- Hubert Walas
From Moscow’s perspective, the long-stated goal of demilitarisation and denazification of Ukraine is long gone. At the very least, the Kremlin needs to capture the Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts within their administrative borders to call the operation a victory. A rather anemic performance of Russian units since the second phase of the operation began around mid-April, suggests that this objective is looking remote. However, the last few days have brought the biggest Russian successes since the second phase of the war in Ukraine began and show that the war is far from over.
The report was produced in cooperation with the Rochan Consulting analytical center, cited, among others by the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times. Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, Rochan publishes a daily war report called Ukraine Conflict Monitor, which presents an in-depth and unique analysis of the battlefield. You can purchase access to Ukraine Conflict Monitor via the link in the description.
Now lets a take look at a visual breakdown of the 5 key operational axes:
Kharkiv axis
Russian redeployments to Izyum and Severodonetsk left Russian positions severely weakened north of Kharkiv. According to various Ukrainian sources, Russians had only around 3-5 BTGs in the area.
Within a few days, Ukrainians reached the border regions. Securing the entire border between Oleksandrivka and Starytsya is within reach. Through its artillery means, Kyiv’s forces will be able to strike Russian positions near Belgorod, its logistics centers, restoration bases, and concentration areas. Concurrently, Ukrainians will be able to hit Russian logistics lines coming through Vovenchansk, thus degrading Russian ability to supply its units around Izyum from Belgorod.
During last week, reinforced Russian units pushed back against counterattacking Ukrainian formations. Russians may have retaken Ternova and Vesele as a result, but the exact situation is uncertain.
Izyum axis
After a few weeks of intense fighting, Russian forces could not break Ukrainian defenses south and southeast of Izyum. Consequently, these forces did not attain their immediate tactical objectives of reaching Barvinkove and Slovyansk.
At some point, around 20-25 Russian battalion tactical groups (BTGs) were deployed around Izyum, but Russia never employed the bulk of this force at once. Instead, it chose to send them to battle piecemeal so that it would always have some units in reserve. The consequence of this choice was that Russia could never achieve the preponderance of firepower and superiority in numbers sufficient for breaking defensive lines. Ukrainians capitalized on these weaknesses and started their counteroffensive, which recaptured territories northwest of the city. Russian formations around Izyum are now only probably tasked with ensuring that Ukrainians do not take the city and do not conduct an encirclement operation to the Oskil River. Russian operations around Izyum failed.
Severodonetsk axis
The situation in Severodotensk's direction is very difficult for Ukrainians. Yet the focus on Severodonetsk did not bring immediate results. Rubizhne was only captured on the 12th of May. Russian units tried to cross the Siverski Donets River around Bilohorivka to attack the Ukrainian rear near Lysychansk. However, this operation was thwarted by Ukrainian artillery fires, which destroyed more than 70 Russian vehicles, or the equivalent of one reinforced BTG.
To the south, Russians captured Popasna on the 8th of May. A part of the force that took the city moved north of Oleksandropillia. This combined with the now failed attempt at a river crossing near Bilohorivka, indicated that Moscow hoped to cut off Ukrainians around Severodonetsk.
Since the capture of Popasna, the Russian presence near the city expanded considerably, suggesting a collapse of Ukrainian defensive lines. Some reports suggest Russian forces are on the outskirts of Soledar and Vasylivka. Moreover, the Ukrainians are endangered by being cut off from the T1302 road, and thus the entire Ukrainian posture in the area could be threatened.
In the last couple of days attacks near Severodonetsk have gathered pace. Russian forces are on the verge of entering the city. They are approaching from three directions: west, east, and north. At least one bridge linking Severodonetsk with Lysychansk was blown up by Russians, which complicates the supply efforts of Severodonetsk and may also hinder the withdrawal of defending formations.
Russian units have been shelling Lyman for over a week now. It is likely that Lyman will fall over the next few days if the Russians maintain the pace of their advances.
It remains unclear if we are witnessing the collapse of Ukrainian defensive positions or a more or less coordinated retreat?
On a strategic level, the capture of Severodonetsk and the remaining areas on the Luhansk Oblast will allow Moscow to claim a victory and a partial fulfillment of their war objectives, or at least the ones related to the second part of the “special operation”.
If Ukrainians do not conduct a counteroffensive, they may soon be pushed significantly back with a real prospect of losing forces now deployed to defend Severodonetsk.
Donetsk axis
Russian operations around Donetsk develop in two directions. The northern direction seeks to capture Novosilivka and Niu-York. In the Western direction, Russian and proxy forces move towards Mar'inka. Since the start of the war, Russian progress around Donetsk has been minimal, and one should not expect the situation there to change soon.
Kherson/Zaporozhia axis
The situation in these areas is stabilized. Russian units focus on artillery fires, but they don’t have enough resources to break Ukrainian defenses. Ukrainian General Staff reports stressed that Russians are consolidating their gains and bringing in engineering equipment to build up defensive lines. North of Kherson, Russia is establishing a buffer zone around the city. Reaching Mykolaiv is beyond their current reach. The main line of defense is rested on the Dnieper River. It has been rumored that Russia may annex Kherson without resorting to so-called “popular referendums”. Given that Russian operations are stalling across the entire battlefield, such development is probable as it would formalize Russian presence in these areas.
Recent Russian gains give Moscow an advantage in the short term, but unless Russia conducts some form of mobilization, time will work in Ukraine's favor in the long term. It is unclear to what extent Ukrainians will have the capability to stop Russian attacks and then dislodge the opposing forces from areas they recently seized. The political-military leadership in Kyiv realizes that Ukraine can only retake territories it has lost since 24FEB through military force. This is what the leadership would consider a victory. Time is working in Ukraine’s favor. Unless Russia conducts mobilization (general or partial), its armed forces will not only stall over the next few weeks, but the influx of Western weaponry and Ukrainian personnel will allow Kyiv to start pushing Russian units back along a much broader front.
On the 21st of MAY, President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, stated that Ukraine has over 700,000 soldiers fighting all across the country. As a rough estimate, we can assume that this number consists of an army of over 500 000 and 150 000 territorial defense troops. There are also reasons to be doubtful that all 700,000 servicemen are engaged in military and support operations. The Ukrainian Armed Forces are now at capacity to train and equip new personnel. Rochan sources in Ukraine reiterated that many people who have signed up to join the armed forces are still waiting to be inducted. The training will also take several months to make recruits at least partly combat-ready.
Classically, Russia should be looking at a 3:1 of an attacker to a defender ratio. Indeed, this is more or less the scale of Russian versus Ukrainian losses. On average, Russians lose three times more equipment than Ukrainians, but the latter can rely on a steady and swift influx of weapon systems from NATO (or captured from Russians) and other countries. Of course, the 3:1 ratio can be mitigated by well-developed electronic warfare systems and reconnaissance, higher morale, capable commanders, well-developed and sustained logistics and communications lines, and the steady influx of reserves into the battlefield. Neither of those things is currently working for Moscow.
It is quite telling that in a country boasting more than one million people in the armed forces and a population of 144 million, the authorities are unable to find even tens of thousands willing to fight in Ukraine.
