- Hubert Walas
In Quest Of Answers.
Responding to the perhaps clickbait title right away - no one knows the answer to this question. The war in Ukraine directly or indirectly involves hundreds of millions of people, leading to a tangle of causal links over which no one has de facto control. Nevertheless, to at least try to look for answers, it is best to search for the opinion of people closest to current events, with constant access to information, even the most secret.
The person who fits the description from the introduction best is the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Kyrylo Budanov. The Ukrainian general is one of the best-informed people about the ongoing invasion, both on the Ukrainian side and due to his function - on the part of the agresor.
Budanov is not quoted by us for the first time. The information provided by the Ukrainian general formed the basis for, as it turned out later, the prophetic episode of November 25th, 2021, in which we talked about the plans for the Russian invasion.
Recently, Budanov has given two interviews - one for Ukrainska Pravda and the other for American The Drive, in which he shares his perspective on many key issues of the ongoing war. In it, he also answers the question - of how and when, in his opinion, the greatest war in Europe in 80 years will end.
All Russia is doing now is acts of terror, says Budanov. Previously, they mainly attacked military targets and a smaller number of civilian targets. Now they only target civilian objects. They dream of plunging Ukraine into darkness, cold, and hunger. However, in the general's opinion, these dreams will remain in vain.
Terror is the goal of the new head of the Russian armed forces - Sergey Surovikin. However, Surovikin's taking over the command will not change anything, says Budanov. “He shouldn't be underrated or overrated. But, you won’t surprise anyone with cruelty here. There are too many victims, too much time has passed, people are used to explosions, murders, and deaths. They are used to everything. It won’t work like that here.”
Russian terror can go on for a long time - thanks primarily to Iranian drones Shaheed and Mojacher. The stock of Russian ballistic and maneuvering missiles is decreasing, but the use of Iranian drones, 70% of which the Ukrainians are currently knocking down, means that the prospect of putting an end to terror won’t be possible for at least a couple of months. We can also see Iranian ballistic missiles in Ukraine soon.
Here we had a section about the operational situation in Kherson, but while the material was being compiled on November 9, Surovikin and Shoigu gave the order to withdraw beyond the Dnieper, including from the city of Kherson. Budanov was betting that the city would be defended, nevertheless it is worth quoting one paragraph from the first version of the script that further lends credence to the Budanov’s predictions.
What are the prospects for the liberation of Kherson? Budanov gives a specific date. In an earlier interview with Ukrainian Pravda, he said it will happen by the end of the year. In an interview with The Drive 4 days later, he shortened the date by saying that Kherson would most likely be liberated by the end of November.
As it turned out later, this prediction came true early in the month.
What with the threat posed by Belarus? Budanov believes that it is real, this is no secret to anyone, but the threat is not immediate. The Russians do not have sufficient forces there at the moment, as there are only over 4,000 Russian soldiers, while it is unlikely that Belarussians will act on their own. Nevertheless, the situation could change very quickly when the Russians lose Kherson. Forces from this direction could be quickly transferred to Belarus to renew the threat from the north.
Budanov adds that the Russian grouping in Ukraine now amounts to over 170,000 troops, and the current wave of mobilization will add another 220,000. Still, he believes the wave of poorly trained and low-morale recruits will not be crucial. "They throw cannon fodder at us, but in the modern art of war, it does not have much significance, decisive for the fate of the war." On the other hand, mud begins to play an increasingly important role. Initially, it served the Ukrainians, but now it works against them. The terrain is now often impassable for wheeled equipment.
Budanov's view on the Nova Kakhova dam is also interesting. The Ukrainian confirms that the dam has been partially mined by the Russians since April. It is also true that blowing it up completely would cause a great humanitarian and environmental disaster. But the effects of this explosion would primarily affect the Russians because the water would devastate mostly the left bank of the Dnieper - the area east of the river - and therefore controlled by the Kremlin at the moment. The Russians would also lose the ability to supply fresh water to Crimea, which was one of the operational targets in the southern direction. The operations of the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant would also be at risk. Moreover, as a result of these actions, the Russians would eventually be forced to withdraw to Crimea, says Budanov.
On the other hand, the potential gains from sabotage, i.e. the slowdown of Ukrainians, would be short-term - it would hold the offensive for about two weeks but would not be of strategic importance. Therefore a more likely scenario is a partial destruction of the dam, which would include the destruction of the engine room and lock section or roads leading to the object. The dam would be unusable as intended, and some water would overflow, but it would not be so disastrous. This scenario is also indicated by the way in which the Russians mined the facility.
Budanov also touches on the Russian Federation's internal situation and highlights the Russian elite's minor mood after the fictitious annexation of four Ukrainian regions. "This is a disaster for them. They know it very well. I can't say that everyone there is an idiot - that's not the case. I say this even though I don't like Russia. They annexed new territories, and the next day they started losing them."
What’s really interesting, later in the interview, Budanov names Putin's potential successors. He immediately crosses out Medvedev, who he says has no chance. Among experts, Nikolai Patrushev is often mentioned as the number two person after Putin. However, Patrushev would not see himself in Putin's place, but his son Dmitry, the current minister of agriculture, the Ukrainian general says. Budanov also puts another name on the table - Sergey Kiriyenko - deputy chief of staff of the Russian Presidential Administration. He sees himself as the successor after a more or less peaceful transfer of power.
When asked if Putin's overthrow is a realistic scenario, Budanov answers affirmatively, but it’s not probable at the moment. Nevertheless, if Russia suffers a defeat, it will happen very quickly. The Russian Federation, as we know it, will change its form. Whoever comes after Putin, will certainly put all the blame on the current Kremlin Tsar.
The most important question remains - how and when the Russian-Ukrainian war will end. And here, Budanov does not shy away from the answer. "It's very simple - it will end with a victory of Ukraine. We will reach the 1991 borders of Ukraine, and then we will consider it a good chance to end the war." Recall that these borders include the Crimean Peninsula. When might this happen?
“Next year" - answers the head of Ukrainian intelligence.
Having said that, we must be aware that voices in the prominent Western media are increasingly fearful of such development. For this purpose, we can look at two texts for two serious and opinion-forming media. Emma Ashford's piece for Foreign Affairs is more veiled.
The author admits that although it is not the time to bring Kyiv and Moscow to the negotiating table, the question is not "whether to start negotiations, but when" because, as she claims, almost all wars ended with negotiations. Ashford praises the Biden administration for helping Ukraine so far but also says, "If the administration does not prepare soon, it may find its carefully calibrated response to the war being overtaken by a dangerous fantasy of absolute victory."
So what is Ashford proposing? “Ukraine and its allies must focus on core interests, such as preserving Ukraine’s sovereignty and protecting its population. Rather than trying to retake all its pre-2014 territory or to punish Russian leaders, Ukraine should pursue objectives that are less likely to produce dramatic escalation”. Later, an even more interesting thesis appears, suggesting that Ukraine, with a smaller territory without Crimea and Donbas, will be easier to defend in the future and more stable.
Although the article preemptively stipulates early on that it is not about succumbing to "nuclear blackmail," it is hard to understand what kind of Russian escalation the author has in mind. Russia is throwing all post-Soviet and more modern military technology against Ukraine, which the Ukrainians are fending off using a fraction of NATO's hardware potential. Russia is throwing thousands of untrained recruits onto the battlefield. Finally, Russia is throwing or rather abandoning the foundations of its economy by severing its energy ties with Europe. In a word, it is throwing against Ukraine all its potential, excluding its nuclear payloads. The Kremlin's instillation of a nuclear narrative is one of the last instances to force Ukraine and the West to negotiate, and Ashford's text fits in perfectly.
A similar atmosphere of fear, this time in an article for the New York Times, is introduced by Charles A.Kupchan. The text, with the emphatic title "It’s Time to Bring Russia and Ukraine to the Negotiating Table," begins similarly to Ashford's essay - with the assertion that Biden and his team were right to help Ukraine in the beginning. But now it's time to use that advantage and force the Ukrainians to the negotiating table. Kupchan doesn't beat around the bush. He criticizes the Ukrainians for allegedly provocative attacks on the Russians and writes bluntly, "Ukraine’s battlefield successes could go too far." because, in short, it threatens a world war, including, again, nuclear escalation.
What solution does Kupchan propose to Kyiv? First - Ukraine will never join NATO and will remain neutral. Here the author repeats the famous theses among Russian propagandists about NATO's military power standing at Russia's doorstep. The second part of the agreement would have to include territorial concessions to Russia - preferably Crimea and Donbas.
Both authors, interestingly working at the same university - Georgetown, consciously or not succumb to the illusion of improving the situation by achieving a short-term deal. The argumentation standing in opposition to such viewpoint has already been presented on this channel, but as the stakes are the highest possible - it is worth saying it again.
The nuke threat exists, but it has always existed for the very reason, as Budanov put it, because "our neighbor is a bit crazy and has nuclear weapons." However, this threat mainly targets Ukraine during this war, and if Kyiv accepts such an eventuality, it has the right to do so.
A rotten truce will bring apparent peace today, but it will hit ten times harder only belatedly. All the urging to conclude any deal now before Ukraine regains its legally due territories while bowing to the nuclear bogeyman sends only one signal to authoritarian states - you can unleash a big war, but since you have nuclear weapons, you'll get away with it, and even gain something. They also undermine the status of American power - which, having the resources to protect the order it has established, has not done so. Yielding to nuclear blackmail - because that's what Ashford and Kupchan's texts boil down to - makes one thing sure - you'll definitely hear more of it in the future, and nuclear war will become more legitimate.
From Ukraine's perspective, the issue is even more straightforward. Zelensky says he wants to spare the next generation more wars with Russia - precisely, that is at stake now. After all, Ukrainians are convinced that another war targeting Ukraine is a matter of time unless Russia is punished for its criminal actions today. The only question is whether the next war will happen in 5, 10, or 15 years. The problem is that the Kremlin will surely prepare better for it next time. There is a similar belief in the Baltic States or Poland, which for this reason, is undergoing the greatest militarization in centuries.
Contrary to Ashford's assertions - there is an end-of-war scenario in Ukraine that includes both: a full Ukrainian victory, resulting in the recovery of all territories, and one that does not end in nuclear annihilation. Moreover, such a scenario could play out very quickly. Then we would deal with the following sequence.
The progress of the Ukrainians and the conventional defeat of Russia are resulting in an increasingly unstable situation in the Russian power apparatus. This is already happening. This leads to consolidating the resources and tightening control over them by the siloviki - the people who wield real power in Russian ministries - usually the so-called " ministries of force”. We already see this - Kadyrov or Prigozin have de facto private armies. At some point, one of them or some other general may find that more than in Ukraine, his troops will be useful in Moscow to protect his own narrow sphere of interests or to fight for top positions in the Kremlin. This could result in an almost immediate retreat from Ukraine and a power struggle in Moscow. According to Timothy T.Snyder - a well-known historian who deals with the post-Soviet area - such a sequence of events has historically been very common.
Moreover, Snyder, in a counterpoint to the increasingly frequent comments on the right side of the US establishment calling for a reduction or abandonment of support for Kyiv, made a very logical argument as to why supporting Ukraine against Russian crimes is not only a moral responsibility, but it is also a matter that is absolutely central to the US's hardline interests - American power and the security of American citizens.
Ukrainian resistance to the Russian onslaught supports American security more than any Washington policy does or would do. For years, the U.S. administration, Snyder says, has failed to take action that would effectively prevent the Russians from weakening and breaking the global order.
By beating Russian forces and exposing its weaknesses, the Ukrainians have made the prospect of a much larger war in Europe, geographically closer to the West, much less likely today. A global war is also less likely, in the historian's opinion.
By stopping the Russians, the Ukrainians have shown how complex such operations are. This has not gone unnoticed by the Chinese, the main rival of the US, who are planning the incorporation of Taiwan - peaceful or not. In Snyder's view, Ukraine has reduced the likelihood of a Chinese strike on the island. It has done so only by defending itself. Without the Ukrainians, Washington would not have had the instruments to send a signal of this magnitude to the Chinese without endangering the lives of American soldiers.
It's downright awkward, Snyder writes, that the other country is doing so much for us. The gains from Ukrainian defense are so huge for American security that our establishment is embarrassed to talk about it directly.
Snyder concludes: "My concerns about the Russian invasion of Ukraine are the prevention of genocide and the defense of democracy. But those who think first of U.S. interests should acknowledge what Ukrainians are doing for American security. The least we can do is be on our own side."
The summer of next year, which was mentioned by Budanov as the time of Ukrainian victory, is a very optimistic scenario. However, it is precisely this, not a rotten truce, that should be the goal of everyone who cares about a peaceful and safe future for the next generations.
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraines-intel-chief-on-how-the-war-ends-putins-nuclear-threats-iranian-drones-and-more
https://wartranslated.com/kyrylo-budanov-when-we-return-crimea-the-crimean-bridge-will-cease-to-exist/
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/ukraine-war-will-end-negotiations
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/02/opinion/russia-ukraine-negotiation.html
