- Filip Dąb-Mirowski
Europe's awakening?
Both world wars started unfavourably for the democratic alliance and each time, after a laborious coalition, its combined potential prevailed over the enemy. Will it be the same this time? Despite the ongoing stalemate in the US Senate, the first positive signs suggest a gradual European awakening to the Ukrainian cause. What are they?
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Ammunition hunger
There are many reasons for the current problems of Ukrainian forces. Still, one of the most important is the acute shortage of artillery shells, which determines the effectiveness of not only offensive but also purely defensive operations. Put simply, the Western military equipment handed over to Ukraine has nothing to shoot with.
These shortcomings forced the Ukrainian command to shorten the front line, withdrawing from the fortified town of Avdiyivka (16.02), despite its long and effective defence. This lasted as long as the defenders could count on the support of their own artillery. When this ceased to be the case, the Russians quickly began to turn the tide.
According to one of the Russian so-called milbloggers, Andriy "Kot Murz" Morozov, at least 16,000 Russian soldiers were to be killed in the attacks on the village between October 2023 and February 2024. This estimate was condemned by the Russian media and put pressure on Murz, who reportedly committed suicide as a result. He stuck to his guns to the end, praising the Ukrainian army commander, General Syrsky, for, in his opinion, successful withdrawal from the city.
The figure given by Morozov is close to the estimates of Western experts. Counting the missing and wounded, the Russian losses amount to some 50,000 people, with 5,000 to 7,000 Ukrainian casualties. At the same time, visually confirmed Russian losses in heavy equipment amounted to more than 600 units (official Ukrainian statistics speak of nearly 400 tanks and more than 700 armoured vehicles), with dozens of Ukrainian vehicles lost.
Despite such a favourable balance and perfectly prepared fortifications, defending advanced positions without artillery support became impossible. This was true of the entire front. Aware of this, the Russians are pushing in many directions at once, concentrating mainly on the areas liberated by the Ukrainians during the spring-summer counter-offensive.
This is a very difficult time for Kyiv, as the supplies given to Ukraine last year are running out, and new supplies have not yet arrived in sufficient quantities to stabilise the situation. The shortfall is a direct result of the blockade imposed by Republican members of Congress, who for almost six months have thwarted any attempt to pass another package of US military aid. This applies not only to Ukraine but also to Israel and Taiwan.
The United States still has the largest army in the world, with an arsenal that exceeds that of any other Western country. It is not, therefore, a question of a lack of available means of destruction, because there are still plenty of them, depending on the type, but of a domestic crisis that is spilling over into the foreign policy of a superpower. Worse still, there is no end in sight, and it is difficult to see how it will end after the presidential elections in November, whoever wins.
Despite immense pressure, both domestic and foreign, House Speaker Mike Johnson is using his position to block the Senate-passed aid bill, while at the same time giving other reasons for his behaviour. As the man anointed by Donald Trump to his position, he remains bound by his will and the demands of the extreme part of the Republican Party, the so-called Trumpists, who promote the idea of American isolationism and present anti-Ukrainian views during the election campaign, in line with the Kremlin's info war. The heated political dispute is paralysing the adoption of the budget and preventing an agreement on securing the Mexican-US border.
Blocking aid not only to Ukraine but also to Israel and Taiwan sends a message not only to Europe but also to Asia and the Middle East. The intricate web of US-built links around the world is shaking, and security discussions are being held in many parts of the world. Countries are being forced to do so as a precaution in case the Americans decide to withdraw definitively from their role as the world's policeman, compounded by a different strategy from the new administration and/or domestic crisis. In this case, alliances will need to be rebuilt, and alternative means of defence against revisionist countries created. This increasingly includes the proliferation of nuclear weapons to states that have voluntarily given them up in exchange for being placed under the US nuclear umbrella - more on this we’ll say in our upcoming episode.
So it seems that the collective West is currently experiencing an identity crisis, exacerbated by the apparent personal weakness of some of its leaders, including President Joe Biden or Chancellor Olaf Scholz. New leaders are needed, with the vision and charisma to consolidate allies and compel them to act towards a clearly defined goal. The existing strategy towards Russia and Ukraine has run out of steam.
Still standing
After the initial shock of a full-scale invasion, many wondered whether the West would rise to the challenge or abandon the Ukrainians to the mercy of an aggressor. After the painful failure of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the mood among the allies was poor.
However, the unyielding stance of the so-called eastern flank countries - including Poland, Romania, the Czech Republic, the Baltic states and the Scandinavian ones, backed by Anglo-Saxon capabilities - pushed EU and NATO policy in the right direction, which, combined with their own potential, enabled the Ukrainians to withstand the first blow and go on the counter-offensive. The resistance of reluctant politicians to greater involvement was gradually broken down, and one barrier after another in the form of refusals to allow the supply of Western systems was overcome - armoured vehicles, tanks, missiles or aircraft. But this was not enough.
The maxim 'for as long as it takes', always uttered in Western capitals, has become a sad memento of the lack of an effective strategy to defeat Russia. The strategy has been reduced to maintain Ukrainian resistance at the lowest possible cost. This lack of a long-term concept, coupled with the failure of the basic plan to end the war quickly with a "cheap" Ukrainian victory in the summer of 2023, led to a crisis of decisions not only in Kyiv but also in the West. There was a clear lack of a contingency plan.
Measures to increase production capacity were taken too late and are being implemented too slowly. The West is currently not producing and ordering enough ammunition to meet not only Ukraine's needs but also its own. Mere narrative favouritism and continued funding of the Ukrainian budget are not enough in a dynamically changing environment.
This led, among other things, to a decrease in the effectiveness of the sanctions, an unravelling of Russian arms production, and an increase in the smuggling of components needed to produce military equipment. Meanwhile, the activities of the Russian agents and the spread of disinformation are intended to delay the necessary measures and, in the long term, to create favourable conditions for a temporary ceasefire for Russia. This is important because the Kremlin's basic premise is to 'wait out' the West long enough for it to tire of helping Ukraine and return to the negotiating table on Moscow's terms.
Paradoxically, we can say that the war initially went…all too well for the Ukrainians. It created unnecessary relaxation in the West, to the degree that it was even afraid that Russia would fall into internal chaos, which was particularly evident in Washington's conservative attitude during the so-called Prigozhin uprising in June 2023, when the Americans called on all European capitals (including Kyiv) to demand absolute passivity in the face of these events. Washington did not want Ukraine to beat the Russians too badly, which could have led to a great Russian “Smuta”, lined with the uncontrolled proliferation of post-Russian nuclear weapons.
Many politicians, including Ukrainian ones, hoped that the Kremlin would be willing to make concessions because the costs incurred by the Russians - human, material, financial, economic and political - would be unbearable for any civilised country. The success of the Ukrainian counter-offensive in the 2023 summer was supposed to make the geopolitical situation so favourable that it would be possible to dictate the terms of a ceasefire on Ukrainian terms.
The operation's failure, which can be summarily attributed to the aforementioned 'Western relaxation, derailed these plans. Vladimir Putin, recovering from a Wagnerian rebellion, strengthened his conviction that total victory was the only way forward for him. He removed Yevgeny Prigozhin from the equation, followed by Aleksey Navalny. He threw critics like Igor Girkin into prison, and the unleashed Kremlin propaganda machine began to promise the conquest of the whole of Ukraine, then the Baltic states and Poland.
Awakening
This is where we are today, although perhaps more accurately, this is we were at the turn of 2023 and 2024. Looking for a proper analogy we can say that the West is acting like a pendulum in this war. Before the war, there was a period of very low morale and lack of faith in the Ukrainian resistance (recall that Washington was convinced of the imminent Kyiv fall). Meanwhile, after the first few months, there was a period of enthusiasm and belief in easy victory - the pendulum swung the other way. This led to a period of relaxation, the failure of the counteroffensive and the Russian initiative - the pendulum swung back to the February 2022 period. It is possible that today, the pendulum has again reached its critical point and is beginning to swing back in Kyiv's favour. What are the symptoms?
The confluence of three factors: the difficult situation on the front line, the impotence of the Americans and the Kremlin's determination, backed by aggressive rhetoric, is bringing a long-needed sobriety to Western leaders. It has become clear that the confrontation with the Russian Federation will be systemic and last for many years. Europe has been forced to take responsibility for its own security. This is not necessarily because Donald Trump is hounding it, but because of the unforgiving reality.
Is Europe taking over the responsibility in the war from the hitherto dominant United States? Indeed, something is afoot.
The Hungarian veto in the European Council on aid to Ukraine has been toppled, freeing up €50 billion for 2024-2027. The rhetoric has changed, too.
The possibility of a direct military conflict between NATO and Russia in the event of a Ukrainian defeat has been raised. This is repeated by field experts, intelligence agencies, military officers and politicians, followed by the media. This shift in public sentiment can be seen as part of an effort to regain control of the narrative and refocus public attention on the essence of this war, which is to contain neo-imperialist Russia. This is a good thing because the only effective way of dealing with the threat (or even stopping it) is to be fully aware of the seriousness of the situation.
Politically, the gap left by the Americans is being tried to be filled by the French as the only remaining nuclear power within the structures of the European Union. They are trying to act on many levels of cooperation, including through the reactivated Weimar Triangle, to shape a European defence policy together with the Poles and the Germans. At the same time, it is Paris that seems to dominate.
The Elysée Palace has many attributes in its disposal, including nuclear energy & weapons, a capable military, which are invaluable assets in times of chaos and which push Paris to take the lead in Europe, especially with the insipid or even harmful actions of the German Chancellor Scholz. The post-colonial French elites have gone on the offensive.
This is why, at a hastily organised conference in Paris (27 February), President Emmanuel Macron, accompanied by a dozen heads of state, opened a discussion on the possible introduction of Western military forces in Ukraine, breaking one of the latest narrative taboos. Although, in his words, no consensus was reached on the issue, similar actions should not be ruled out in the future. He described his stance as “strategic ambiguity”.
France's problem remains the question of credibility. You do not become a leader by words but deeds. Meanwhile, Paris has a long, recent history of cooperation with Moscow that is hard to forget. All the more so as the French support for Ukraine, recently declassified, remains essentially modest. We are talking about less than €4 billion in military aid over two years of war. Even if we add spending within the EU, which totals €13 billion, the whole is far too modest to be a leader not only in words but also in action. 4 billion euros are peanuts for a $3 trillion worth French economy. It is less than the Polish support, which due to its size, cannot be seen as a continental leader of any sort. Meanwhile, with Germany in crisis - just think of its economic problems or the deep penetration of the German state by Russian agents, revealed by the Wirecard scandal, the bugging of Luftwaffe commanders or the arrest of a high-ranking German official for espionage - and with the British outside the EU, France even has the chance to return to its 19th-century position in Europe. But it will have to prove it, not just in words.
In addition to the Ukraine issue, France is also heavily involved in helping stranded Armenia, which is increasingly turning its back on Moscow. It is present in the Black Sea, supporting Romania and Moldova, as well as in the Middle East and Africa. It has interests in South America and the Pacific. Its potential does not qualify it as a world power, but such a wide network of contacts gives it a great deal of room for manoeuvre in shaping foreign policy, especially if it can skilfully win the favour of partners who will take it where it cannot go alone.
Although Macron's statement on the possibility of sending Nato troops to Ukraine created a lot of media hype, in fact, the intervention of Western armies in the event of Ukraine's collapse was discussed behind the scenes from the very beginning of the conflict. In March 2022, it was mentioned by the leader of Poland's then-ruling Law and Justice party, Jaroslaw Kaczynski. At the time, however, the idea aroused more indignation. It was even rejected by Volodymyr Zelensky, who perhaps feared the scenario that was pushed by the Kremlin, i.e. Poland using the war would want to regain Galicia, including Lviv, which of course, was and is nonsense.
That is why today, when the situation is more difficult, there are noticeably fewer similar voices of protest, even though NATO societies fear that the Alliance will enter into direct conflict with Russia. For the time being, therefore, most of them say that "there is no need for it at the moment", yet it can hardly be interpreted as a firm objection. Representatives of Canada, Lithuania, Estonia and the Netherlands admit that they are considering President Macron's concept. Unofficially, one might suspect that more would be willing, but it all depends on the specific circumstances and the level of commitment.
Nothing has been said about the nature of a possible Western troop presence in Ukraine, but it doesn't have to be a combat mission. A likely scenario, if such decisions were to be taken, would be the deployment of NATO troops in non-war and border-protection roles to relieve the Ukrainian forces involved in their protection, which would constitute a big boost for the frontline troops. In addition, it is known from various sources that certain groups of Western forces have been on the ground for a long time. Some are involved in advising or training, others in demining. Some are also said to be helping to direct Scalp and Storm Shadow missiles, a fact that German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has revealed to the displeasure of his allies. The mere discussion of intervention, apart from the technical side of the issue, should at this stage be seen as a so-called strategic signalling to Russia. There will be no appeasement and no collapse of support, as Putin hopes.
Concrete action
To reinforce the message, the Paris Conference decided to form a coalition of the willing to provide Ukraine with medium and long-range weapons of destruction. This can be interpreted as allowing attacks on the territory of the Russian Federation. It is also a signal, part of a broader trend in which individual states have stepped up their efforts to provide further tranches of military assistance to Ukraine on a bilateral basis or in ad hoc coalitions. Some of these packages are missiles that can be used on Russian territory, a fact officially acknowledged by Finland, for example, when it said that the aid it was sending was not subject to any restrictions.
One of the most promising initiatives that could quickly improve the situation of the Ukrainian armed forces is that led by Czechia. In early February, the government in Prague announced that it knew where it could quickly obtain a large supply of artillery ammunition for Ukraine. Without giving too many details, it was said that 800,000 shells were stored in warehouses in non-European countries. The secrecy was necessary because these countries preferred to remain in the shadows. They did not want their stocks to go directly to Ukraine, so the Czech Republic agreed to act as an intermediary but needed more than a billion euros to finance the purchase.
Media speculation pointed to stockpiles in South Korea and South Africa, with a total of 500,000 122mm projectiles and 300,000 155mm. More than a dozen governments quickly signed up to the initiative, with some officially pledging specific amounts. Canada is known to have pledged USD 26 million, the Netherlands USD 150 million and Belgium EUR 200 million. Official support has also been given by France and Poland, among others. The former has agreed to withdraw its objection to the use of European funds to buy ammunition from outside the Community. President Macron hopes to launch the Czech initiative at the beginning of March. The funding seems now secured.
At the same time, Bulgarian authorities have announced the delivery of 120,000 122 mm shells. Germany has promised the same number for delivery in 2024, although February's deliveries included only 4,000 155mm shells. This appears to be just the beginning, as the Bundestag has passed a bill authorising the transfer of €7.6 billion in military aid later this year. France intends to spend up to €3 billion and the Netherlands €2 billion over the same period.
All of these countries signed a series of military, industrial and political cooperation agreements with Ukraine, providing a bilateral framework for inter-state cooperation in the coming years and pledging continued support for Kyiv in its war against Russia. The UK had previously done the same, announcing a package worth €2.9 billion. This brings the total pledged military aid from the British, French, Germans and Dutch alone to €15.5 billion.
But smaller states are no less active. In February alone, military aid from the Scandinavian countries amounted to some $1.4 billion. Finland pledged around USD 206 million, Denmark's package was worth USD 247 million, Norway donated equipment worth USD 325 million and Sweden USD 682 million. The latter's membership of the North Atlantic Alliance was finally ratified, first by the Turkish parliament (January) and finally by the Hungarian parliament (February). This means that the Baltic Sea has become a NATO 'closed lake' for the Russian Federation.
It can be very cautiously assumed that Europe is indeed slowly getting into the gears of war but this process will only begin to bear fruit in a few months' time at the earliest. The best example is the European programme to produce 1 million artillery shells for Ukraine, launched last year on the initiative of Estonia. So far, only 30% of these have been delivered (according to President Zelensky). In a recent interview with Bloomberg, Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski stated that the annual production of shells is currently around 850,000 units and is growing.
The head of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, has called for increased spending on the European arms industry precisely so that the continent has its own autonomous industrial capacity and does not have to rely on US support. Current US production of 155mm projectiles is 40-50,000 per month and is expected to double by the end of 2025.
To put these figures into perspective, analysts Michael Kofman and Franz-Stefan Gady estimate that Ukrainian forces need at least 250,000 rounds per month for a major counter-offensive and between 70,000 and 90,000 per month for defence.
The above information means that already in March large quantities of ammunition will arrive in Ukraine, provided only by the actions of European countries. Including the Czech ammunition initiative, these deliveries should amount to at least some 1.5 million rounds by 2024, helping to stabilise the front line. In the longer term, i.e. by the end of 2025, a rough estimate is that Europe will reach a production ceiling of 2 million 155mm artillery rounds, while the US will reach about 1-1.5 million rounds.
If the Americans manage to break the deadlock, we might even be able to add several hundred thousand more, which in turn would allow Ukraine even to go on the counter-offensive. This is not out of the question, as individual members of Congress are working on legal solutions to circumvent Speaker Johnson's blockade. In addition, the Pentagon is preparing for President Biden to release the last of his funds under the so-called PDA (Presidential Drawdown Authority), to the tune of about $4 billion.
Tightening the loop
The consolidation of the West is progressing, but its effects will not be immediate. While industrial capacity is being mobilised and defence capabilities are being rebuilt, accompanying political actions are taking place. Difficulties in Congress are not preventing Washington from applying sanctions or exerting pressure to limit the possibilities of circumventing them.
The sanctions package announced on 23 February hit more Russian entities, including the largest transport company, Sovcomflot, 14 tankers carrying Russian fuel, a steel producer, as well as companies from China, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey and Kazakhstan that sold banned goods to Russia. The European Union and the United Kingdom, among others, have also announced their sanctions.
When this is not enough, political pressure is applied, as in the case of India, the second largest buyer of discounted Russian oil after China. According to the latest data, these imports have started to decline significantly since December 2023. Unofficially, Indian refiners have been forced to ask the Americans for permission. The decline in volumes is also partly related to the persistently low crude oil prices on world markets. They are influenced by rising US production and the lowest price ceiling set by Saudi Arabia in 27 months. This makes Russian crude less profitable and Indian refiners more willing to buy Middle Eastern crude.
Given the costs that the Russian Federation incurs on a daily basis to fight the war, any move that leads to a drain on its budget could significantly shorten the duration of the conflict. This is why Moscow has asked Beijing for a loan in yuan. Apart from the impact on the Russian economy and production capacity, the financial support for the Ukrainian budget is also important. For the time being, funds are coming from the European Union, the G7, the IMF and a number of countries providing bilateral assistance to Ukraine. But politicians want the costs of repairing the damage and the ongoing war to be borne by Russia itself.
The G7 countries are therefore continuing to work on finding a legal way to use it to support Ukraine. Everyone agrees that this can easily be done with the interest generated each month by the staggering sum of around €300 billion, but there is no agreement on the main amount. The Americans are in favour, but the French and the British are against. The main problem is to find a mechanism that does not undermine confidence in the Western banking system and the safety of the money stored there. Such proposals are due to be presented at the group's next summit in June this year.
No easy times ahead
All these circumstances prove that the picture of hopelessness of the support in Ukraine effort and despair that the Kremlin's propaganda machine is trying to paint is far from the truth. Despite America's difficulties, support for Ukraine continues. The void left by the hegemon is being filled by states that individually have less potential than it, but as a group are able to counterbalance the threats from the Russian Federation. The main challenge for them is to find a good formula for cooperation and to put aside their differences.
It should be noted that Europe continues to “manage” this war in a way that is almost unnoticeable in the daily lives of its citizens. Same in the US. Russia, on the other hand, has been operating in war economy mode for some time. This shows what great potential has not yet been unleashed.
This does not mean that the worst is over for Ukraine or Europe. On the contrary, when quick and favourable solutions for Europe were possible in the past two years, they were lost due to insufficient engagement. The old continent still faces many risks and difficult choices, including a reshuffling of the Western world's leadership. However, difficult times like today are a moment of political birth for tough people who can rise to challenges. They are the ones who will have to take the reins of events, just as their 20th-century predecessors did. Will they succeed?
No one knows that, but history says that the combined potential of democratic states always prevailed in the end over the expansion of totalitarianisms. Democracy takes time, but once all the wheels are in motion, it is hard to stop.
