrast to the situation in Asia, where China dominates the rest. By the same token, the risk of Russia spreading regional hegemony over Europe is much less likely than Chinese dominance over Asia. Therefore, as Colby points out, Washington needs to recalibrate its military capabilities so that they are tailor-made for the kinetic form of the Chinese threat, mainly a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

Why is Taiwan so important? It represents a rubicon that, if crossed, could irreversibly change the structure of the world. "Taiwan is China’s best target for breaking apart the anti-hegemonic coalition that is the only way we can prevent Beijing from dominating Asia. If China seizes Taiwan, it will deal this coalition a huge—possibly mortal—blow. We cannot allow this." Colby claims.

Despite those grave words, Colby did not push to abandon Ukraine. On the contrary, when his article was published three days after the war broke out, he concluded that NATO should provide Ukraine with permanent access to modern weapons without getting embroiled in a direct clash. Access to U.S. weaponry will degrade Russian military capabilities, while sanctions will inhibit their resurgence. As the subsequent months showed, this became Washington's strategy against the Russo-Ukrainian War.

Looking more broadly, a similar strategy should be adopted toward all of Europe, says the founder of The Marathon Initiative. The United States, with its advanced weaponry and know-how, should assist European allies who are ready to defend themselves. Here, Colby mentions the Poles, Balts, Scandinavians, and also the Germans after their announcements regarding significant military investments. Here, too, we can see the origins of the realization of this idea. Berlin, for part of the now famous 100 billion euros allocated for defense, intends to buy American F-35 aircraft, as does Warsaw, which additionally wants to purchase 500 HIMARS and more than 350 Abrams tanks, some of these on preferential terms. There is one goal: to deter Moscow. This subjugation of interests and dispersal of responsibilities is intended as a response to the progressive degradation of the current order.

Elbridge Colby presented his concepts more extensively in his book “Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict.” Colby's and others' take, which firmly establishes Asia over Europe as the region where American interests are to be pursued, is becoming increasingly manifested in actual US geopolitical movements.

North Atlantic (and Indo-Pacific?) Alliance

In March, just a month after the Russian invasion began and as Russian forces further attempted to seize Kyiv, the Pentagon released the new “2022 National Defense Strategy.” Boiled down to 4 priorities, it identifies the threat of action by the People's Republic of China as the first and most important. The name Russia falls only in the third of the four points. "Deterring aggression, while being prepared to prevail in conflict when necessary, prioritizing
the PRC challenge in the Indo-Pacific, then the Russia challenge in Europe." Therefore, it leaves no question about Washington's long-term priorities.

Three months later, the world's largest military alliance followed the Pentagon's concept. At the June NATO summit in Madrid, the alliance adopted a new "Strategic Concept," where it first stressed that it views China's ambitions and extortionist policies as a threat to the interests, values, and security of its member states.

The reasons why NATO, let’s remember the North Atlantic Alliance, have come to such conclusions against a country that is geographically thousands of kilometers away from the core of NATO's theater of influence are many. Jo Inge Bekkevold listed the most important of these in his text for Foreign Policy.

First of all, NATO countries accept that we are entering into a bipolar world, leaving a unique moment of a unipolar one behind. Such a world somewhat imposes on the smaller players to pick a side. Economically it is not an easy choice for alliance members, as China is often a more significant trading partner than the United States. Militarily, however, such a choice is easier to make, primarily since China is indirectly siding with the Russian Federation in its imperial attempt to conquer Ukraine. And this is currently the biggest security challenge for European members of the alliance in decades. Therefore, NATO is not looking at China as an isolated entity but increasingly through the prism of the Beijing-Moscow axis.

Chinese technological expansion is also making a strong mark, especially on the mercantile-minded Western economies. However, while enjoying very tangible economic benefits through cooperation with China, these have been very slow in responding to this threat. Still, there has been a debate over Huawei's 5G activities in a number of European countries.

Ideological values, the importance of which is often downplayed by hard-core realpolitik advocates, are not irrelevant here either. Xi Jinping's increasingly authoritarian rule, the tightening of the noose around Hong Kong, and the exploitation of the Uigurs in Xinjiang do not escape the attention of European societies, which through democracy, have the opportunity to exert pressure on their own policymakers. In this dimension, at least doctrinally, NATO countries agree that China is a potential threat to the free world.

The last factor Bekkevold describes is perhaps the most important. European members of NATO may increasingly fear a substantial decline in American commitment to Europe, so to continue to enjoy the umbrella of U.S. military power, they feel pressure to align with Washington's priorities, with the main one being China.

However, this does not mean we are about to witness significant expeditions by European fleets to the South China Sea. The fact is that British or French ships, from time to time, participate in military maneuvers in Asian waters. Moreover, in its maiden deployment, Britain's new Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carrier sailed through the Straits of Malacca into the South China Sea. Ben Wallace, the defense secretary, said HMS Prince of Wales's mission was to "hang the flag of Global Britain." The British want to designate two warships for the Indo-Pacific operational theater permanently.

Nevertheless, the ambitious British plans are being tempered by the Americans through the mouth of their Defense Secretary, Lloyd Austin. He said that although he is "excited about the interoperability of the British and American fleets from Europe to Asia," he stressed that "the British will be more useful in Europe, not Asia."

Pelosi's Strategic Ambiguity

An important episode in Washington's multi-domain recalibration in favor of the Indo-Pacific was written during Nancy Pelosi's recent visit to Taiwan. According to many commentators, this visit by the acting speaker of the US House of Representatives was an unnecessary escalation of tensions between the two powers. However, in secluded corridors, many politicians presenting a more hawkish view, even within the Republican party, cheered the visit of Pelosi, the third highest rank person in the US after the President and Vice President. It was the first US policymaker of this rank to visit Taiwan in 25 years.

The Chinese reacted to Pelosi’s visit with extreme aversion. Chinese Foreign Ministry deputy Xie Feng accused Pelosi of "deliberately provoking, playing with fire against the will of the people." Before the visit, Beijing began ostentatiously signaling its displeasure by displaying hundreds of military units in the province of Fuyan neighboring Taiwan. Meanwhile, the US delegation’s plane landing in Taipei was watched on the flight-tracking app FlightRadar by hundreds of thousands of people. Indeed, the situation was very tense. Chinese warplanes violated Taiwan's airspace 21 times and were met with warnings and the readiness of Taiwanese anti-aircraft defenses. An error in judgment by either side could have ended tragically. Moreover, the Chinese began extensive military exercises around the island immediately after the visit.

Interestingly, Joe Biden also voiced unfavorable remarks regarding Pelosi's visit. The White House, through the mouth of its spokesman, has had to reassure several times that Washington does not support Taiwan's independence, and Pelosi's statements that "the visit honors America's unwavering commitment to supporting Taiwan's vibrant democracy" are her own opinions. It's unclear whether this was a deliberate signal by the Biden administration. Still, the whole thing fits within the US strategic ambiguity framework toward Taiwan and, more broadly, within the ultimate US recalibration to the Indo-Pacific region.

America First, Asia Second, Europe Third

As heartless as it may sound, Russian aggression against Ukraine has had a domino effect that is playing out positively for the grand strategy of the United States at the moment. In addition to the apparent events being in Washington's interest, such as the degradation of the Russian Federation's military capabilities, the Americans gain much more. The Russian invasion, for previously skeptical European capitals, is such a tangible manifestation of the Kremlin's imperialism that it can be no longer ignored. They are forced to take their own security challenges much more seriously, thus allowing the Americans to quietly "pivot to the Indo-Pacific." There is no escaping the bitter conclusion that incremental American military aid to the Ukrainians is also a derivative of this calculation. If the Americans had provided the Ukrainians with hundreds of HIMARS, F-16s in a month, in a word, used all of the military might at their disposal, then the Ukrainians would perhaps have quickly chased the invaders away. But Washington would have used invaluable resources it could later not use in the direct confrontation with China. Also, there was a con siderable risk that Europe would not feel any pressure to invest in its own security but further rest on the Americans. Huge arms contracts to U.S. arms companies would not materialize too. Whereas now, as the latest NATO strategy shows, Europeans are gravitationally pulled toward US interests, whether they like it or not.

After Europe First, there is an unprecedented moment of transition to the Asia First strategy in US foreign policy. We are moving toward a world where security responsibility will become much more diffused. In practice, we are returning to the default setting, as the last 30 years have been more of an exception than the norm. We are moving toward a world where the two major powers look at each other more and more straightforwardly. Still, they will have to get used to this, as neither of them, with their military-social-economic potential, will suddenly disappear from the face of the earth.

Sources:

The Strategy of Denial: https://amzn.to/3QZ4TYx
https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/
https://media.defense.gov/2022/Mar/28/2002964702/-1/-1/1/NDS-FACT-SHEET.PDF
https://time.com/6152096/us-support-ukraine-china-priority/
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-not-russia-still-poses-greatest-challenge-us-security-203228
https://www.dw.com/en/trump-nato-germany/a-54451443
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/11/nato-strategy-china-russia-threat-europe-asia-geopolitics/
https://www.wsj.com/articles/nancy-pelosis-taiwan-straits-taipei-visit-china-beijing-xi-jinping-white-house-joe-biden-11659391114?st=cgpgs5trwxte0a7&reflink=article_copyURL_share
https://www.ft.com/content/7fb26630-a96a-4dfd-935c-9a7acb074304
https://www.wsj.com/articles/nancy-pelosis-taiwan-straits-taipei-visit-china-beijing-xi-jinping-white-house-joe-biden-11659391114?st=cgpgs5trwxte0a7&reflink=article_copyURL_share
https://www.cnbc.com/2022/08/02/white-house-struggles-to-insulate-bidens-china-policy-from-pelosis-taiwan-trip.html