- Tiago Pedreiro De Lima
"We have taken the first steps in a new historic stage of the struggle for what is ours". These were the words of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in his speech to the nation following a referendum on 3 December. The vote was held to gauge the mood of Venezuelans over Caracas' territorial claims to the Essequibo region of neighbouring Guyana. 95% of voters backed efforts to take control of the Essequibo. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela claims that it is entitled to control 70% of the territory of the neighbouring Republic of Guyana.
The referendum has been preceded by increased activity by the Venezuelan military and a higher level of readiness by Brazilian troops, who have relocated to the disputed territory. The Americans and British, on the other hand, are preparing Guyanese forces. All the signs point to an invasion being a viable scenario.
The Essequibo dispute dates back to the era of European colonisation, but there are many more motives for its resurgence. At stake are billions of dollars from Guyana's natural resources, an internal electoral showdown in Venezuela, a regional balance of power and a global rivalry. The latest news is that Maduro has announced the unilateral annexation of the Essequibo by Venezuela.
The source of the dispute
The dispute over the Essequibo region, also known as Guiana Essequiba, has been going on for more than 180 years. The 160,000 square kilometre region, slightly larger than Greece, lies west of the Essequibo River. For decades, Caracas has marked the Essequibo as a contested territory on its maps. Let us not forget that we are talking about more than 70% of the territory of a neighbouring country. Nevertheless, the Venezuelan claims are not completely out of the blue. To look at the issue in more detail, we need to go back to the period of colonisation.
First under Spanish and then Dutch control, the British finally incorporated the Essequibo into their empire in 1814 through a treaty with the Netherlands. However, the treaty did not clearly define the western border. On the other hand, both Gran Colombia, which gained independence from the Spanish Empire in 1819, and the Republic of Venezuela, which separated from Gran Colombia in 1830, had a clear position on the border with British Guyana: it should follow the Essequibo River.
The discovery of gold in the Essequibo in 1840 brought British attention back to the area and formalised British action. In 1835 Robert Schomburgk, a German explorer working for the Royal Geographical Society, undertook a botanical and geographical survey of British Guyana, on London’s request. The result of these surveys was a concept of a boundary which, according to Schomburgk, corresponded to the western boundary of the lands claimed by the Dutch and later the British.
The British therefore opted for a border drawn along the 'Schomburgk line', which added some 80,000 km² to the territory. Venezuela rejected the new borders and called for US intervention. And so, Washington pressured for international arbitration of the case in 1865. 34 years later, the Paris arbitration ruled in favour of the British and established the 'Schomburgk Line' as the official border. In the mid-20th century, however, revelations surfaced that suggested a possible conspiracy. The British were said to have secretly collaborated with a Russian lawyer, Friedrich Martens, who had been a judge in the 1899 trial that resulted in the Essequibo falling to the British Empire.
Venezuela annulled the decision in 1962 and reported the irregularities to the UN. Although the UK refused to review the accord, negotiations began that led to the Geneva Agreement of 1966, which is still in force today. This agreement essentially supported the status quo, recognising Venezuela's territorial claims and instructing the UN to seek a solution. In 2018 Guyana appealed to the International Court of Justice in The Hague, the UN's main judicial body, to resolve the territorial dispute. But Venezuela rejected the court’s jurisdiction to settle the dispute. Yet the court has since ruled on the case three times. - in 2020 recognising its jurisdiction. In April 2023 - rejecting Venezuela's request to involve the United Kingdom. And on 1 December 2023. - two days before the referendum in Caracas, it ordered Venezuela to refrain from compromising the regional status quo until a final decision had been made on the matter.
Shortly after the Hague Court’s decision, Venezuelan military units displayed banners saying "Essequibo is ours", calling for the annexation of the Essequibo region to Venezuela. Nicolás Maduro, meanwhile, accused Guyana of posing a 'serious threat to stability and peace'. On the same day, Defence Minister Padrino Lopez declared that Venezuela would "march against imperialism" in Guyana.
Fear is growing and the spectre of invasion hangs over Guyana. So let us look at the strategic situation.
Venezuela’s potential and its reletions with Russia
The Venezuelan armed forces consist of three traditional branches - land army, navy and air force - all with a strength of around 130,000 soldiers, supplemented by the National Guard and the Bolivarian militia. It constitutes a reserve of 3 million citizens with limited military training, used as a repressive force by the socialist Maduro regime.
Venezuela is the only country in the region with medium and long-range air defence systems, including Russian made, S-300 and Buk-M2 batteries. With these capabilities, Venezuela can effectively control its airspace and deter any Latin American air force, including Brazil. The Venezuelan army has several hundred artillery pieces, mainly OTO Melara M56. What’s more, nearly 200 Russian T-72B tanks and obsolete French AMX-30 tanks. Venezuela also has 200 BMP-3 and BTR-80 armoured vehicles, recently purchased from Russia.
The air force consists of a fleet of 23 Su-30 fighters and 16 F-16 fighters, although their combat readiness is unknown due to the US embargo. Air support is provided by a group of just 10 Mi-35 attack helicopters and only three Mi-26 transport helicopters. The state of the Venezuelan navy is even worse. Caracas has a very limited number of frigates, corvettes and patrol boats. Its two submarines have been decommissioned and the operational status of its two landing ships is unknown.
Although Venezuela is not a military power, these capabilities are sufficient to overwhelm Guyana, which has no significant defence capabilities. Guyana spends a minimal 0.6% of its GDP on defence. The result is a poorly equipped and trained force using outdated Brazilian military technology such as Cascavel and Urutu armoured vehicles and Spanish VSC M1 armoured vehicles. Artillery and air defence are non-existent, and the country lacks helicopters, and fighter planes. Guyana also has no navy.
Venezuela's small but dominant vis-a-vis Guyana military capability stems from its relationship with Russia. Caracas has been a regular customer of Moscow since 2005, when the first arms deal was signed. Political scientist Arnaldo Cardoso, a professor at Mackenzie University, notes that between 2007 and 2011, Venezuela purchased more than $12 billion worth of arms from Russia. Since 2008, the two countries have conducted joint military manoeuvres, including one involving a nuclear-powered cruiser and a pair of Tu-160 bombers. These were Russia's first such operations in Latin America since the Cold War. In December 2018, a Russian nuclear-capable bomber landed in Venezuela to prepare the country's defence in the event of a coup.
As Maduro's consolidation of power weakened in 2019, and opposition leader Juan Guaidó was recognized as interim president by more than 50 countries, Donald Trump reiterated that 'all options are on the table', suggesting that military intervention in Venezuela was not out of the question. However, Russian support, which included sending Wagner Group mercenaries into the country to bolster the president's security, ultimately strengthened Maduro's grip on power. This political support from Russia was confirmed in a meeting between Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev and President Maduro in March 2023. Patrushev praised 'Venezuela's public condemnation of the West and NATO's destructive policy towards Russia'.
How would the invasion take place? Military aspects
But, history shows that a hardware advantage only is no guarantee of success. Remember that the Essequibo is essentially a jungle.
This Amazon jungle poses quite a challenge to the movement of tanks and large military formations. The terrain itself is a de facto major defensive asset of Guyana. There is essentially only one road through the Essequibo, connecting the main towns with Brazil. There is no direct link to Venezuela. With only a single road connecting the major cities and Brazil, capturing this road would be a formidable task for Venezuela. However, once this vital communication line is severed, operational siege on Georgetown becomes plausible, particularly with the implementation of a naval blockade.
The population of Guyana is just under 800,000, with about half living in the capital, Georgetown, and nearby coastal towns. This concentration makes the city the main strategic point, leaving vast areas less defended and susceptible to potential advancement by Venezuelan forces.
Logistics meanwhile are a headache for both sides. Towns a natural choice for supply depots, but these are far from the Essequibo region. Given the limited road infrastructure, both sides will therefore have to rely on river transport. Large scale air supply operations are not a viable option due to the lack of sufficient aerial resources for both forces. What’s more, the severe drought in the Amazon has led to historically low river levels, further complicating navigation and limiting loading capacity.
Having analysed these factors, what are the manoeuvre options in the event of an invasion? An amphibious landing? Even if naval vessels were capable of carrying out such an operation against the capital Georgetown, it must be remembered that naval bases are located at Puerto Cabello and Punto Fijo. This means that ships would have sail to through the territorial waters of Caribbean countries, with strong ties to the US, before reaching Guyana.
Another option would be to use Brazilian territory as a passageway to avoid going through jungle areas. The Venezuelans would then have access to the main line of communication and could move towards Georgetown. But Brazil, although its president is essentially an ally of Maduro, seems reluctant to escalate the conflict into a military invasion. Additionally, authorization for the entry of foreign troops into Brazil depends on approval from the Legislative Branch, which currently leans adversely toward the left wing.
Therefore, unless the Venezuelan Armed Forces intend to meticulously advance through the jungle, reaching the banks of the Essequibo River and declaring the region occupied, their options appear limited. The question arises: Does Padrino, the Defense Minister, plans to progress gradually through the jungle and engage in guerrilla warfare?
Why escalate the crisis now?
But let us get back to the bigger picture. Why has Maduro decided to ratchet up the pressure now?
Since 2021, Venezuela's domestic politics have gradually stabilised. The opposition leader Guaidó had lost his influence both inside and outside the country. But Maduro could not expect Venezuela to disappear completely from the international radar. As early as November 2022, the presidents of Colombia, Argentina and France met in Paris to broker a deal with Venezuela, proposing free presidential elections in 2024.
The incentive was to be the release of a $3 billion fund from frozen Venezuelan assets, intended to address the country's humanitarian crisis. Another geopolitical gesture of good will was the Americans' declaration that Chevron was ready to explore oil in Venezuela. This is significant because Venezuela do not have the resources or technology to effectively develop their own hydrocarbon fields. With this move, the Americans wanted to break the monopoly of the OPEC+ cartel and at the same time hit another petrostate - the Russian Federation.
In October 2023, there was a breakthrough. The US Treasury temporarily suspended sanctions on Venezuelan oil, gas and gold. Critiqued by Republican senators, this measure was a response to an agreement between the Maduro government and the opposition to conduct presidential elections in 2024. So the Americans had a vested interest in unblocking Venezuela, and the motive of free elections provided the perfect justification.
Undersecretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Brian Nelson explained that the funds could be withdrawn if Maduro's representatives did not fulfil their obligations. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, meanwhile, stressed that the US expects a defined schedule and a concrete process for evaluating candidates in Venezuela, as well as the release of all unjustly detained US citizens and Venezuelan political prisoners.
Unsurprisingly, Maduro has failed to live up to these demands. Instead, the Venezuelan Supreme Court annulled the results of the primary elections held in November to determine the challenger in the 2024 elections. The right-wing candidate, María Corina Machado, won with 92% of the vote, with more than 2.3 million voters taking part.
So Maduro might be using the nationalist agenda of Essequibo annexation to unite public opinion on the eve of the presidential elections scheduled for March 2024. The armed conflict could serve as an excellent justification to postpone the elections and gain time.
Another possible motive for the invasion is the regional reshuffle at the top of power. After the 'second pink tide’ that brought several left-wing presidents to power, recent elections have reversed this trend.
Successful governments in Uruguay and Paraguay, the high popularity of President Bukele in El Salvador and recent victories for the right in Ecuador and Argentina coincide with major institutional crises in left-wing countries such as Chile, Peru and Bolivia. Maduro is defending himself against a right-wing resurgence in Venezuela, while at the same time taking advantage of the fact that his historic ally Lula is president of Brazil - the primary regional power capable of politically supporting the Venezuelan elections.
Certainly, Lula is already expressing his support for Maduro through both words and actions. He expressed the hope that "common sense will prevail on the side of Venezuela and on the side of ... Guyana" - which can be read as an endorsement of Caracas' blackmail. He also declined to meet the Guyanese president in person at the COP 28 summit in the United Arab Emirates.
There is finally a global motif. Who would be interested in opening a third front, after Ukraine and Gaza, to attract the world's attention? You guessed it - the Russian Federation, a key partner of Maduro's Venezuela. All the more so as Moduro owes Putin a debt of gratitude for helping him consolidate power at a critical time. Perhaps the Russians are influencing Caracas' decisions, conveniently distracting the West's attention from Ukraine. After Sudan and Gaza, Venezuela could be the next conflict to demand US resources, which are not unlimited.
And the future?
A lot depends on Brazil's behavior. It is the main power of the entire continent, and geography means that the best route for an invasion is through its territory. The Lula government has taken measures to prevent the crisis between Venezuela and Guyana from escalating, but predicting its actions in the event of an actual invasion is challenging. Brazil's armed forces have increased their presence on the country's northern border amid rising tensions. Despite having an army almost three times the size, better trained and armed than Venezuela's, the Brazilian government favours a negotiated solution. Brasília's international affairs advisor, Celso Amorim, visited the Venezuelan capital to discuss the issue, while the foreign ministry stressed that it appreciated that 'at a time when several regions of the world are experiencing armed conflicts, South America remains an environment of peace and cooperation'. Brasilia thus seems to be positioning itself as a promoter of regional peace, without, however, criticising Nicolas Maduro.
Guyana itself is also not completely isolated. As a member of the Commonwealth, formerly known as the British Commonwealth, it maintains a partnership with the UK in the training of officers. The Commonwealth Secretary General issued a note on 1 December offering full support to Guyana. It stated that: "The Commonwealth calls on all members of the United Nations to encourage parties to respect the integrity, legitimacy, and binding nature of ICJ decisions that create international legal obligations for parties" Irfaan Ali - President of Guyana - took to social media to reassure the population. "I want to assure Guyanese that there is nothing to fear in the coming hours, days, months. We will be vigilant, but we are working tirelessly to ensure that our borders remain intact, and that our people and country remain safe," he said.
What about the hegemon of the Western Hemisphere - the US? The Americans are also trying to prepare Guyanese for the worst. On 27 November, military personnel from the US Army's 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) and the Guyana Defence Force met to plan the military readiness and security response capabilities of both countries. US Ambassador to Guyana, Nicole Theriot, reiterated: "We support Guyana's territorial sovereignty and urge Venezuela to do the same."
It is important to remember that US companies are part of the massive economic success that Guyana is currently experiencing. The economy is expected to grow by 37% this year, and last year it grew by 62% year-on-year, according to the IMF. Guyana's GDP is growing at the fastest rate in the world, and this is thanks to oil extraction in Guyana's offshore shelf. US companies are responsible for this, with Exxon and others investing billions of dollars. This makes it clear that although Guyana is part of the Commonwealth, it is the Americans, not the British, who have the greater interest in supporting Guyanese self-determination. This is undoubtedly what the leaders of American oil giants such as Exxon are lobbying for, and their influence in the United States is significant. There is also another reason why the Americans are trying to put out fires in every part of the world. Every new conflict undermines the international order of which they are the guarantors. For these reasons, if tensions rise, it is not out of the question, for example, that a US aircraft carrier group could be deployed off the coast of Guyana. The power projection capabilities of such a grouping dwarf those of the Venezuelan army and would be a Russian roulette for Maduro. Would the Americans come to Guyana's defence if it were attacked? This is the question Nicholas Maduro would have to ask himself when giving the order to attack. On the other hand, the Americans cannot be stationed there indefinitely. Asked about the possible consequences, the aforementioned US ambassador to Guyana said: "We will cross that bridge when the time comes.”
On the other hand, the economic and legal instruments to put pressure on Venezuela are already being used almost to the maximum. In theory, the Americans have more room for manoeuvre when it comes to Brazil, and then the Brazilians could exert more pressure on Caracas.
Finally, how to assess Venezuela’s plans? In theory, there are legal grounds for challenging the state of Essequibo. In practice, however, we are talking about a country that has its own culture and its relationship with London is not the same as it was 150 years ago. Guyana is an independent country and an independent nation. Even if the territorial arrangement at the time favoured the British, today the interests of the Guyanese people have to come first and they do not want to be part of either Venezuela or the United Kingdom, as they proved when they gained independence in 1966.
Already in the process of making this episode, Maduro issued a decree declaring the unilateral annexation of the Essequibo by Venezuela. He appointed General Rodriguez Cabello to lead the occupation of the region. But for the annexation to move from de jure to de facto, Venezuela must carry out the actual invasion. Will Maduro give the order? The situation over Guyana is being monitored by US reconnaissance planes. Guyana's President has announced that his country is preparing to defend itself.
What the future holds remains to be seen, but we are on the verge of another war, this time on the other side of the world. The periphery is cracking at the seams and the world is shaking ever more.
Sources:
(1) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hKsnANzUbqo
(2) https://www.opovo.com.br/noticias/mundo/2023/12/01/cij-ordena-que-venezuela-se-abstenha-de-acoes-que-ameacem-status-quo-com -guiana.html
(3) https://t.me/hojeno_mundomilitar/17629 ; https://t.me/hojeno_mundomilitar/17630
(4) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d4ORp9naCAI ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jQut0MbgGss
(5) https://www.gazetadopovo.com.br/mundo/o-que-significa-a-chegada-de-bombardeiros-russos-a-venezuela-7lr3cho2irw46l6orvezt28a7
(6) https://x.com/trbrtc/status/1072975160762949633?s=20
(7) https://www.gazetadopovo.com.br/mundo/a-relacao-militar-entre-venezuela-e-russia-em-milhoes-de-dolares-e-outras-noticias-relevantes-da-semana
(8) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-russia-exclusive/exclusive-kremlin-linked-contractors-help-guard-venezuelas-maduro-sources-idUSKCN1PJ22M/
(9) https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/02/22/china-russia-have-deep-financial-ties-venezuela-heres-whats-stake/
( 10) https://www.gazetadopovo.com.br/vozes/filipe-figueiredo/o-interesse-dos-eua-por-petroleo-e-pela-relacao-entre-lula-e-maduro/
(11) https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/articles/c51jr5pr9d1o
(12) https://noticias.uol.com.br/ultimas-noticias/afp/2023/10/30/supremo-da-venezuela-suspende-primarias-da-oposicao-e-promotor-interroga-organizados.htm
(13) https://www.dw.com/pt-br/uma-guinada-%C3%A0-direito-na-am%C3%A9rica-do-sul/a-65570407
(14) https://thecommonwealth.org/news/statement-commonwealth-secretary-general-icj-process-regarding-guyana-venezuela-border-dispute
(15) https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/articles/cgezlprlqnzo
(16) https://noticias.r7.com/brasilia/reuniao-entre-lula-e-president-da-guiana-para-debater-crise-com-venezuela-e-adiada-01122023
(17) https://gy.usembassy.gov/us-army-guyana-defence-forces-strengthen-military-partnership/
(18) https://www.montedo.com.br/2023/11/29/eua-enviam-militares-para-defender-guiana-da-venezuela/
(19) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1DinEhiV9Ys
(20) https://www.brasildefato.com.br/2023/03/01/chief-do-conselho-de-seguranca-da-russia-visita-a-venezuela-e-se-reune-com-maduro
(21) https://g1.globo.com/mundo/noticia/2023/12/03/lula-diz-que-espera-bom-senso-na-tensao-que-envolve-venezuela-e-guiana.ghtml
(22) https://noticias.uol.com.br/internacional/ultimas-noticias/2023/12/02/venezuela-guiana-lula-itamaraty-brasil-maduro.htm
