- Hubert Walas
A parade of misfortunes.
May 9th. Victory Day. Preparations for festivities had been going on for a long time, despite often difficult conditions. Many people expected an official declaration of war, thus announcing mass mobilization. None of this happened. We witnessed a rather clumsy attempt to illustrate Russian military power. The Russian air force did not appear in the sky, officially because of bad weather. Unofficially, because of low readiness.
Meanwhile, in Yekaterinburg, the Russians poorly emphasized their uniqueness by copying the uniforms of the NSDAP Nazi militia Sturmabteilung.
All eyes, however, were on just one person - Vladimir Putin. The Commander-in-Chief gave a speech in which not once did he use the word ...Ukraine. Instead, there was much talk of neo-Nazis, which, in Putin's eyes, is basically the entire West, with the United States at the forefront. There was a lot about the incredible values for which Russia, in the face of the degenerate West, remains the only enclave. The current war, on the other hand, has been likened almost directly to the Second World War, or rather the Great Patriotic War, where the Russians again have to defend their lands, and in practice the whole world, against Nazism, this time with a “neo” prefix. Nevertheless, Putin moved quite quickly from memories of the Great Patriotic War to complaints about Russia's unfavorable place in the international system. The Russian leader once again returned to the Kremlin's December proposal, which, as a reminder, would effectively push NATO out of the alliance's eastern flank and restore the pre-1999 status quo. In the same vein, he was later echoed by the Kremlin's leading propagandist, Vladimir Solovyov, who explicitly reminded us that Russia's main objective is not Ukraine, but a change in the security architecture in Europe.
This change is what Moscow managed to do. Although the Russians imagined it rather differently. On May 12th, in a joint statement by the Finnish president and prime minister, Finland officially announced that it will apply to join NATO. It is highly likely that we will soon hear a similar statement from the Swedes. Moscow loses its strategically convenient position on its European northern flank, which it has enjoyed since the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940. The accession of Finland radically changes the balance of power in the Baltic Sea, especially in the Gulf of Finland, and its beneficiaries are primarily the Baltic States - Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. It is true that the three Baltic states are still connected to NATO countries by land only through the narrow Suwałki GAP. However, with Finland on board in the event of war not only does it open up a front of over 1,000km to the Russians, but in practice cuts the Russian fleet off from warm European ports. The port of St.Petersburg would be easily closed by NATO forces operating from the shores of Finland and Estonia, while the Black Sea ports would inevitably be closed by the Turks blocking the Turkish straits. Before the war, many analysts called for the Finlandisation of Ukraine. Finland's Finlandisation eventually led to its entry into NATO. In the face of such Finlandisation, Kyiv would definitely have no objections.
The Russian Victory Day was also met with a reaction from the source of all Russian misfortunes, namely the USA. Not only are the Americans supporting the efforts of alleged Ukrainian neo-Nazis, but they have also decided to desecrate the Soviet holiday by announcing the finalization of a massive support package for Ukraine, which is already commonly referred to as the Lend-Lease 2.0, which we discussed in one of our previous materials. What's more, Washington felt that the original $33 billion was a bit too little after all, so Joe Biden asked for an increase in the aid budget to $40 billion. That's the equivalent of ⅔ of the whole Russian Federation's annual military budget. The pre-war budget, now after the projected decline in GDP, this amount will be reduced, unless the structure of Russian arms spending changes.
American money, and so far only some 10% of the new Lend-Lease, is already fighting at the front and changing the battlefield. First and foremost, we are talking about the M777 howitzers which have already reached the Ukrainian front in a full 90 pieces package. They probably took part in the extremely successful action of Ukrainian artillery, aviation, and, above all, reconnaissance on the Siverskyi Donets river. Twitter user Maxim, who, as evidenced by the details of the operation he shared, is most likely a Ukrainian engineering officer, took part in the operation. As he reports in his Twitter thread, he took part in an ambush on a Russian river crossing, which was to take place using a pontoon bridge. With his participation, the exact location of the crossing was determined, and Ukrainian artillery and aviation were targeted as the Russians crossed the river. As a result of the attack, up to 1,500 Russian soldiers were to be killed and up to 70 enemy vehicles destroyed.
Overall the front situation is developing primarily in two directions. The Russians are trying to push forward and are making slight territorial gains in the direction between Izium and Severodontesk. However, the Russian positions near Izium are now within striking range of American M777 howitzers, as the Ukrainians are advancing in the Kharkiv direction. Sources close to Wanger's group, report that the Ukrainian Armed Forces have approached the border with Russia at "the distance of a tank shot". This is confirmed by Igor Girkin, who fears that increased infiltration of Russian territory by Ukrainian special forces will now be inevitable. The deployment of Russian troops on Ukrainian territory is well illustrated by the saturation map of Russian SIM roaming use. We can observe the largest groupings near Izium and Severdonetsk and near Kherson in the Crimean direction.
Whereas Oleksiy Arestovych, who remains one of the most reliable and objective sources of information on the war in Ukraine, shared some interesting insights in his May 11 stream. Again, thanks to user @mdmitri91 for the translation.
Firstly, according to Arestovych, there was supposed to have been a great reshuffle in the Russian General Staff. Valery Gerasimov was to be let down in his duties, which would explain his absence during the Victory Parade. In addition, the commander of the First Guards Army was to be replaced. Arestovych believes that the Kremlin is finally getting in touch with reality, which results in a recalibration of political goals, and Putin's speech was a manifestation of this. Of great importance here is the $40 billion in aid that is already arriving on the front lines. The Ukrainian also draws attention to the position of China, which recognizes the territorial integrity of Ukraine together with Donbas and Crimea - which is a big blow to the Kremlin. Here it is important to note that Beijing, contrary to expectations, has not started massive exports of consumer goods to Russia. On the contrary, exports have fallen by almost 26%, including exports of laptops down by 40%, smartphones by 65%, and telecommunications equipment by 98%! On the other hand, it must be remembered that Chinese imports from Russia are reaching new peaks, mainly thanks to gas, oil, and coal imports. Compared to April last year, there was an increase of more than 50%. It is easy to see that China is trying to play this situation to its advantage without being exposed to American sanctions. Now back to the Ukrainian's broadcast - Arestovych also declares that there will be no agreement similar to the Minsk agreements. He interprets the calls for 'not humiliating Russia' made by French President Emmanuel Macron as behind-the-scenes attempts by the Kremlin to seek a way out of the stalemate. Meanwhile, Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky is now firmly declaring something that few dreamed of at the beginning - to talk of peace, the Russians must "at a minimum" withdraw to the state before 23 February.
Meanwhile, Budapest still plays an ambitious but above all risky and cynical game, around Moscow, Brussels, Washington, and mainly Kyiv. The Hungarian leader, Viktor Orban, opposes the imposition of an embargo on Russian oil because, in his words, this would have the effect of "dropping a nuclear bomb on the Hungarian economy". Why this is not the case is well explained by Centre for Eastern Studies expert Wojciech Konończuk. Hungarians have one refinery - Duna. This one processes just over 8mln tonnes of oil a year. Around 3.5 million tonnes are imported from Russia via the Druzhba oil pipeline and 4.5 million tonnes via the Adria oil pipeline via Croatia. Adria has a capacity of 10m tonnes, so Hungary can already buy all its oil needs from non-Russian sources today. Budapest also claims that they need 5 years to adapt their refineries to non-Russian oil. This is interesting, because the German refineries Schwedt and Leuna, which until now have processed only Russian oil, actually 3 times more than the Hungarian Duna, will switch to non-Russian oil by the end of this year. Engineers even claim that the Hungarian refinery would have it easier because already today more than half of the oil it processes does not come from Russia. Hungary's heroic stance has already been recognized by the Kremlin, specifically by Dmitri Medvedev, who praised Viktor Orban for his bravery, i.e. for his resistance in blocking the embargo on Russian raw materials. Perhaps Orban will also live to see his medal from the Kremlin after Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szjarrto received his order in Moscow 3 months before the war. It is not the first time Orban tries to leverage his position to unlock reconstruction funds from the European Union.
That is not all, on May 2nd even heavier accusations fell on Hungary. The secretary of Ukraine's Security Council, Oleksiy Danilov, accused Budapest of knowing about the Russian invasion before it began. An even more serious accusation from Danilov was that Hungary supposedly wanted to annex the Ukrainian region of Transcarpathia, inhabited by 140,000 ethnic Hungarians. Budapest called these accusations 'fake news’', while the Ukrainians have no evidence to support these claims, but the fact that they were made by a senior Ukrainian official shows the level of relations between the two countries, which are reaching rock bottom.
It would not be an overstatement to say that Budapest is pursuing a revisionist policy, seeking partners above all from the revisionist powers of Russia and China. Fidesz, the party of Viktor Orban, has many times between the lines recalled that Hungary was greatly hurt by the Treaty of Trianon of 1920 when the Kingdom of Hungary lost the vast majority of its territories. As a result of the war in Ukraine, was Hungary hoping for a partial territorial restoration of the 1920 state? This is what Kyiv seems to be suggesting.
The question remains whether Viktor Orban's Hungary will not, to put it colloquially, 'cross the red line'. As a relatively small economy located in the center of Europe, the Hungarians have based their development model primarily on Western institutions, joining the European Union and NATO, and connecting their country to the economic bloodstream controlled primarily by Germany. Politically, within the European Union, Fidesz sought an alliance with Poland, governed by the Law and Justice party. In Brussels, trust towards Hungary is minimal, Hungary’s position in NATO has steadily declined since the beginning of the war, while the political alliance with Poland, with their differing views on fundamental security issues, is highly questionable. In a nutshell, Hungary is antagonizing many of its key partners, putting its current development model at stake, while hoping for dubious benefits from its close relations with an increasingly weak Russia.
