- Hubert Walas
Lend-Lease 2.0?
In the third month of the war, we are beginning to see the implementation of the fundamental strategic choices that have been made in the West. A coalition of the willing has decided to stand firm in supporting Ukraine in its effort to defend freedom. This effort could take years, but according to Jens Stoltenberg, the head of NATO, the alliance is prepared even for such a scenario. The coalition's leader, the United States, has announced the launch of a military support plan whose scale is reminiscent of World War 2 programs.
On the front, we are observing a war of position. Although attacks are now continuing along the entire length of the front the Russians have not made any significant progress. Russian forces remain unable to break through the Ukrainian fortifications that have been built up in the Donbas over the past 8 years. As reported by the Insitute for the Study of War, Ukrainian counteroffensives near Kharkiv will likely force the Russians to shift some forces from Izium to the north to secure that direction. In addition, there is a regrouping in Kherson, where the Russians are preparing to seize Kherson's administrative borders.
The Russians are also focusing on the Russification of the occupied territories - Russian television starts broadcasting, Russian mobile network starts covering the occupied territories, and the Russian ruble replaces the Ukrainian hryvnia as an obligatory means of payment.
According to British intelligence, the Russians have suffered the greatest losses among their elite units, including airborne troops. Building and training these units is years of work and billions of rubles. Rebuilding them will unwittingly be an extremely difficult challenge.
An even greater loss is the death, at least in the dozens, of high-ranking Russian commanders who have been killed since the war began. The apogee of this sleaze came on the night of April 30, when Ukrainians shelled Russian command centers near Izyum. It is likely that at least 20 high-ranking officers were killed, including at least one general. Ukrainian intelligence believes that Valery Gerasimov, the Chief of the Russian Staff, was also in the area of the shelling and was said to have been lightly wounded.
In addition, Ukraine feels increasingly confident striking deep into Russian territory. There are rocket attacks, acts of sabotage, and diversion. Unlike Russian attacks inside Ukraine, which often targeted residential buildings, the Ukrainians are focusing on attacking strategic infrastructure - fuel, ammunition, weapons depots or logistical hubs.
On the other hand, the situation in Moldova, specifically a possible attack from Transnistria, a de facto Russian exclave on Moldovan territory, is worrying. The Times, citing anonymous sources, reports that the decision to attack Moldova has already been made in the Kremlin. In a similar vein, warns Ukrainian intelligence. Oleskiy Arestovich declares that Ukraine will be able to help Moldova, but Chisinau will have to officially request it.
On the other hand, it would be a surprising move, to say the least. Moldovan forces are very modest, numbering just over 3,000 troops. However, the Russian forces stationed in Transnistria are twice as small. The Russians might be able to reposition some of their forces there, but access to Transnistria is very difficult, and a sea and air landing would likely be neutralized by the Ukrainians. Additionally, Ukraine still has fresh, unused troops in nearby Odesa. To sum up, the chances of success of this operation would be similar to those of the February-March seizure of Kyiv. Perhaps this is another informational smokescreen to draw Ukrainian forces away from Donbas.
Meanwhile, in Moscow, preparations are underway for the Victory Day parade on May 9. I leave the visual associations to you. Part of the expert community is inclined to believe that on that day the Kremlin will change the official narrative from "Special Military Operation" to classic war, which will set in motion a number of possibilities - with popular mobilization at the forefront. How it will be - we will find out next week.
The first recordings of Polish T-72 tanks operating in Ukraine, of which Warsaw has donated over 240, have already appeared. John Kirby, the Pentagon spokesman reports that at least half of the howitzers pledged by the US have already arrived in Ukraine. This is at least 45 pieces. The @mil_in_ua twitter user reports that heavy artillery from at least 10 countries is to arrive in Ukraine. As of today, the declared number probably already exceeds 200 pieces. These are often modern systems that, combined with the Ukrainian advantage in reconnaissance, may significantly strengthen the Ukrainian firepower. This is a very important aspect, as with the positional warfare we see in Donbas, artillery is responsible for the vast majority of enemy losses. High accuracy of artillery in combination with an effective guidance system, e.g. via drones, may help to break through Russian positions. Especially since, as user Ian Matveev points out in his analysis skeptical of Russia's chances in the Donbas, the Russian military, despite having an advantage in firepower, does not translate that into combat effectiveness. This is for at least two reasons. First, as noted earlier, the Russians are inferior to the Ukrainians in aerial reconnaissance.
And secondly, the Russian commanders have the Soviet virus, which means that the goal of Russian artillery is often not to annihilate the enemy but to meet the expected statistics and produce the report expected by the leadership. As a result, yes, Russian troops do make fierce shellings, but their accuracy is, to put it mildly, questionable. However, the Russian commanders have clean hands because the shelling was executed successfully.
Meanwhile, the aforementioned 200 artillery pieces from the West are certainly not the end. On Thursday, April 26, a very important meeting of representatives from more than 40 countries - including all NATO countries as well as the European Union, South Korea, Australia or Japan, and, of course, Ukraine - took place at the U.S. base in Ramstein, Germany. During the meeting, Ukraine communicated its defense needs, requesting everything from artillery, drones, and tanks to anti-ship missiles and fighter aircraft. "We need weapons. Modern weapons. A large number of modern heavy weapons," - Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov wrote on Twitter after the talks. The United States being the leader of the coalition of the willing, through the mouth of Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, said that "allies will move heaven and earth" to strengthen Ukraine's defense.
It didn't take two days for Washington to move from words to action. On April 28, Joe Biden asked Congress to approve a $33 billion aid package to Ukraine, of which $20 billion will be military aid. By comparison, Ukraine's entire defense budget is less than $6billion dollars.
Such sums mean that high-capital equipment will certainly come into play. To illustrate, $20 billion would be enough to buy 1,000 of the latest Abrams tanks or 160 F-16 fighters. Rumors say that it is the American F-16s that are about to enter the service of the Ukrainian Air Force, and Ukrainian pilots are already expected to train on American machines.
This scale of aid is beginning to resemble the Lend-Lease act of World War II, when the Americans, starting in 1941, supplied their European allies - primarily Great Britain and the Soviet Union - with essential military aid for four years. Today, the Soviets' heirs - the Russians - are on the other side of the modern Lend-Lease.
These are not the only historical comparisons that are made during this war. In another attempt to look at the Russian way of thinking, it is worth quoting a text by Ivan Timofeev, a prominent Moscow analyst and member of the Valdai Club. The text entitled "No time for fatalism" was published on the portal of the Russian International Affairs Council and is mainly based on the analogy to the years 1917-1920. In Russia then there was a revolution, which resulted in a civil war and economic chaos. Similar threats are also possible today, the Russian warns.
Timofeev divides threats into three baskets. The first basket is the threat from outside - from the united West. The second basket is the collapse of the Russian economy and public administration. The third basket is the crisis of statehood. A return to the 1917 scenario is not a foregone conclusion, but the conflict in Ukraine has significantly highlighted all the external threats to Russia. For years.
The Russian is critical of the strategic decision to attack Ukraine. He argues that although the pre-war order was not perfect, it provided a basis for peaceful coexistence between Russia and the West. Meanwhile, Ukraine, except for 2014, was nevertheless a region of low importance for NATO, especially with the decline in the intensity of the fighting in Donbas. Meanwhile, the Russian attack changes everything dramatically. Ukraine has become the epicenter of Western unity. The previously weak European Union and especially Germany - are arming themselves. The number of troops on the eastern NATO flank is growing, military aid is flowing to Ukraine, Finland and Sweden stand at the gates of NATO - in a word, the scale of the threat to Russia from outside has multiplied, Timofeev writes.
All this is leaving its mark on the economy as well. The modernization of the Russian state faces a big question mark. Russia is now cut off from the global financial system, technology, and industrial goods. Key markets in Europe are likely to be lost. They can be partially swapped for exports to China and India, but that will not cover the losses that are inevitable. "The accumulation of shocks is a challenge for Russia in the short and medium-term, while economic backwardness and underdevelopment are long-term issues." - states the Russian.
These challenges create a real threat to Russian statehood, a threat far more serious than Ukraine's Maydan or Color Revolutions. The scarcity of resources may cause anger in both society and the elite. This is yet to be seen, says Timofeev, but the eruption will be much more difficult to contain than the occasional liberal protests we face today. In addition, the Russian points out that the Western fight against Russian culture favors the Kremlin. It gives the argument that only Russia is a safe haven and a true home.
Timofeev concludes: “The cumulative pressure on Russia by threats from all three baskets will test the strength of its statehood. It may turn out that the bet on the fall and imminent demise of the West is illusory, and Russia will turn out to be the weak link. There is another alternative. Russia will undergo inevitable painful transformations and suffer losses, but it will have a fundamentally different basis for its life. This is only possible if the creative forces of the people are unleashed and liberated at all levels.”
Timofeev's assessment of the situation is sober, even with regard to the suppression of Russian culture by the West, which only serves as fodder for Russian propaganda. However, the appeal to unleash creative forces in a country where creativity has been suppressed for at least 80 years is tantamount to wishful thinking. We see it at every turn, including in this war. Timofeev's text is another example showing that even Moscow's elites feel the cold wind of revolution and potential disintegration on their necks. This one is obviously not in the interest of the Russian Federation, but isn't it in the interest of the Russians themselves? I leave that question open.
