GTBT - Ukraine Fortifies Kursk Gains As Russia Goes After Pokrovsk

: Hubert Walas; Created: 10 September 2024

Three weeks have passed since the largest attack by Ukrainian forces on the territory of the Russian Federation during this war. In that time not only have the Ukrainians not withdrawn from the territory they have seized, but they have actually expanded the scope of their operations. Thus, opinions about the short-lived nature of the incursion, which is also the first attack by a foreign state on the core territory of Russia, and previously the USSR, since the Second World War, have not been confirmed.

The exact size of the controlled territory remains unknown, but the Ukrainian command puts it at around 1,200 square kilometres, 93 settlements, including the town of Sudza. This is roughly the amount of Ukrainian territory the Russians have captured since the beginning of this year.

Since our last report, the Ukrainians have taken full control of the town of Sudza and extended their attack eastwards to include settlements such as Guyevo and Borki. Further north, the AFU have also taken control of Martynovka, Malaya Loknya and the village of Pogrebki - while simultaneously facing Russian counter-attacks.

The central axis of the incursion - towards Lgov - also marks the northernmost extent of the Ukrainian operation, according to the Institute for the Study of War. Moving west, the AFU are also expected to be on the outskirts of Korenevo, the second town in the region, the size of Sudza. Snagost and Viktorovka are also likely to be under Ukrainian control.

Also of note are Ukrainian attacks on bridges over the Seim River, to the west of the controlled area. The aim is likely to cut off Russian forces remaining on the other side of the river, threatened by Ukrainian encirclement. US HIMARS and GBU-39 bombs and French AASM guided bombs were used to destroy them.

In the previous report, we mistakenly said that the Ukrainians could not use US missiles in their operation. The fact is that they contributed significantly to the success of the operation, in particular by neutralising the Russian convoy in the early days of the invasion.

Washington allows the use of US offensive weapons as long as they are used from Ukrainian territory and target border areas, so Kyiv can fire shorter-range HIMARS rockets at Russian positions in Kursk. However, the Ukrainians are still prevented from using ATACAMs or Storm Shadow missiles against high-value Russian targets in the interior of the country. This is not permitted by US doctrine at this point in the war, although given the gradual relaxation of other red lines during this war, it is not impossible that this barrier too will be crossed in time.

Indeed, among the many objectives of the Kursk operation, one of the most important motives was inevitably to address the issue of illusory 'red lines'. Kyiv wanted to demonstrate that even such a bold gambit as an attack on the core territory of a nuclear power would not provoke it to any of the massive responses that the West fears. In theory, an attack on its territory should immediately provoke the Russians to respond with a tactical nuclear strike. But nothing of the sort is happening, even in official communications.

In practice, the Ukrainian presence on Russian soil changes nothing. The Kremlin could theoretically use a limited-range nuclear warhead, but it will not do so because it would be counterproductive for Moscow.
That is because, such an event would be aimed at forcing the Ukrainians to withdraw from Kursk or, more generally, to accept defeat in the war. But the problem is that Kyiv is clearly communicating that such an attack will in no way change the attitude of the Ukrainians - Ukraine will continue to fight. The only thing the Russians would achieve, apart from a limited local damage to Ukraine, would be even greater global ostracism - perhaps even within a group of 'balancing' or sympathetic to Moscow states, and the neutralisation of the only trump card of their own superpower, as the nuclear card would be 'checked' - and would not achieve its intended purpose.

In other words, by attacking the Kursk region, the Ukrainians wanted to show world opinion that further red lines are an illusory concept and should not be taken seriously. But while global opinion may change its mind on this basis, decision-makers in Washington are guided by their own calculations, which may not be identical to official communication.

So what's next for Kursk Operation?

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What's next for Kursk? Stabilisation of gains, entrenchment and consolidation of positions. Enlarging the beachhead, especially vertically, will be difficult, and again it is unclear whether it will pay off in the broader war picture. Ukrainian forces still remain relatively thinly spread along the entire front, and manpower levels remain inadequate. More captured territory, meanwhile, requires more troops to protect it.

All the more so as the Russians are drawing reinforcements to Kursk from less priority directions - ISW writes of Robotyne, Siversk and northern Kharkiv, among others. However, Russian forces continue to maintain a high level of engagement on the main axes of Pokrovsk or Toretsk, which we will come to shortly.

With few losses of its own, Kyiv gained a comparable amount of territory in a few days to Moscow's gains in the whole of 2024, captured hundreds of prisoners (probably around 500) and boosted the morale of its army. After three weeks, the operation can therefore be considered a success for the AFU and its commander, Oleksandr Syrsky, who was recently promoted to four-star general.

Retired General Mick Ryan said that the Kursk operation showed that the Ukrainians had learned the lessons of the failed Zaporizhia offensive. Indeed, Kyiv presented a flexible approach to the current stage of the war, despite the fact that in recent months the Ukrainian side had been on the chronic defensive along almost the entire front line.

But can the whole operation be described as a strategic breakthrough? Probably not, as the strategic goals and problems of both sides remain the same. The Russians are still pushing towards Pokrovsk and Toretsk, and even the loss of a significant chunk of their territory will not change that. The Kremlin is getting the population used to the fact that this state of affairs (occupation) may last for a while, because offensive action in Ukraine is more important.

That said, let us move on to Ukraine.

From the north. The Russians are maintaining a foothold north of Kharkiv, with no significant territorial changes. There is limited fighting around Hlyboke or Lyptsi.

The lack of change also applies to the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line. Some fighting has taken place near Synkivka, Petropavlivka and Makiivka, among others. There has also been no change in the approach to Chasiv Yar in the last three weeks, from where some units were supposed to be sent to the Kursk region. Further away, however, the situation is becoming more serious.

On the way to Toretsk, the Ukrainians have withdrawn from the village of Pivnichce, meaning that the Russians are already on the outskirts of the town, which had a pre-war population of around 30,000. The Russians are also claiming full occupation of Nju-York, but there is no agreement on this.

From Kyiv's perspective, the situation near Pokrovsk is even worse. Under Russian pressure, the Ukrainians are being forced into a controlled withdrawal to avoid devastating losses to their battalions. The Russians have made significant advances to the west and south-west in recent weeks. Zhelanne and Orlivka have fallen, with Novohrodivka and Komyshivka on the way. Russian Federation troops are now less than 12km in a straight line from Pokrovsk. The Ukrainians still have a line of fortifications in front of the city, but if this too is breached, the city of 60 000 pre-war population will be in great danger.

There has been no change in Zaporizhzhya, although reports of the transfer of some troops from that part of the front to Kursk may give the Ukrainians a chance to break through.

The Ukrainians are also warning of the build-up of military potential by the armed forces of the Republic of Belarus along the border with Ukraine. Ukrainian intelligence reported on 25 August that Belarus had amassed significant forces in the Gomel region (which borders northern Ukraine), including special forces (probably Spetsnaz), weapons, military equipment and fighters from the former Wagner group. The Belarusians were said to have motivated the moves with military exercises.

However, Rochan Consulting, which closely monitors Belarusian movements, believes that the threat of a new front opening from the north remains negligible. The Belarusian military remains weak and any offensive action would require widespread mobilisation. All the more so as the Ukrainians have mined and fortified the approaches to the north. Entering the war would be a huge risk for Alexander Lukashenko, who would be starting a war without popular support and risking an entrance of military or guerrilla action into his own country, including a possible military coup.

In other words, the military exercises on the border are Lukashenko’s means of responding to pressure from Moscow, which is demanding greater involvement from Minsk.

Against the backdrop of their own offensive operations - Ukraine's in Kursk and Russia's in Donbass - both sides are engaged in a campaign of inflicting damage in the enemy's hinterland.

On 26 August, the Russians launched a massive rocket attack on Ukraine, involving more than a hundred missiles and a hundred drones - making it one of the largest aerial attacks of the war. The missiles that arrived in Ukraine included Kindzhal, Iskander, Kalibr, KH-101 and North Korean KN-23 missiles, as well as Iranian Shahed drones.

Almost the entire country was under attack, including cities such as Dnipro, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Kryvi Rih, Odesa, Vinnitsa, Khmelnytskyi and Lutsk, not so far from the Polish border. In addition to terrorising the civilian population, the targets were again energy infrastructure facilities. Kyiv's Vyshorod hydroelectric power plant, whose dam holds 3.7 billion tonnes of water, was among the targets. Despite the damage, the condition of the dam remains under control, but the Ukrainian operator, Ukrenergo, has already announced power cuts.

The Russian attack was in some ways a response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk, as well as the Ukrainian air strikes that have also taken their toll in recent weeks. Most devastating of all was the attack on the Proletarsk fuel depot on 18 August. The facility burned continuously for 10 days, setting a new record for continuous fire in this war. On 23 August, the facility was hit again by a Ukrainian drone strike. The fire, fought by more than 500 firefighters, was not brought under control until 27 August, but plumes of black smoke continue to rise above the base. X user MT Anderson analysis indicates that the fire has consumed between 20 and 30 fuel tanks at the base.

Ukrainian drones also reached the Marinovka airbase in the Volgograd region. Su-24 and Su-25 fighters stationed in the hangars were most likely damaged, as well as anti-tank weapons and fuel. Ferries carrying fuel were also hit at the port of Kavkaz in the Rostov region.

However, none of these attacks caused as much of a stir in the Russian infosphere as the arrest of Pavel Durov, the founder of Telegram, at Le Bourget airport in Paris.

According to the French officials, the 39-year-old Russian billionaire (who is also a French citizen) was arrested on an arrest warrant for crimes related to the popular messaging app. The investigation reportedly relates to a lack of moderation and the use of Telegram for illegal purposes, and Mr Durov has been accused of failing to take steps to curb the criminal use of Telegram.

The panic among Russian milbloggers and the military stems from the fact that Telegram is currently the main means of communication among the Russian military, while the app's encryption prevents infiltration from the Ukrainian or Western side. The Russians fear that if Durov 'betrays' and gives access to Telegram to Western services, all internal Russian communications could be exposed. As a result, some milbloggers are already duplicating their platforms of communication, including moving to Russian government-controlled Vkontaktie.

Durov is said to have disobeyed the Russian government apparatus, making Moscow respond by blocking the app at the end of 2018. However, 1.5 years later, it was back in favour. As a result, some observers have questioned Durov and Telegram's home-grown resistance to Kremlin pressure, making it difficult to assess the impact of Durov's arrest realistically.

If this leads to a mass exodus of users to other government-controlled sites, it will mean greater regime control over those who criticise the Kremlin's actions. If Durov remains in custody for an extended period or convicted, it could also reduce trust in the app and create ad hoc communication problems that Ukrainians and Americans could exploit by infiltrating less secure messengers. So far, however, there is no sign of the app's performance deviating from the norm, while some in the Western infosphere, led by Elon Musk and Lex Friedman, have called for the 'protection of free speech' that Durov's detention would supposedly violate.

The war is opening its new chapters. When it began, no one imagined that rogue anarchists would ravage half of Russia, or that Ukrainians would invade Russian Kursk Oblast. The Ukrainians know now that in order to survive they have to be very flexible and playful, not only with the enemy but also with allies whose aims do not always coincide with those of Volodymyr Zelensky's government. This is why the Kursk operation took the Americans by surprise.

The Ukrainians are asking and pressing the Allies for more arms and for permission to strike deeper into the country, but even when they are not met, they are not confined to their bubble of victimhood, but are thinking and acting outside the box.

“To expel the occupier from Ukraine, it is necessary to create as many problems as possible for the Russian state on its territory” - President Volodymyr Zelensky said recently, and the Kursk operation is surely not the last act of this play.

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