GTBT - The fall of Assad's Syria [Mapped]

: Michał Nowak; Created: 10 January 2025

End of Assad rule in Syria

Events in Syria are very dynamic. We have made all the necessary efforts to make this material as up-to-date as possible at the time of publication, but the Syrian story is still being made before our eyes.

Disaster and discredit - these are the words that come to mind when we look at what has happened to the Syrian army and Bashar al-Assad's regime in recent days. In our last episode on Syria, we pointed out that the likelihood of Islamist rebels attacking Syrian army positions in recent weeks was high. This was evidenced by the noticeable preparations and concentration that had been going on for several weeks. Nevertheless, the offensive launched by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham on 27 November came as a complete surprise to the Syrian army. Its defences collapsed at the first blow, and in ten days the various rebel factions retook all the areas previously under Assad's control, while destroying the Syrian army's structures, which offered virtually no organised resistance. Let's take a look at what is happening on the map of this Middle Eastern country today, where, after almost five years of a cessation of hostilities, things escalated rapidly, ending the more than 50-year chapter of the Assad dynasty's rule over Syria.

Shortly after dawn on 27 November, HTS jihadists launched an offensive into frontline areas west of Aleppo city, striking three Syrian provinces - Aleppo, Idlib and Hama - in an operation codenamed "Deterring Aggression". The first strike was a complete success, and Syrian troops began to retreat westwards towards Aleppo with virtually no resistance. In less than three days, the Syrian army completely lost control of Aleppo and the surrounding countryside. In the defence of the western suburbs of the city, the Syrian 30th Division of the Republican Guard was crushed and elements of other units involved in the fighting in that direction were partially broken.

At the same time as the HTS operations in the direction of the city, other units of the group attacked south of the provincial capital, rapidly pushing Syrian troops out of Idlib province and approaching the border with Hama province. The main target was the town of Saraqib in the eastern part of Idlib province. Late on 28 November, the HTS managed to cut through the key M5 motorway linking Aleppo to Damascus, taking control of some 90 kilometres of it in the following hours. Villages and towns continued to fall, and areas that had been fiercely contested for years fell almost without a fight. Even places that had been Loyalist strongholds in the past, where the Loyalists had defended themselves, sometimes for years, even in a situation of total encirclement, were not defended. The Syrian army was completely disorganised and continued to retreat southwards from Aleppo province towards Hama, Homs, Damascus and the coast.

The reasons for the Syrian army's failure are many, but let us try to summarise them. One is the lack of external support, which is so crucial to the SAA. The Russian contingent is much smaller than it was four years ago, and consequently the support it can provide has diminished. Hezbollah, which withdrew its fighters to Lebanon as the war with Israel entered a new phase, is absent in Syria. Moreover, Hezbollah itself has been severely weakened by the loss of all its senior military commanders. Iran, for years a pillar of support for Assad, has also managed to reduce its involvement by turning its attention elsewhere. Many senior Iranian officers were killed in subsequent Israeli air strikes. Assad tried to salvage the situation and flew to Moscow immediately after the HTS offensive, where he spent several days, but the result of his talks with Putin was nothing but disappointment. Russia could not come to his aid.

In addition, the demobilisation of Syrian soldiers has progressed in recent months, due to the cost and the belief in maintaining the ceasefire. Many of them, including the most experienced and motivated, have returned to civilian life. Conscripts remained at the front with little or no motivation to fight. Fortifications were often manned by skeleton crews due to desertions and the practice of extended leave in return for appropriate payment to the commander. By the time of the attack, the defending forces were severely weakened and the practice of corruption, harassment and exploitation of soldiers by some officers disorganised individual units. The 27 November offensive revealed the extent of the disintegration of the Syrian army and the structural weaknesses and problems in the command corps. The reforms carried out in recent years have not only failed to deliver the expected results, but may even have accelerated its disorganisation. Staff shortages, desertions, the loss of much of its operational equipment and the lack of external support left the Syrian army with no chance of success in defence, let alone the prospect of a counter-offensive.

There was no leadership on the ground to motivate subordinates to resist and take control of the situation. Instead, senior commanders were among the first to withdraw. Chaos reigned and there was a retreat of units, abandoning most of their heavy equipment along the way after running out of fuel in their tanks.

Not insignificant was the general apathy of the Syrian people, both military and civilian, who, unlike the events of 2012-2015, i.e. before the Russian intervention, did not resisy. There was no grassroots organisation to defend any areas. The economic situation in Syria probably played a significant role in this. Despite military successes and the regaining of control over almost all of Syria's major cities, Assad did not offer Syrians the prospect of rebuilding their lives. There were shortages of jobs, electricity and even bread. The dire economic situation also took its toll on the army. Soldiers received little or no pay, and food rations were dramatically reduced. All this meant that the motivation to fight, especially among conscripts, was virtually non-existent. Assad no longer cared about the pillar of his power, the army and security forces. Demobilisation and pay cuts, as well as a series of personnel changes, meant that by 2024 both commanders and rank-and-file soldiers no longer felt a strong connection to Assad. In fact, many units existed only on paper, and in most cases staffing levels were less than 40-50%. It should be noted that, in addition to conscripts, some units were staffed by ex-rebels who had 'reconciled' with Damascus under the agreements and joined or created army units with Russian involvement.

On the other hand, the opponent has not wasted the past five years. It has steadily built up its capabilities, mainly with the support of Turkey, but also through its own resources. The HTS has developed its drone programme very seriously, and its use of drones, including FPV drones, from the very first days of the fighting has radically changed the balance of power and in many cases ended the fighting before it could even begin.

But let us return to the map. Three days after the start of the HTS offensive, the SNA, a group totally dependent on Ankara, launched its own operation. Operation codenamed Dawn of Freedom struck south from the al-Bab area against positions abandoned by Syrian troops. More villages fell without a fight, but the SNA's progress was hampered by the SDF Kurds. The Kurds were also intent on occupying areas from which Syrian troops were withdrawing. Thus, on 30 November, the Kurds captured the town of Deir Hafer, the villages of Tell Aran, Tell Hasel and the Kuweirs military airport, and reached Aleppo itself by occupying Nayrab International Airport, and the Shia towns of Nubl and Zahraa north of the city. The Kurds linked the areas under their control by creating a corridor between Manbidj in the east and the Shahba cantonment, centred on the town of Tall Rifaat. The SDF also secured the Kurdish neighbourhood of Sheikh Maqsoud in Aleppo and its immediate surroundings. Many Christians and loyalists who feared Islamist rule had fled to the area.

But the Kurds' gains were short-lived. The very next day, they were forced to retreat in the face of an attack by the Turkish-controlled SNA, and almost all the Kurdish gains were captured by SNA troops. They then continued their rapid march south, reaching the key towns of al-Safira and Khanasir, cutting off the last evacuation route out of Aleppo. Many of the Syrian army units that continued to try to retreat were ambushed by SNA Islamists. The Kurds, however, continue to hold their positions in the Sheikh Maqsoud district of Aleppo.

Yet, operations east of Aleppo were not the only direction in which the SNA was attacking. On 1 December they launched a major offensive into the Kurdish-controlled Tall Rifaat, which had been under Kurdish control for years, and immediately captured the villages of Shwargha, Menagh, Maranaz, Kafr Naya and several others, and the very next day announced that the Kurds had been driven out of Tall Rifaat and that the Shahba cantonment had been completely captured. Up to 200,000 Kurds were trapped and eventually displaced, possibly by force, east of the Euphrates to areas under SDF control. There has been looting of Kurdish property and, according to the SOHR, even the execution of civilians.

At the same time as the Islamist groups were making rapid advances in two separate operations, Syrian troops were trying to break out of their tentacles and retreat towards the city of Hama in central Syria. Along the way, some troops were ambushed or captured. At least several dozen units of heavy equipment were abandoned along the retreat route. Before the battle for Hama began, the Syrian army had lost at least 150 tanks of various types, nearly 100 mechanised vehicles or 90 different artillery systems to abandonment. Much modern equipment, such as T-90 tanks or BM-27 Uragan or BM-30 Smerch self-propelled rocket launchers, also fell into the hands of HTS and SNA fighters. Syrian army units stationed in the area engulfed by Islamist activity have been largely disbanded.

Disorganised units began to concentrate around the city of Hama, to which units from other parts of the country were also diverted, including, by the standards of this army, the good-looking 4th Armoured Division. The intention may have been to defend here on the basis of the fortifications that existed years ago to the north of the city of Hama, but this failed for at least two reasons. Firstly, the Syrian army units withdrew from all positions north of Hama, often without any contact or activity from the enemy, and secondly, the HTS launched an offensive on Hama immediately after the capture of Aleppo. In this context, the attempt to reorganise the defence by reoccupying towns and villages that had already been abandoned did not work. On 30 November, the HTS captured the towns of Taybat al-Imam, Kafr Zita, Latamneh and Morek without a fight. The following day there were reports that the HTS had entered Hama itself, but this was not true. The situation of the defenders in terms of committed forces was so bad that soldiers from military intelligence units were thrown to the front. Many regular army units were not sent to the front, perhaps for fear that soldiers would desert or even cross over to the enemy side. The chain of command in the Syrian army had completely broken down. Some units stood passively in their old positions, gradually disintegrating into thin air, while others retreated on orders without contact with the enemy. Against this background, the forces assembled by the Syrian army in Hama were inadequate, partly fragmented and made up of elements from many units whose loyalty was not in doubt. These included elements of the 25th Special Forces Division, the 4th Armoured Division, the 5th Corps, the 15th Special Forces Division and the forces of numerous militias or intelligence units. In total, the Syrian army was able to field around 20,000 troops for the Battle of Hama, as it turned out - the battle of last resort.

From 2 December, Syrian army units on the ground, under the command of General Suheil al-Hassan, began operations to push HTS back from Hama. Some success was achieved in retaking several lost towns north of the provincial capital. However, the situation could not be stabilised and between 2 and 4 December the HTS succeeded in attacking on the wings of the defenders. On 3 December, HTS fighters were directly on the eastern outskirts of Hama, and shortly afterwards made gains to the west of the city. On the evening of 3 December, the base of the 87th Brigade, part of the elite 25th Special Forces Division, was captured. The roads linking Hama to Latakia and Raqqa were then cut. The only road left for the defenders was the M5 road between Hama and Homs. Hama was then semi-circled by HTS. On 5 December, the HTS captured all of Hama virtually without a fight, including the nearby military airport. The Syrian army withdrew in a disorganised manner towards Homs, leaving the garrisons defending the minority-populated towns of Muhrada, Suqalibiya and Qomhana in the areas occupied by the HTS trapped in an encirclement. This was the end of the Syrian army's second and last defensive battle.

The Syrian army was in a state of disrepair and disorganisation. Many units offered no resistance and retreated after the first contact with the enemy, sometimes even without it. On the other hand, elite units such as the 25th Special Forces Division and the 4th Armoured Division suffered heavy losses either during retreats or as a result of heavy fighting in the Hama area. As a result, they were partially or completely disbanded, leaving insufficient forces to defend other areas after the loss of Hama. Some Syrian units existed only on paper, as desertions were very high and many soldiers abandoned their units and returned home. Some, or perhaps most, of the troops that withdrew from eastern and southern Syria simply disappeared without ever reaching their destination.

The narrative built up over the years of an existential threat to minorities - Christians, Alawites or Shi'ites - which in many cases matched reality, led them to rally around Assad, with many men taking up arms and fighting alongside or in place of army units as part of various militias. Now, however, the situation has changed. With the first successes of the civilian power structures subordinated to the HTS and its leader, Joulani, many appeals and messages have gone out to minorities, loyalists and members of the armed forces or security services. Amnesty has been granted to army deserters and officers, minorities have been guaranteed security and non-persecution, and fighters have been urged not to take revenge on civilians or surrendering soldiers. For the war-weary Syrian people, such a narrative was enough. With Assad failing to guarantee the basics of peace and Joulani guaranteeing security, it may have been worth the risk. The strategy bore fruit. Long queues of Syrian army deserters lined up for days at 'reconciliation points' in Aleppo, and previously resistant minority villages and towns were occupied without a fight as a result of the deals.

The success of the HTS offensive was total: Aleppo fell almost without a shot being fired, as did Hama a few days later. For a few days, the Syrian army defended itself on the approach to the city, but with its defeat and being flanked, it no longer continued its resistance in the city itself. With the fall of Hama on 5 December, the Syrian units fighting for the city withdrew to the city of Homs, 40 km to the south. The army no longer offered any organised resistance. The towns of al-Rastan and Talbisah were not defended. The bridge over the Orontes River was not blown up. The Russian air force tried to bomb it, but the effect of these attacks was almost non-existent. The town of Salamiyah, which had come under HTS control through negotiations, was abandoned without a fight. On 6 December, HTS fighters captured the undefended towns of Al-Rastan and Talbiseh and advanced towards the outskirts of Homs. The following day, limited fighting continued outside the city, and on 8 December the HTS captured Homs without a fight after government forces withdrew.

Let us now turn to southern Syria. From the first days of December, further outbreaks of resistance began in the southern provinces of Daraa and Suwayda. Mass desertions followed. Years ago, many rebels in Daraa province from the former Southern Front had laid down their arms and reconciled with Damascus under agreements, and new Syrian army units had been formed from their structures to form the 5th Armoured Division. Faced with Assad's defeats, the same fighters changed sides again and began to conquer the southern provinces. At the same time, on 5 and 6 December, the Syrian army began a complete withdrawal from the east, from the provinces of Raqqa and Deir ez Zor. The abandonment of the border with Iraq finally put an end to any dreams of a reprieve from Iran. In fact, some Syrian soldiers crossed the border into Iraq in a compact column and were interned there. On all fronts, there was a full retreat towards Damascus, Homs and the coastal provinces of Tartous and Latakia.

The reality of war hates a vacuum, and the areas to the east were quickly occupied by the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces, which entered the towns of al-Mayadeen, Deir ez-Zor and al-Bukamal. Local Arabs, however, resented the presence, let alone the power, of the Kurds. Grassroots resistance began to erupt against them, and on 7 December columns of Turkish-backed SNA moved across the desert towards Deir ez-Zor.

To further complicate the situation, I would like to mention that also on 5 and 6 December, the US-backed rebels stationed in the al-Tanf area launched offensive operations by entering Palmyra, which had previously been abandoned by the Syrian army. The collapse of the Syrian army was complete. However, it was not clear whether the army would resist defending the capital, Damascus.

After the voluntary surrender of further provinces, Damascus, Homs and the coastal areas of Latakia and Tartous remained under Assad's illusory control. The rebels advancing from the south and south-east, mainly the common mob and former fighters from the Southern Front, advanced very quickly towards Damascus without encountering any resistance. In the afternoon of 7 December they reached the town of Darayya on the outskirts of Damascus. At this point they were about 5 km from the capital. In the hours that followed, other towns and villages on the southern and eastern outskirts of the capital were overrun by local residents or rebels from the south. Meanwhile, there were reports from Damascus of mass desertions or even orders for soldiers not to resist. There was much footage of soldiers stripping off their uniforms. Meanwhile, the retreat of Syrian troops from Homs towards Tartus began around 17:00 on 7 December. The road to Damascus was open to the HTS. Around midnight, the capital began to be overrun by armed gangs, deserters and rebels from the south. There was no resistance in the capital and around 3am the HTS entered Damascus. It took ten days from the start of the Aleppo offensive to the capture of Damascus and the fall of Bashar al-Assad. On 8 December, HTS fighters also entered Assad's strongholds of Latakia and Tartous. There was no resistance there either.

The state under Assad's rule crumbled like a house of cards, just as he was emerging victorious and gradually consolidating his position. Successive Arab states re-established diplomatic relations with Damascus and Syria was readmitted to the Arab League. At a time when he could have pretended to be the strongest, Assad proved to be the weakest. Among the reasons for the disintegration of the army, and therefore the fall of Assad, was economic issues. The key to understanding them is the so-called Caesar's Law, i.e. the US sanctions that for years blocked the possibility of any foreign country or company participating in the reconstruction of Syria. In his own way, Assad won the war until 2020, but lost the peace that followed. This in turn led to his swift defeat after a lightning campaign launched on 27 November. Once again, Napoleon's words that war requires money above all else were put to the test.

Bashar al-Assad did not await his opponents in his residence but fled to Moscow with his family and some of his immediate entourage before they entered Damascus, where he was granted asylum, according to Russian assurances. This marks the end of 50 years of Assad family rule in Syria. But it does not end the war in the country.

The operations carried out by the Islamists of the HTS and the SNA against structures loyal to the Syrian president were not and are not the only ones that we have seen in recent days and that we can expect in the near future. Fighters from the Turkish-controlled SNA have been working hard to capture the Kurdish-controlled town of Manbidj on the west bank of the Euphrates. The Kurds seized the city from Islamic State in 2016, and in the following years the US protectorate over the area was replaced by a Russian one. However, the Russians have been weakened and have not been able to stop their previous actions in Syria. In the US, on the other hand, we are in a period just before the transfer of power to a new administration. This is an ideal time for Turkey to use the SNA to push the Kurds out of the border areas. The operations carried out by the SNA have the direct support of the Turkish artillery and air force, and the superiority of the Islamists will inevitably lead to the defeat of the Kurds. The SNA entered the city on 8 December, but it was expected that the Kurds would drive them out. On 9 December, however, the SNA announced that it had taken Manbidj, and fierce fighting continued around the city. Given the favourable conditions, it cannot be ruled out that Manbidj will not be the only area targeted by the SNA and Turkey. They could also attack the Kurdish-controlled towns of Kobane, Ayn Isa and Tall Tamr on the eastern bank of the Euphrates, and they may even be tempted to attack Raqqa. Years ago, pro-Turkish rebel advances on these cities were halted by Russian intervention, but Russian units and the Syrian army have already withdrawn from the area, leaving it vulnerable to Ankara's actions.

The coming weeks, and perhaps days, will therefore be full of further news of armed action by active parties to the conflict. Assad has fallen, but the remaining factions will compete, possibly militarily, for spoils and power over certain areas. The strongest of these is undoubtedly Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which controls Syria's four largest cities - Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and Hama - as well as the previously occupied Idlib. It has also captured the two coastal provinces and several hundred smaller towns. It is Joulani who has entered Damascus as the victor and has all the attributes to take full power. Turkey, reacting to the actions of the HTS, has made marginal gains by getting involved in heavy fighting with the Kurds, and the remaining rebels in the south are so weak that they will have to submit to the stronger man. The Kurds and the SDF are still fighting over the spoils. However, without external protection, they will not be able to resist Turkey and the SNA in the long term.

It is also not out of the question that, as the conflict escalates, there will be open fighting between the HTS and the SNA, with the currently cooperating factions going at each other's throats as they have done so many times in the past. For the time being, however, the honeymoon period following the success of the revolution will continue and the only armed struggle will be between the SNA and the Kurds.

Nor does the fall of Assad put an end to Israeli activity against the country. On 8 December, the Israeli Air Force carried out its heaviest bombing raids yet against Syria, and let us recall that it has been bombing Syria with consistent regularity for the past 12 years. The targets were military airports, arms and ammunition depots, as well as selected targets in Damascus, including the intelligence headquarters or a military research centre. All this to prevent Hayat Tahrir al-Sham from taking control of these resources. In addition, Israeli troops entered Syria from the occupied Golan Heights and took control of the buffer zone to the east, capturing the city of Quneitra.

The fall of Assad does not, therefore, mean the end of the war in Syria. The country will remain divided between rival factions, and the outbreak of open conflict between them hangs in the air. Nor can it be ruled out that, in the general chaos that will reign in the country, the still-active cells of the Islamic State will gain strength. Syria is back in the spotlight, but again only because of the bloody war that has been raging there for more than a decade and which has claimed hundreds of thousands of lives. It is, unfortunately possible that the death toll will rise rapidly again, plunging the country into more years of chaos.

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