Will Ukraine Be ‘Betrayed’?

“The Impending Betrayal of Ukraine” - this is the title of the text by analyst Tim Willasey-Wilsey of the prestigious RUSI centre. In it, the Briton, pulling together key factors - including the US election, Western war fatigue, and the Ukrainians' domestic problems comes to an ominous conclusion, from Kyiv's perspective - Ukraine may be forced into negotiations from a submissive position.

RUSI's piece, is just one, of many manifestations of pessimism around the war among the global and Ukrainian commentariat. It intensified after the Volodymyr Zelenski administration's trip to the US, and subsequent tour of the capitals of the Old Continent and with Donald Trump's improving polls. In the States and Europe, Zelensky presented his ‘victory plan’ as a tool to ensure a lasting peace for Ukraine and victory for the Allies. However, from the moment the plan was made available for Americans to see, people from the establishment began to express a negative perception of the plan Zelensky presented.

The fact is that the ‘victory plan’ is a political failure for President Zelensky. However, before we say why it is a failure, traditionally.

Kursk Direction

The extent of the Kursk outbreak is gradually but steadily diminishing. The Ukrainians have been pushed back from Korenevo and also in the Lyubimovka area. On the other side of the cauldron, from the east, the situation is more stable, although there, too the Russian thrust is increasing. Despite the advance, the Ukrainians also maintain three small bridgeheads to the west. One is near the Glushkovo forest, another is near Tyotkino, and the third is at the level of Rylsk.

With regard to the resistance in the Kursk region, it is worth noting that North Korean soldiers are allegedly preparing for combat in this area. The involvement of the Pyongyang regime's infantry has been reported by both Ukrainian and South Korean intelligence services. For the time being, this is still unconfirmed information, although the footage is said to show soldiers from the Korean peninsula. According to the head of Ukrainian intelligence, 2,600 of them are due to go into action as early as 1 November. Weather this is true, we will see it soon.

Kharkiv Direction

From a bird's eye view of the Kharkiv region, little has changed in the past month. The Russian advance continues. However, there are two places where the Russians have managed to move the front line. In Synkivka, north-east of Kupyansk, they have moved about 3km closer to the town. They also improved their positions south of there on the level of Senkove, where they almost reached the Oskil River and the P-79 road.

The head of the military administration of the Kharkiv region, Oleh Synehubov, reported that the Ukrainian authorities were evacuating civilians from Kupyansk and the surrounding area.

Luhansk Direction

In the direction of Luhansk, one must pay attention to the Russian advance at Makiivka, and especially at Nevske, where they pushed back the Ukrainians by a significant 6 kilometres. From the south, Kremlin forces are also pushing towards Terny.

Donetsk Direction

Most of the action has taken place in the direction of the Russians' priority - the Donbas. The Russian Federation has improved its position at Chasiv Yar, where it is approaching the city from the south, coming out of the "German Forest". In recent weeks, this advance can be estimated at around 3 kilometres.

Further south, the Russian advance has been somewhat halted at Toretsk, where the front has not changed. The same cannot be said for Niu-York and Nelipivka. The Russians are advancing towards Scherbynivka and encircling Toretsk.

After a month, the Kremlin commanders returned to the frontal advance on Pokrovsk. They have approached the villages of Mykolaivka and Sukhiy Yar and are about 6 kilometres from the borders of Pokrovsk.

This does not mean that efforts south of the city have been abandoned. It is there that the Russians are making most of their territorial gains. After passing through Ukrainsk, federal forces captured Tsukuryne and this, together with the improvement in the situation at the height of Hostre, means that Kurakhivka - another important logistical hub - is surrounded on three sides. The water barriers to the south of the town work in the defenders' favour, but the situation is still very difficult.

Our last report was also written just before the fall of Vuhledar, which materialised in the following days. The Ukrainians were also forced to retreat at Kostiantynivka.

On the rest of the front there were no significant changes.

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Events on the front, another month (excluding the Kursk action), follow a similar trajectory - the gradual progression of the Russians, at the expense of the gradual receding of the Ukrainians. Invariably, the motives for these developments are recited by all instances each month: the West's insufficient commitment, the Ukrainians' command problems (including the ever-present “Soviet” element among the AFU leadership), the Kremlin's determination (despite the piled-up costs), or simply the difference in scale of the two warring sides. All this is true.

Therefore, with the pattern of events repeating itself, one could expect President Zelensky's proposal to be based on a correct reading of these signals, a change of approach, and the formulation of a plan based, from Kyiv's point of view, on unfavourable international and internal conditions. Has this happened? Let's take a look at Zelensky's plan, which he officially presented to the Verkhovna Rada on 16 October. It contains five essential open points and three secret ones.

Point 1 is the issuing of an official invitation for Ukraine to join NATO and actual membership. Thus, so to speak, playing a game of accomplished facts “fait accompli”, and escalation on terms similar to those of the Russian Federation. The idea was to seal Ukraine's future so that its fate would not be subject to any negotiation at a potential table of talks with Russia.

Point 2 is to increase military aid to Ukraine. A greater scale of supply of equipment and ammunition, the abolition of attacking targets within the Russian Federation, and potentially the destruction by NATO of Russian missiles from the territory of the flanking states - including Poland, Slovakia, or Romania. In addition, the development of Ukraine's domestic arms industry to meet the majority of the AFU’s needs.

Point 3 is to ‘increase conventional deterrence capability in Ukraine’. - behind this enigmatic statement is the idea of redeploying NATO systems to Ukraine to deter Russia's actions. From the NATO playbook, such a move could be called an ‘extended deterrence’.

Point 4 is to invite Western partners to explore Ukraine's mineral deposits. Ukraine has rich deposits of strategic minerals including uranium, lithium, or titanium - as we discussed extensively in an episode two years ago. This would be a kind of incentive for the West and at the same time an element of war funding for Kyiv.

Point 5 is the proposal that Ukrainian forces, in the event of the end of the war, would replace the American troops on the Old Continent, as part of stabilising the security system. With this move, the Ukrainians would be allowing the Americans to more easily depart into other military theatres of the world - including Taiwan and the Middle East.

It should be noted at the outset that we do not know the details of this plan (including the three secret points), and details can sometimes change the perception of certain issues, but it is clear from the initial reactions from world capitals that the plan has been received rather cold. To put it bluntly, at this point in the war, it has done more harm to Ukraine than helped it.

Such an assessment may displease some of the viewers, especially the Ukrainians for whom we also translate our content, but the facts are that the President's office misread the international situation and, therefore, constructed an ineffective plan.

Yes, there is no doubt that this plan, had it been implemented, would have drastically improved the situation in Ukraine. Perhaps it would even help Ukraine to push Russia out of the country altogether and win peace on its own terms. If its implementation depended on us, or on you - I am addressing the audience sympathetic to Ukraine's fate - no one would hesitate for a minute to implement it. Unfortunately, reality is different, and for the past two years the West has responded to Kyiv's calls for planes, munitions, missiles or tanks with similar laziness, procrastination and almost reluctance.

Insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results. - Albert Einstein was once supposed to have said, and this is precisely what Kyiv's plan looks like.

Meanwhile, as the situation is moving towards perhaps the crucial period of this war, issuing a list of demands/expectations/requests that are even several levels higher than those previously sent, and which were also not adequately met, was doomed to failure and caused much consternation in Western capitals. One could even say that it was irresponsible behaviour from the point of view of Ukrainian interests. Responsible policy means adapting the plan to reality. The defenders of the plan claim that it was necessary to start with a high bid so that there would be something to come down from later, but if you bid too high, instead of negotiation, all you get is an 'Eye-rolling'.

OK, so what could the Zelensky administration have done differently?

First of all, it should have started by proposing its own contribution, its own offer to the Allies. Again - many of you will say that Ukraine is doing enough, and its victory should be worth every dollar spent by the West. That is true, but it does not mean that this argument, repeated previously a thousand times, will be heard adequately for the thousand and first time.

The West, and the Americans in particular, believe that a possible defeat of Ukraine will cause some turbulence, but in the big picture - it will not change much. Much more important is the internal situation, the rivalry with China or even supporting Israel, which can count on a much stronger lobby in Washington than Kyiv. Of course, this may be a misjudgment, and many analysts believe it is a misjudgment, but being right when Russia wins the war will be of little use to the elites in Kyiv.

Criticism of this tone can also be heard in Ukraine itself: 'According to the plan, it seems that someone has to do everything for us” - said Oleksiy Goncharenko, a member of the Ukrainian European Solidarity Party.

Starting with its own offer would be a fundamental change, making it much easier for Western capitals to 'sell' the issue of more and more aid to Ukraine, to their individual constituencies. Despite the very bad situation, Ukraine still has the capacity to make certain offers, and although each is costly from the Ukrainian perspective - yet, again, there are no magic solutions at this stage.

First, lowering the age of conscription. Opponents of this move say: if we are going to lose our youngest generation to rebuild the country, then why even continue? Supporters: if you do not do everything in your power to save Ukraine, soon there will be no Ukraine. But apart from the obvious - supporting its own army - this move has the second advantage of showing a reluctant West that Ukraine is capable of doing whatever it takes to win this war.

The second is to individualise the approach to each potential ally. Sometimes we forget what drives politicians, but it is always the same - winning the next election and improving their own political status. Kyiv can take this approach in any direction: American, German, French, Italian, British or Polish. Offer something in return for concrete military support.

Of course, it can be typical commercial contracts, such as military assistance in exchange for contracts to rebuild Ukraine's cities. It could be technology contracts - Ukraine is rapidly developing its military complex, with a particular focus on drones or missiles. Many countries would be keen to learn about these technologies, and the Ukrainians can expect concrete help in exchange.

Ukraine's resource base, also mentioned in the Victory Plan, could also fall under this option. This is where the details we do not know are important. Kyiv could, and even should, go so far as to allow the West to exploit these deposits in exchange for military support for the duration of the war. Otherwise, it would be difficult to expect anyone to invest their own capital in the exploration of deposits in a country at war.

The opposite of individualisation is what the Volodymyr Zelensky cabinet did in America by supporting the Kamala Harris campaign. This could turn out to be a very costly move if Donald Trump wins the election - and there is growing evidence that he will. In practice, with the polls so evenly matched, Kyiv should have offers for both camps and not favour either of them.

Moreover, the offer needs not to be a typical economic one. In the case of Polish-Ukrainian relations, there is still the unresolved issue of the exhumation of victims of the Volhynia massacre, which Volodymyr Zelensky's government does not wish to raise with Warsaw.

Third, in theory, Kyiv has also offered to contribute, in addition to raw materials, in the form of replacing American troops on the European continent with Ukrainian troops once the war is over. In this scenario, this would relieve the Americans from Europe and contribute to the European security architecture.

While the experience and skills of the Ukrainians will certainly be useful in post-war Europe, an 'offer' constructed in this way once again shows a misreading of the international situation. The presence of US Marines in Europe is not about the mere fact that a certain number of soldiers to be stationed on the Old Continent - it is about the fact that they are American soldiers, and to them is tied the entire economic and industrial power of the United States. Hitting these soldiers risks hitting the whole of the US, so Kyiv's proposal could have been downright dangerous for the Poles or Germans - where US troops are stationed - because it would have lowered their sense of security.

In conclusion, the Zelensky plan is bad not because its implementation would not lead to Russia's defeat - on the contrary, it could. It is bad because it does not reflect reality and the willingness of the Allies to implement it. A good plan should have one goal: to present tools that will best improve the situation in Ukraine, while at the same time having the highest chance that the allies will want to implement it (this second caveat is as important as the first).

There is a cost to presenting an ineffective plan. Ukraine is struggling for media attention and the attention of world leaders - such campaigns can be presented once in a while, and Kyiv has lost this attempt. Secondly, it can cement a view that Kyiv does not really have an idea for the war, other than to duplicate existing demands - and this can only reinforce voices about the need for peace negotiations as soon as possible. There is also a third possibility - that the Ukrainian leadership is more concerned with its political position at home and wants to go with the 'electoral' flow rather than make unpopular decisions.

Does this mean that Ukraine is being betrayed, as the title says? Not necessarily, but it is a mistake to think in these terms in the first place and to set itself up as a helpless victim. In the first step, care must be taken to ensure that all the issues that remain in Kyiv's power are taken care of. The second step, if you look for foreign support - one needs to think creatively. Looking for different options, including apparently unpopular choices. One of the eternal truths is that fortune favours the prepared.

The Ukrainians are still playing poker. They have weaker cards than their opponent, but that does not mean they will lose the game. No one knows what card the dealer will draw next. Perhaps Ramzan Kadyrov will roll over on a banana peel and Chechnya will be plunged into turmoil. Perhaps South Korea will opt for a strategy of proxy war with the North via Ukraine, where it will simultaneously test its advanced missile arsenal? Or maybe the new US president will show different reasoning and unfreeze the many red lines imposed on Kyiv so far? In 2025, there will be many scenarios that we do not even consider today. Ukraine is struggling, but the first step to ensuring that it does not lose is to respond better to the signals sent by reality.

Sources:

1. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/impending-betrayal-ukraine
   
2. https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/UAF%20Kursk%20Incursion%20October%2021%2C%202024.png
   
3. https://x.com/sternenko/status/1847202618071818460
   
4. https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/ukraines-victory-plan-receives-mixed-reactions-western-allies-114958883