- Filip Dąb-Mirowski
Wintertime sadness?
The beginning of 2023 marked the peak of Western military assistance to Ukraine. The Ramstein Coalition donated significant supplies of ammunition and military equipment to Ukrainian forces and helped train and equip tens of thousands of troops, all with the hope that these contributions would lead to a breakthrough on the southern frontline. However, this did not happen.
The reality of the end of 2023 is quite different. The impasse on the frontline has been reinforced by the domestic decision-making issues of Western countries. The budget dispute is paralysing the US Congress while blocking the adoption of a new aid package for Ukraine. Put up against the wall, President Biden admits that instead of the support continuing "for as long as necessary", without new measures he will only help "for as long as possible". The same is happening in the European Union, where any moves are blocked by Hungary.
The resulting decision-making crisis of the West is being exploited successfully by Russia, which is enthusiastically regaining control of the narrative after long months of failures. Bullish propaganda, influence agents and traditional Kremlin allies have been set in motion. All to convince of the futility of further support as well as resistance to an all-powerful Russia.
What would happen if Western aid were actually halted and hostilities suspended? How many years would the Kremlin need to rebuild its capabilities and, finally, how real and imminent would a confrontation between the Russian Federation and the NATO countries be in such a scenario?
Nearly a year ago, we aired our mini-series depicting a cascading scenario of events that could, in effect, cause Russia's third collapse in the last 100 years. Yet, the concept is based on one key variable - the assumption of continued and strong Western support for Ukraine. Only through it would Ukraine have the potential needed to push Russian forces out of its territory and restore the 1991 borders. This would mean a wartime defeat for the Russian Federation and would inevitably lead to massive internal problems. In fact, we have actually witnessed the first symptoms of this process. It was during the Prigozhin rebellion that the Russian power system came closest to collapse in the last 30 years. The Russian pendulum was at a historic bottom.
The second half of 2023, however, reversed this key variable. Instead of growing, support for Kyiv began to decline. Moreover, the hopes raised by the successes in Kyiv, Kharkiv and Kherson for a similar triumph for Ukrainians in Zapoprozhye were not fulfilled for various reasons. Kyiv, on the other hand, lost control of the narrative, which manifested itself, among other things, in President Zelensky's clumsiness with Western partners and internal disputes with the military command.
Meanwhile, at the cost of heavy losses, the Kremlin survived the difficult situation at the front, meanwhile carrying out post-revolutionary purges in the army including the elimination of the Wagner Group leadership, and regained control of the disjointed power structure. It also eventually switched the economy to a quasi-war mode, which the Russian population accepted, the same way as they accepted waging a murderous war. Today, in the face of a stalemate over support for Ukraine from the United States - effectively the only country with the physical resources to effectively rearm the Ukrainians - the aforementioned pendulum is swinging the other way.
The Kremlin senses this weakness, which reinforces its belief that the West's resolve will weaken faster than the Russian Federation's melting resources. Its problems are still structural in nature, so the scenario we have described remains in place. However, the catalyst for its beginning is much less likely today than it was a year ago.
A realist position, therefore, forces us today to ask ourselves how quickly Russia is able to reactivate its potential to threaten not only Ukraine but NATO as a whole. And straight away, to rebut dismissive voices comparing dry figures in favour of the alliance, two issues should be mentioned. There is a great risk asymmetry between the two centres - the Russians are already at war, NATO is not. Secondly, Moscow's aim would not be to destroy the entire alliance power but to break its collective - which is enough to show that NATO does not exist. All the more so given the alliance's geographical challenges.
The consensus so far, which has prevailed since last year, spoke of a timeframe of 5-10 years from the suspension of hostilities. This is how long Russia would need to rebuild its capabilities. This estimate is a product of the equipment losses incurred by the Russian armed forces in Ukraine, and the production/reconstruction potential of Russian industry. Added to this are a number of other parameters such as the mobilisation of human resources, munitions, missiles, financial capabilities, the impact of sanctions, etc. A recent report by the German Council on Foreign Relations puts the prospect of a possible Russia-NATO confrontation at 6 to 10 years.
However, there is a path of history that can shorten this deadline. The head of Poland’s National Security Office, Jacek Siewiera, spoke about this recently. He believes the West should assume a less optimistic scenario and be ready in three years.
- This is the time when a capability must be developed on the eastern flank as a clear deterrent to aggression, he stresses.
Thus, the West should be ready for a confrontation before Russia reaches the state allowing it to resume the aggression - that’s quite obvious. This is the only way the West can stop the Kremlin from starting another war. This deterrent mechanism did not work in the Ukraine affair, precisely because Putin considered NATO too weak for real action. He was wrong, but only slightly.
Until recently, estimates of 5-10 years could be considered moderate, but history is like a river, forever flowing, so one should not lose vigilance. The failure of the counter-offensive and the waning support are parameters that could change these reckonings.
So what is the, for now, theoretical, black scenario should support run out?
If there is an enforced ceasefire in Ukraine or something along the lines of the ATO (so-called anti-terrorist operation in the Donbas) of 2014-2021, such a state of affairs will allow the Russians to delegate some production to restore capacity. The weakening of Western support will also lead to a weakening of the will to tighten sanctions. It is not enough to impose them, constant modification is needed to prevent them from being circumvented. This is what happened after 2014, and this is what is happening now. One need only look at the economies of Central Asia, whose trade with Western countries - mainly Germany - has skyrocketed suddenly. The inconsistency will lead to a natural erosion of relations between the countries of the eastern flank and so-called 'old Europe', as their perception of the threat becomes increasingly different.
The pause and shift in priorities, and the weakening of the will of the West will also open a window for China, which will inevitably want to deepen the Kremlin's dependence, through cynical-transactional production and technological support. Already today, Russia is forced to sell raw materials to China at heavily discounted prices and, moreover, to bear the full cost of building the transmission infrastructure. At the same time, Chinese companies are gaining a market monopoly in the supply of electronics or cars. The risk of sanctions being imposed on Beijing, simply because of the supply of technology lines or licences, will decrease rather than increase in the scenario described.
In the final chapter, making Russia China's chain dog will break up Western unity, stretch US resources and provide an opportunity to play relations bilaterally. In other words, it will bring the new multipolar global order one step closer. In this context, it can be argued that China cannot afford to abandon Russia, given the risk of realising the American dream of turning it against Beijing. At the moment, these are still distant plans, but if Washington does not allow the Russian backbone to be broken, it is for this reason, among others.
Such a progressive disengagement of the West may also be fostered by the possible presidency of Donald Trump and the rise of his MAGA movement. During the debates in Congress, in which MAGA speaks with one voice with the radical left, it is apparent that the two groups share sympathy for Russia and isolationist inclinations. As if this were not enough, Trump has repeatedly announced that he would enforce a ceasefire in no time. However, it is difficult to hope that it would be beneficial for Ukraine, as such can only be achieved with Russia on its knees.
So, for the sake of example, let us assume that the freezing of the conflict occurs more or less in the autumn of next year (2024), although, for example, the Russians themselves expect to defeat Ukraine in 2025. The sanctions that are being circumvented, and Russia's financial health, allow it to continue to arm itself (with the help of e.g. Chinese loans) over the next few years. The belt is being tightened, and the Russians are getting poorer and poorer, but the creaking machine goes on. The land is yielding grain and potatoes, oil and gas are flowing. So there is something to eat, something to ride on and something to keep warm. That's how you can survive without much more, as long as you feel it was worth it. And the ceasefire as it stands now will be seen as a victory in Russia and will convince a public stupefied by propaganda to make further sacrifices.
So now let’s see the numbers. According to recent reports, Russia will deliver up to 2,000 vehicles to the front this year. Of which, tank production will amount to ~600 units (T90, T72B3M, T62M combined), and more or less equal number of armoured vehicles. Another 900-1000 will be other types of vehicles (e.g. artillery) or those that have been 'modernised', i.e. removed from post-Soviet stockpiles and returned to service.
As a reminder, in the four months of the counter-offensive alone, the Russians lost some 3,700 tanks and armoured personnel carriers, not counting other types of military hardware. So they are producing less than they are losing, but this is only because of the intensity of the ongoing operations. This is why they are so keen to pause, as the Kremlin's propaganda machine is convincing on many levels. In the absence of American support and the insufficient production of European states - for this potential is currently absent, being reconstituted but too slowly for needs - Ukraine will simply not be able to sustain the pace of destruction of Russian potential. Worse still, it will struggle to hold on to the territories it currently controls. A formal pause is therefore not necessary for the Kremlin to achieve the desired result.
To have a point of reference, let us assume that the Russian production capacity of equipment that can be allocated to rebuilding capabilities will oscillate between 1,000 and 1,400 vehicles per year. The remaining production will be absorbed by frontline operations and losses. A simple calculation will give us a figure of 3000-4500 vehicles in 3 years. Missile production, again deducting expenditure on the 'frozen conflict', which will nevertheless cause some losses - will be 100 per month, 1200 per year, and 3600 in 3 years. The number of Shahed and Lancet drones is likely to be similar, although the Iranian design is much simpler and can therefore be mass-produced.
On top of this, the Russians are sure to develop radio-electronic warfare means, which is already taking place, and somewhere in the background, the slow (as now) recruitment of the next generation into the army will be going on. Recently, Vladimir Putin announced another increase in the size of the army, this time by 176,000 men - the size of the German city of Mainz - to reach the announced 2.2 million-plus troops.
Regardless of the current problems, caused by war losses, and 'plugged' by convicts being released from prison en masse, in the next few years, fanatical teenagers of generation 'Z' will be of the conscription age. If they are given the nourishment of a 'great victory', i.e. a ceasefire, with the Zaporizhzhya Corridor and the Donbas incorporated into Russia, their appetites will crave further bites for the ever-hungry empire. As from a young age they have been brought up to adore the leader and hate the outside world.
With the above in mind, in three years' time, Russia may have a sizeable potential that it will use much better than it did in the case of Ukraine. It does not really need to recreate all its pre-2022 potential but only the capacity to create a larger fighting force than its opponent.
By the way - what was the strategic mistake in attacking Ukraine? Why is this war a missed opportunity for them? Among other things, this is because the Kremlin lost the flower of its army at the outset and since then all it has been doing is making up for the losses with replenishment. It is unable to rebuild reserves that could tip the balance. Instead, the Russians are forced to continually replenish ongoing losses.
Every pause is a gift from heaven for them. The Russian potential is only a shadow of the Soviet one, but despite its primitiveness, it is already in war mode, sped up like an old Lada. Meanwhile, Europe is just getting into its Mercedes and Renault. Unless the Russians burst a flat tyre and end up in a tree, they will be the first to reach the finish line. We can throw nails along the route of this metaphorical Russian Lada, close down repair shops etc. but for this, we need active measures and determination.
Now let's move on to NATO.
How many men and equipment would it take to threaten the Baltic states - the most geographically sensitive area of the alliance? What if - purely theoretically - 150,000 men, 1,000 tanks and 2,000 APCs were gathered at the Pskov direction? A force potential that is absolutely achievable in a three-year timeframe. Similar to what we observed during the February invasion of Ukraine, and gathered in the vicinity of three countries with borders many times shorter than Ukraine's, with virtually zero strategic depth. On top of this, it is safe to assume that a Russia-controlled Belarus would also be active. Discussions about the defence of the Baltic states have been going on for several years, and NATO has been slow to concretise plans and actions to secure them (this was discussed at this year's summit in Vilnius, among other places).
The fact is that Washington's policy of measuredly dispensing military aid to Ukraine and scaling the degree of escalation has emphatically demonstrated to the Russians that a full-scale conventional conflict without the use of nuclear weapons is entirely possible. The parties can impose a confrontational framework on each other without resorting to means of last resort. And even more so if the initial aggression can be diluted in the grey area of the lack of clear definitions of when we can speak of an invasion and when it is merely a 'hybrid operation'. And yet, unlike before 2022, the West no longer has the will to impose drastic sanctions, so it must be ready for physical confrontation. But is this the case?
The Russians will be ready. The Kremlin will happily lose even a few armoured and mechanised divisions with a smile on its lips if it is convinced that at least a few thousand NATO soldiers will fall at the same time. For they believe that the West has lost its ability to wage war effectively and will allow itself to be broken. Pressed against the wall, it will agree to a new deal in Europe. In the name of peace, or perhaps calm. Returning to the concert of powers and consolidating its position will be for the Kremlin an end that justifies the means. Just as it was meaningless for it to lose tens of thousands of troops during the seizure of Bakhmut.
The vigilant commentator should ask, all right, but what about Ukraine? Won't the ongoing conflict be an obstacle to that? Won't it tie the Kremlin's hands? This is the case now, but without the pressure from the West, and most importantly, without substantial support, the Russians are capable of keeping Ukraine in check, just as they did before. They may not conquer it, but they will certainly focus on intensifying the process of 'internal decay’ to destroy economic potential, ignite conflicts, hinder reforms, and weaken the will to resist. They think they can control a lower-intensity conflict, which is what this war will turn into if only because there is no decent supply of ammunition. Kyiv will lose its ability to conduct offensive operations. Moreover, its continued subsidisation by the European Union and other Western capitals will raise costs for the allies, who will become more willing to establish a new balance of power in the region as time goes on. This is how Putin may look at it.
In such a situation, nothing will stand in the way of forcing a new deal in Europe, similar to the Kremlin ultimatum in December 2021. Hybrid operations will follow, that’s a no-brainer. What was the cost of damaging the link between Finland and Estonia?
In summary, we cannot assume that the Russians will only recover in 10 years. That would be extremely irresponsible. The above negative scenario is only one eventuality and is not a foregone conclusion, but NATO, must be ready to deter Russia in less than 5 years, even in the perspective of 3 years.
Finally, let’s briefly return to the subject, mentioned at the beginning, of "Russia’s Collapse", as it seems to be the key term in the whole puzzle. All the facts indicate that this is not a phenomenon that is in the interests of the Americans. Therefore, it is at the same time one of the most logical arguments for which the Americans are heavily "drip-feeding" the Ukrainians. The Americans, for a fraction of their defence budget, and profiting from orders to their defence industry, are destroying one of their biggest adversaries via the hands of another nation. Let’s be real - this sounds like a geopolitical jackpot, which Washington, however, is not bringing to fruition. Why?
The Americans seem to think that opening Russia's pandora's box, which would be the disintegration of the Russian Federation, for a power that for the time being guards the global order and the 'status quo' would be a too chaotic event and the Russians feel it. During Prigozhin's mutiny, CIA chief William Burns, spoke to his Russian counterpart Sergei Naryshkin, assuring him that the US had nothing to do with attacking Putin's rule. The Americans were also said to have forbidden Kyiv from taking any action during Prigozhin's rebellion. In an interview with the Berliner Zeitung, former NATO military commander General Phillip M. Breedlove makes a similar point - "Western countries are afraid of a Ukrainian victory," he says.
The Russians are sensing this hesitation, believing that they just need to wait out Washington. As Americans will sooner or later come with an offer to turn Moscow vis-a-vis Beijing. The proponents of such a path are increasingly visible in the States. In that case, Ukraine would be sacrificed on the altar of rivalry with China. In principle, however, this is wishful logic that presupposes belief in Moscow's intentions - which, as the last decades have shown, have been false every time. At the same time, the Americans are degrading themselves from the role of playmaker to that of petitioner.
The Pentagon is surely aware of this, which is why both options are further on the table. Nothing is yet a foregone conclusion. History continues to be written. The war is ongoing. Ukraine is not winning this war at the moment, but it is not losing it yet either. The US may stop subsidising the Ukrainian war effort, while at the same time calling into question the future of Ukrainian statehood and its own standing among allies. But they may still decide to continue, or even increase, military aid. Ukraine can still win this war. Paradoxically, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have retained significant potential to resume operations after a change in the weather. Provided they receive substantial supplies of artillery ammunition.
Drawing scenarios such as the one above is an extremely important task, as it shows the costs of not supporting Kyiv. Washington is trying not to bring Russia to its knees, but calibrating this process in such a way as not to bring about its collapse while keeping it militarily weak seems impossible. Indeed, Russia and its people are accepting all the inconveniences in the name of imperial aspiration, while other revisionist states are also providing support. In three years' time, should Ukraine be abandoned, the Kremlin may have amassed resources under NATO's borders that will raise existential questions for the alliance. That's when US Marines will have to turn up in Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, facing the real prospect of losing their lives. And if they do not show up, the concept of NATO will most likely be a thing of the past, as the other capable member states will focus on their own defence sensing the coming war, and the lack of support of departing hegemon. The question Washington is asking itself now is, therefore, not: "Should we continue to support Ukraine?", but - "Do we continue with our strategy of maintaining global order?". Because abandoning Ukraine will mean the end of the order we have known for the last 30 years and the beginning of a new era, of "American isolationism". This, we will talk more about in the near future.
