- Hubert Walas
After the Ukrainian offensive that swept through the Kharkiv region, Kyiv has recently achieved further successes at Kherson and Lyman. On the other hand, the Russian front line is beginning to be patched up with the first mobilized reservists. The Belarusian direction also remains uncertain after the recent statements by Alexander Lukashenka. Whereas in the background looms the prospect of the third Ukrainian counter-offensive, which would take place in Zaporizhia.
Direction Kharkiv:
In September, the Ukrainians liberated almost the entire Kharkiv Oblast, some 10,000 square kilometers - territory the size of Cyprus. Since our last visualization, Kyiv has added more acquisitions.
In recent weeks, the Ukrainians have crossed the Oskil River and have kept up constant pressure on Russian forces east of the river. Ukrainian Armed Forces seized Kurylivka, Kivsharivka, Petropavlivka, and Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi, an important railroad junction. Further on, the Ukrainians advanced some 10km east of Kupyansk, where they stopped near Ivanivka. At least part of the Ukrainian forces were directed toward Kruhliakivka, where they joined Ukrainian Army units advancing from Borova. The main effort appears to have been on the movement east from Kupyansk towards Svatove. In this area, Ukrainian forces entered the Luhansk region.
The Ukrainians, on the other hand, failed to make progress near Dvorichne for the second week in a row. The Russian defensive lines at Tavilzhanka have not been broken.
These gains mean that Kyiv now controls some 97% of the Kharkiv region. As a result, instead of the Kharkiv direction, we can slowly start talking about the Luhansk direction.
Direction Donetsk
Another high-profile Ukrainian success in recent times was the liberation of Lyman. The Ukrainian advance was more or less steady, but the closer the Ukrainian army approached Lyman, the faster the Russian front line collapsed and the more territory they captured. Within a week, the Ukrainian army had liberated more than ten settlements in the Lyman region (including the town itself), more than Russian forces and their proxies had captured in the Donetsk region since the fall of Lysychansk in early July.
Eventually, the Ukrainians did not create a cauldron near Lyman. It is not clear whether they were unable to or whether they allowed the Russians to retreat so they could catch them in unprepared positions and hit them with artillery. The Russians eventually withdrew on September 30, but some units probably began retreating earlier. As a result of the retreat, the Ukrainians probably destroyed a Russian force of 2,000-3,000 troops.
The Russian actions around Lyman were probably prompted by a desire to delay the Ukrainians so that they could prepare their own line of fortifications in the Troistke - Svatove - Severodonetsk line, which is most likely to be manned with newly mobilized reservists.
The Russians are trying to bite back, especially south of Lyman. They made, without results, counterattacks on Ukrainian positions in Vyimka and Spirne. More successful were the operations near Bakhmut, where the Wagner PMC took Zaitseve and Vesele Dolyna. If they occupy Opytne they will be able to launch ground attacks on Bakhmut from the south. In addition, the aggressors also attacked Pidhorodne, Bakhmutske, Andriivka, Ozarianivka, Mayorsk, Vesele, and Kamyanka.
Direction Kherson
After Kharkiv Region was liberated, largely thanks to the tying of troops in Kherson, the epicenter of events moved back to the south of Ukraine. At the beginning of October, the Ukrainian counterattack in these territories gained momentum again, thanks to which Kyiv liberated the entire Northeast sector of the oblast. Ukrainians report that the attack took place immediately after the rotation of Russian troops and was so strong that it completely surprised and overwhelmed the newly deployed units and caused an uncoordinated retreat. In less than a week, the Ukrainians recaptured 1,200 square kilometers of territory and liberated key towns such as Arkhangelske, Velyka Oleksandrivka, and Davyidiv Brid. For the latter, fierce battles were fought for many weeks, so its capture was a significant tactical success for Kyiv.
However, there was no wider collapse of Russian forces in the Kherson Oblast outside the north-eastern sector. This stands in stark contrast to the Russian posture in the Kharkiv region, which led to an almost complete withdrawal from the region. In July, Kherson was radically reinforced, and even if some formations began to withdraw in response to the Ukrainian counter-offensive in Kharkiv, the Russian presence around Kherson continued to be solid. Rochan, however, believes that Moscow will eventually have to withdraw across the Dnieper, as its positions north of the river are unsustainable in the long run. The Ukrainian campaign involving the destruction of Russian logistic bases, ammunition stores, and river crossings has likely significantly worsened Russia's ability to support its forces north of the Dnieper.
They are certainly not improved by the attack on the Crimean Bridge carried out on October 8. No evidence has yet been released to show that it is open for the transport of the military, so the bridge is probably closed to military traffic, both road and rail. The Russians will be particularly hard hit by the loss of the railway line, which has remained the most effective route for military transport to Crimea and further to the Kherson region. Of course, the Russians have alternatives, such as ferry transport, but it is an alternative consuming more time and resources and also much more limited in terms of quantity.
In response to the attack on the Crimean Bridge, the Russians launched massive air and missile attacks against Ukraine. In total, more than 20 cities were attacked by ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones. According to the Ukrainian staff, 84 maneuvering rockets were fired, 43 of which were intercepted. The attack involved strikes from the Nizhny Novgorod region, Belarus, Crimea, the Black Sea, and even the Caspian Sea. The targets were civilian facilities but also critical infrastructure, primarily energy related.
The retaliation was disproportionate, but that was also the purpose. The Russians want to show that any escalation by Kyiv will meet with a disproportionate reaction from Moscow. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that it was a singular attack. The Kremlin does not have sufficient stocks of precision ammunition to conduct regular campaigns of this type. Moreover, terrorizing the civilian population is counterproductive. It consolidates the resistance to the invader and also motivates the West to support Ukraine further and more. Russian crimes coincide with deliveries to Ukraine of advanced air defense systems - NASAMS or Iris-T.
Direction Zaporozhye
No change in Zaporizhia. This is still the calmest operational direction, despite the fact that the Russian infosphere has for some time been rallying for another Ukrainian counteroffensive precisely in this direction. The Ukrainians are expected to attack in the direction of Mariupol, Berdiansk, and Crimea to cut the land bridge connecting the peninsula to Russia proper. However, as Rochan notes, it is unclear whether Kyiv has logistics efficient enough to sustain three simultaneous offensive operations at once.
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Recent days and weeks have brought another seed of uncertainty from Belarus. On October 10, the Belarusian dictator announced the formation of a regional force grouping and ordered the Defense Ministry to accept thousands of Russian troops into Belarus. Here, however, several things need to be clarified.
First, the Regional Grouping of Forces or RGF has been in existence since 1998. It comprises the Belarusian Armed Forces, elements of the 1st Guards Tank and 20th Combined Arms Armies and Russian airborne forces. The functioning of the RGF has been tested in many strategic-operational command-staff exercises, such as Zapad.
However, Russian formations have suffered very heavy casualties in Ukraine since February, and their combat potential is questionable, to put it mildly. Consequently, the RGF in its current form does not exist.
The announcement that thousands of Russian forces would come to Belarus would indicate that a new formation was being planned. On Monday, some Western and Twitter sources claimed that Russian service members have already started arriving in Belarus. However, this has not been confirmed. The next few days will probably present more evidence of what’s behind the RGF announcement. If troops are deployed, we will need to see where they will be sent to and what capabilities they will display. Only then will we be able to assess whether Ukraine is again under threat from the Belarus direction.
Rochan still maintains that the Belarusian posture is defensive. Minsk is not concentrating its forces, whereas their presence near Ukraine is limited and patchy, given the border length.
If it happens, the deployment of Russian personnel in large numbers could indicate two things. Either Russia wants to force Kyiv to send more troops to defend the border to prevent their use in other areas (Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia), or Russia is preparing to attack Ukraine from the north.
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That said, it is important to remember that from a strategic point of view, the Ukrainians continue to hold the overall initiative in this phase of the war. Ukraine's Armed Forces are conducting two independent counterattacks on opposite sides of the country, forcing Russia to move its forces to fill gaps in defensive lines. Combined with attacks on railroads, bridges, logistics, river crossings, and ammunition depots, Kyiv is attempting to degrade Moscow's ability to support its forces. However, the pace of both Ukrainian counterattacks may slow in the coming weeks.
As we have already mentioned, Russian sources on social media claim that the UAF is preparing for an offensive in Zaporizhia, but it is uncertain to what extent Kyiv can conduct three simultaneous operations.
The next few weeks will also begin to show how much impact the called-up reservists will have on the battlefield, especially as the Ukrainians begin to approach the defensive lines between Svatove and Kreminna.
It is also worth noting that the Ukrainians were able to carry out both offensives by engaging existing frontline units. There is no evidence that strategic reserves were used for this purpose, which means that, taking into account manpower, the Ukrainian offensive potential has not been exhausted. The Ukrainians probably did not create new units but supplemented and reinforced existing formations with new battalions and rear support.
There are also voices saying that the current Ukrainian attacks will only last until the real autumn arrives. Rochan analysts take the opposite view. Although autumn and warm winter may interfere with the mobility of armored vehicles, such harsh conditions open a window of opportunity for the Ukrainians, as the Russians are inadequately prepared for autumn and especially winter weather. Artillery strikes will continue, as will ground attacks aimed at weakening the Russians' will to fight and their morale. Rochan believes that despite the Russian mobilization, the coming months could be very positive for Ukrainian progress.`.
