- Hubert Walas
At the end of August, the Ukrainian Armed Forces launched an official counter-offensive in the Kherson direction. However, as it turned out a few days later, it was not at Kherson but at Kharkiv that the Ukrainians' greatest success of the war to date was to be achieved. In four days, Ukraine liberated more territory than Russia had captured since the second phase of this war began at the end of April this year.
Kherson Direction:
On the 29th of August, as announced by Captain Natalia Humeniuk, spokesperson for the Joint Southern Command of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the Ukrainians launched a broad counter-offensive in the Kherson region. Since the beginning of the operation, Kyiv has been very careful about the information sphere, so based on the fragmentary data coming down from the south, it was difficult to assess the scale of the Ukrainian campaign. In general, however, the attack was divided into five areas:
- Pravdyne – Tomyna Balka:
- Partyzans’ke – Blahodatne
- Andriivka – Bilohirka – Sukhyi Stavok
- Novodmytrivka – Arkhanhel’s’ke
- Vysokopillya – Petrivka – Zolota Balka
After several days of the operation, the Ukrainians liberated Vysokopilja, Arkhanhelskie, and Sukhyi Stavok, among others. One could also be tempted to make a few observations.
Many expected a large-scale counter-offensive. Instead, although it was a frontal attack, the Ukrainians committed forces equivalent to 3-4 brigades deployed across the entire 200-km front line. Not all available forces have been committed to the battle, so even if the attack eventually stops completely, the Ukrainians will still have some reserves that can be sent to other areas of the front. The attack appears to have taken at least some Russian formations by surprise, allowing Ukrainian units to break through the first line of Russian defenses. What’s more, the most modern and advanced Ukrainian artillery assets, such as the Krab and Panzerhaubitze 2000 SPH, or M113 APCs and ex-Polish T-72 tanks, were engaged in the battle. It should be noted that despite some initial successes, the Ukrainians quickly stalled. Therefore, they changed their approach a week after launching the offensive. Frontal attacks were replaced by the use of small tactical formations supported by robust ISR capabilities (satellites, UAVs) supported by Special Forces components.
The ultimate goal is to push the Russians beyond the Dnieper. However, this is unlikely to be achieved any time soon. At this stage, the attack is unlikely to bring operational success. The Ukrainians have used too small a force, too dispersed, to make rapid progress. Still, we must take into account one important caveat. The Ukrainians are continuing to strike Russian storage bases, logistics centers, and bridges across the theatre of operations to reduce their ability to conduct maneuvers, defensive operations, and artillery fire. Russian supply lines are under increasing pressure. This will be a key challenge that Moscow will need to address to ensure its forces can operate effectively north of the Dnieper. If these formations run out of ammunition, we could witness a disorganized withdrawal of Russian forces towards the river.
The Ukrainian strategy, therefore, is to exhaust Russian formations and cut them off from supply while maintaining pressure by conducting ground operations. At the same time, the aim is to drive the Russians out of the city of Kherson without a fight. This could become a reality if supply is a real problem.
Here it should be noted that in the previous edition of our series, together with Rochan, we informed that a counteroffensive in the Kherson direction is currently not probable. This turned out to be untrue, only a few days after these words, Kyiv launched an attack. Nevertheless, the balance of power, which became even after the transfers of the Russian army to Kherson recently, demanded restraint in assessing the situation. In practice, it was only after a few days that we were to witness the greatest success of the Ukrainians since the beginning of the war, but not in the Kherson direction, yet closely related to it.
Kharkiv Direction:
On Tuesday, the 6th of September, the Ukrainians attacked Russian positions in the Kharkiv region, which very quickly cascaded from a counter-attack to a full counter-offensive. Kyiv's forces quickly penetrated 40km deep into the Russian positions and took Balakliya, Verbivka, Yakovenkove, Volokhiv Yar, Bairak and Nova Husarivka. The pace of the attack was unprecedented by the standards of the recent months of this war. By the next day, the Ukrainians were another 30 kilometers deep, reaching a key junction - Kupyansk. The uncontrolled retreat, during which the aggressors left behind a lot of military and logistical equipment, suggests that the attack took them quite by surprise, despite the fact that information about a potential Ukrainian counter-offensive in this direction had been circulating on the net for several days.
The Russian troops near Kharkiv, after the transfers to the south of the country, were badly depleted and stretched, which Kyiv took excellent advantage of. Three to four Ukrainian mechanized brigades attacked several Russian battalions, which were unwilling and unable to face the Ukrainian advance. The Russians did not carry out any significant combat operations against the Ukrainians and were primarily focused on retreat.
Moscow lost relatively few men (especially compared to what it could have lost). However, according to Rochan's assessment, Ukrainian losses were also relatively small. Nevertheless, since the start of the offensive in Kherson and Kharkiv, the Russians have lost the equivalent of three mechanized brigades. Only in the Izyum area did the Russians lose at least two companies of T-80 tanks belonging to the 4th Guards Tank Division. These tanks were abandoned at repair and maintenance bases rather than destroyed in combat. This indicates problems with logistics, rear support, and maintenance. These issues are inherent to the Russian ground forces and are unlikely to be fixed in the medium term. Some of this captured equipment will return to service under the Ukrainian flag. Just as the Russians were unable to make up for the losses suffered north of Kyiv, which ultimately proved decisive for their failures elsewhere in the second phase of this war, the loss of equipment in Kharkiv and Kherson may decimate Russian offensive combat potential in general. In the medium term, that is about six months, the Russian ability to conduct any offensive is likely to be non-existent.
In our previous analyses, we pointed out that while Russia held the initiative in the short term, Ukraine's chances looked better in the medium and long term. The war is now likely to move into the aforementioned medium-term perspective. In other words - it is Kyiv that has the initiative. For the first time in this war, i.e., Kherson, Ukraine decided the time and place of its actions, and all indications are that the Ukrainians will continue to have this advantage.
Crucial to the huge success of the Kharkiv counter-offensive proved to be the redeployment of Russian forces from the Kharkiv region to the southern areas of Ukraine; hence it can be suspected that the two events were closely linked. On Saturday, the Guardian published an article based on an interview with Taras Berezovets, a former national security adviser turned spokesman, who claims that the attack in the Kherson region was a feint and part of a larger disinformation campaign to force the Russians to shift their forces to southern Ukraine and make them vulnerable in the Kharkiv region, where the main Ukrainian attack was to take place. If this was, in fact, the case, the Ukrainians completely outmaneuvered the Russians.
It is essential now to move beyond the Kharkiv direction, which is probably already fully liberated. The Ukrainian army stands at the door of the Lugansk region. On February 21st, Putin signed a decree recognizing both the Lugansk and Donetsk People's Republics within their administrative boundaries. Both provinces are severely depleted of men capable of fighting. If the Ukrainians continue to push into the Luhansk region, the collapse of defenses there could be as significant as in the Kharkiv region. Russia is hastily assembling reinforcements, but as of Sunday, September 11th, it is difficult to estimate their size, strength, and location. The current front line is based on the Oskil River, and another defensive line may be formed on the Severodonetsk-Troits'ke section.
There are two major differences between the Kherson and Kharkiv offensives. Firstly, in the days leading up to the attack, Russian social media accounts reported a Ukrainian gathering in the Kharkiv region, so the attack was not entirely unexpected. Moscow must also have been aware of the movement of Ukrainian forces into the area. In Kherson, the Ukrainians achieved operational surprise, at least as to the date, but not the general direction of where the attack would take place.
Secondly, in Kherson, Kyiv restricted access to information about the progress of the attack from the start. In Kharkiv, we are on the other side of the spectrum, where the influx of information about progress is huge. The aim of the information campaign is clear. To show that the Russians are being overrun, to disorganize the Russian response, and to degrade the morale of Russian forces. And it is working.
This seems to indicate that Kyiv expected many difficulties in Kherson and that it did not expect a quick victory.
Moving forward, the main question is whether the Russians will now start withdrawing their forces from southern Ukraine to patch up the holes in their defense lines in north-eastern Ukraine. If this happens, the Russian ability to maintain its forces north of the Dnieper will be significantly degraded.
In the other directions, the situation remains more or less stable, although there is speculation that another Ukrainian counter-offensive could take place in the Zaporizhia direction.
Overall, Ukraine has liberated more territory in four days than Russia has captured since the second phase of the war began in late April this year. Russian advances since April have been chaotic. Since then, Moscow has achieved three tactical successes. It broke through Kyiv's defensive lines at Popsna, Severodonetsk, and Lysychansk, allowing the Russians to make relatively quick gains. But although the Ukrainian formations were harassed, they were not defeated and withdrew with their equipment to the second lines of defense. Russia's lack of available reserves determined that it was unable to pursue the retreating Ukrainians and prevent them from taking up new defensive positions. Russia, therefore, relied heavily on moving its forces across the theatre to shift the local balance of forces in its favor and make incremental gains.
Russian forces in the Kharkiv region have been defeated, and Russia is now hard-pressed to respond to current events. The Kremlin, in order to establish new defensive lines, is likely to rely on the newly formed 3rd Army Corps and some formations that are forming in the Belgorod Region. However, we do not currently foresee the Russians making any offensive attempts. They lack manpower and equipment. Operations will focus on stabilizing the front to prevent Kyiv from making further gains.
From Kyiv's perspective, there are reasons for cautious optimism. After two Ukrainian offensives (the Kharkiv one actually ended), we may have entered the third phase of this war, characterized by an increased pace of Ukrainian counter-attacks.
This is highly unlikely for the time being, but it must be added, argues Rochan, that a Ukrainian counter-offensive near Kharkiv could have a devastating impact on Russia's overall posture. We could witness a complete collapse of the Russian presence in Ukraine.
