- Hubert Walas
When, on a cold February morning, the whole world watched the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, no one imagined that one year and three months later we would be watching the invasion in the other direction - into the territory of the Russian Federation. The Russian triumph in the capture of Bakhmut after nine months of assaults was overshadowed by the humiliation of the invasion of Russian territory by Russian opposition forces. A few days later, a dam on the Dnieper River was destroyed at Nova Kakhovka, which caused a devastating environmental, economic and social disaster which also diametrically changed the operational situation.
A brief disclaimer at the outset. The visualisation of events in this episode covers the period up to the blowing up of the Kachovka dam. Immediately afterwards, there were significant developments on the Zaporizhia front, where the Ukrainians engaged Leopard tanks, among others. As Konrad Muzyka points out, time will tell whether the current actions are the main thrust of the Ukrainian armed forces in the ongoing counter-offensive. These events will be covered in the next episode of the Mapped series.
Kharkiv direction:
The front line near Kharkiv remains frozen. Most of the attacks again took place near Masiutivka, which, contrary to Russian reports, remains under Ukrainian control. Ukrainian bloggers claim that Moscow has deployed its own 'Storm-Z' units in the area. These units comprise convicts who have not previously fought under Wagner's PMC banner. As such, the 'Storm-Z' were formed to counter Wagner, reduce the number of personnel Wagner could recruit and thus limit its influence on the battlefield.
Yet, the most interesting event in this direction took place not in the Kharkiv Oblast but in the Belgorod region, where on 22 May, the Russian Volunteer Corps carried out a raid on the border crossing at Kozinka. Not only did they take the crossing, but they also advanced towards Glotovo, while smoke could be seen over Gora Podol, some seven kilometres from the border. If Gora Podol was indeed reached, the attackers were about ten kilometres from the Belgorod-22 nuclear storage facility. Following the incursion, the area under the control of the Russian Volunteer Corps was declared 'demilitarized'. The Ukrainians denied involvement in the attack, while Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed that the at tackers had lost more than 70 men in the raid. However, our sources on the Ukrainian side say that the Russian Volunteer Corps lost less than ten men. It should be remembered that although the RVC is, in theory, a unit made up of Russians, the corps' operations are organised and directed by Ukrainian military intelligence.
The attack was 'light' in terms of equipment. The RVC sent at least two tanks, an armoured personnel carrier and several other lightly armoured vehicles, such as US-supplied MRAPs. But this was enough to shock the Russian political-military establishment and social media. It led to bizarre scenes in which the Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces, Colonel-General Aleksandr Lapin, personally led Russian troops into action near Glotovo.
More than a week after the raid on the Kozinka border crossing, the Russian Volunteer Corps and the Freedom of Russia Legion carried out another raid on 1 June, this time on Novaya Tavolzhanka and towards Shebekino. The latter is only 30 kilometres from Belgorod, compared to more than 80 kilometres from Kozinka. This latest attack has therefore brought these units much closer to Belgorod. It is clear, then, that the Russian command and regional administration have learned no lessons from previous invasions, as shown by the ease with which the insurgents entered Russia.
These attacks are of a bullying nature. They are designed to provoke Moscow into responding to a growing threat to its territorial integrity and then to force it to disperse its forces. The first attack was probably a test to see how the Russians would react. It was also relatively small, involving around 300 troops. Given that the Ukrainians had still not been driven out of Novaya Tavolzhanka by Sunday 4 June, this means that either the defences in the area were very weak and/or the Ukrainians had planned a larger force for this attack. Rochan believes that sustaining such an operation for several days is beyond the capabilities of Ukrainian intelligence. It is therefore likely that regular Ukrainian military formations were involved in the current attack, making the sustainability of the Ukrainian presence near Belgorod much greater than in the Kozinka raid. If this is the case, the attack is part of a wider state strategy to destabilise Russia and increase Kyiv's chances of launching a successful counter-offensive.
Of course, we do not know how long Kyiv will be able to keep its forces on the other side of the border. But it is not out of the question that the Ukrainians will push deeper into Belgorod if the situation allows. If that happens, the likelihood of Russian nuclear threats will undoubtedly increase.
Luhansk direction:
The situation in the Luhansk region has not changed significantly, although the Ukrainians are believed to have successfully conducted offensive operations near Serhivka.
In this part of Ukraine, the centre of gravity is around Bilohorivka, where, according to Roman Vlasenko, head of the Severodonetsk administration, most of the Russian troops have been deployed. However, despite this concentration of units and several weeks of attempts to break through Ukrainian lines, the Russians have made no confirmed territorial gains. The village remains under Ukrainian control.
In early June, a Ukrainian source reported that Ukrainian forces had liberated more than nine square kilometres in the Svatove region. The Ukrainians were said to have pushed the Russians across the Zerebets River and captured Serhivka while the Russians had set up their defences in Rayhorodka. Russian sources did not confirm these events, while Ukrainian bloggers confirmed that the village remained under Kyiv's control.
In contrast, the Russians made several attempts to storm Novoselivske, but these failed. Similarly, there were no developments near Makiivka, Ploshchanka and Chervonopopivka. Russian assaults on Terny, Torske and Nevske were equally unsuccessful.
Donetsk direction:
On 20 May, Wagner's chief Yevgeny Prigozhin confirmed that his troops had captured Bakhmut, ending the nine-month battle for the city. Indeed, the town's capture is the greatest Russian victory since July 2022. However, Bakhmut in itself does not represent much strategic value, and the prospects after its capture looks bleak.
The Russians in Bakhmut occupy the lowlands, and any movement towards Chasiv Yar will involve an uphill struggle against Ukrainian fortifications to the west of Bakhmut. Operationally, the fall of Bakhmut changes little.
Meanwhile, the force that captured the city, the Wagner Group, is now leaving. According to reports, Wagner is already being 'rotated' out of the city and replaced by elements of two Russian airborne divisions, based on an assessment by the British Ministry of Defence. It is still unclear what Wagner's next move will be. The organisation is expected to reappear in other parts of the front line. Yet, while Wagner's untrained convicts and other personnel were (more) suitable for urban operations, their utility in open terrain without armoured vehicles will be put to a tougher test.
It is no great secret that both sides came out of this battle badly wounded. Suffice it to say that Ukrainian losses in the town in February alone were in the region of 3,000-4,000 men. Rochan's insight tells us that Ukraine has no problem with manpower. The problem is access to artillery ammunition. Kyiv was bogged down in the fighting, which could affect its ability to maintain adequate artillery ammunition during the counter-offensive.
But Kyiv remains confident. According to Serhiy Cherevaty, spokesman for the Eastern Group of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the Ukrainian forces in the direction of Bakhmut have achieved their main objective. The Ukrainians exhausted the Russians and killed many of Wagner's soldiers. They also forced Wagner to flee the city while Ukrainian forces continued to carry out attacks against the group. Cherevaty added that the troops coming to replace Wagner were not very motivated. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian also said that the Russians had increased the pace of artillery attacks to cover the rotation of their forces in Bakhmut.
Apart from the fighting for Bakhmut, the overall situation in the Donetsk region remained largely unchanged and relatively stable. Fighting continued along the entire front line, but the Russian and Ukrainian ability to tip the balance in their favour did not materialise.
It is worth noting that the Russians destroyed the dam of the Karlivka reservoir with an S-300 missile, exposing Halytsynivka, Zhelanne-Pershe and Zhelanne-Druhe to flooding. So far, the impact on the movement of Ukrainian forces in the area appears limited.
In addition, the Ukrainians most likely launched limited counterattacks near Vuhledar. Russian sources claim that they attacked towards Volodymyrivka and managed to advance and recapture up to 18 square kilometres. They also entered Mykilski Dachii, forcing the Russians to retreat beyond the Kashlagach River, southwest of the settlement.
Zaporizhia direction:
A brief reminder - the description relates to events prior to 7 June 2023.
The past period has again proved relatively stable in the Zaporizhia region. Russian concerns about the impending Ukrainian offensive fluctuate but continue to be loudly heard.
According to one report, 65,000 troops have already been deployed 80-100 km from the front, including two army corps and airborne units. We have not been able to confirm the accuracy of these reports, but the numbers are probably close. Another source, Rybar, reports that the group has around 50,000-55,000 troops.
On the other hand, the Ukrainian military intelligence service (HUR) claims that some 152,000 Russian troops are deployed in the Zaporizhia and Kherson regions. The service has not recorded any withdrawal of Russian troops from the two regions. The HUR also noted that the so-called 'evacuation' of citizens living near the front line was in fact a counter-intelligence and filtering exercise aimed at limiting the number of residents who could provide the Ukrainian army and security services with information on the movements of Russian forces in Kherson and Zaporizhia.
According to Ivan Fedorov, the Ukrainian mayor of Melitopol, Russian forces continue digging trenches large enough to house equipment on the outskirts of Melitopol. He also said that Russian troops are hiding equipment and personnel in the Bohatyr forest and using trees to build additional fortifications. He added that residents of the city report that many military trucks loaded with trees are moving along the ring road towards the front line in Zaporizhia.
Ukrainian forces have again attacked Berdyansk, possibly using Storm Shadow cruise missiles. It is not clear what the target of the attack was, but the repeated attacks on the city suggest that these are high-priority targets.
On the other hand, according to Vladimir Rogov, an occupation official in the Zaporizhia region, Ukrainian artillery hit the T0817 road between Vasylivka and Dniprorudne on 30 May. He also reported that Ukrainian forces shelled Mykhailivka on 30 May. These attacks may be aimed at clearing the way for Ukrainian units to reach the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant.
Kherson & Crimea direction :
On Tuesday 6 June, the dam on the Dnieper at Nova Kakhovka was destroyed. For the record - due to the speed of events, the analysis of these events does not come from Rochan, but from our own sources and observations. Both sides blame each other for the destruction of the dam. The Kremlin claims that the Ukrainians blew up the dam with artillery fire, which would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible. On the other hand, it was widely discussed that explosives planted by the Russians had been inside the structure of the dam for several months.
The dam was under Russian control from the early days of the war and until it was breached, while the risk of it being blown up was discussed during the Ukrainian offensive last year. On 11 November, there was an explosion at the dam, but the structure retained its structural integrity. A dam breach through the deliberate accumulation of critically high water levels is also possible. Satellite imagery shows that the road running along the dam was breached 3-4 days earlier. But, this changes nothing in terms of the responsibility for the event, which still falls on the Russians.
According to Ukrainian journalist Olga Tokariuk, 'Blowing up of Kakhovka dam will have far-reaching and long-standing consequences for Ukraine. Some of the most fertile lands will become a desert. Ukraine's agricultural sector will be badly hit. People will leave those lands because of lack of jobs, climate, environmental change”
Operationally, blowing up the dam has significant consequences for both sides. The Russians' main objective was to delay the Ukrainian counter-offensive and make it more difficult to land across the Dnieper. The Kremlin is counting on the fact that even after the waters recede, the mud and swamps will make the area impassable for heavy equipment. This will allow Moscow to shorten the front line and strengthen the Zaporizhia direction at the expense of Kherson. However, the terrain elevation means that most of the wetlands are on the left bank of the river - that is Russian-occupied territory. So the Kremlin seemed willing to destroy the dam at the cost of losing its own fortifications in Kherson and the minefields, most of which were flooded.
Every stick has two ends. By blowing up the dam, the Russians effectively sealed the fate of Crimea, which was cut off from water. The Crimean Canal used to draw water from the Kakhovka reservoir, but after the breach, the water began to flow backwards. The Kremlin is thus delaying Kyiv's counter-offensive main thrust, but at the enormous cost - not just environmental, but potentially strategic - of losing Crimea and the entire left bank of the Dnieper. Estimates of how long the Kherson Region will be impassable vary, ranging from a few weeks to a few months. Still, the impact of blowing up the dam will be measured in decades and could have disastrous strategic consequences for the Kremlin. Moscow's cold calculation could also result in depriving Ukraine of one of its critical infrastructure objects for years to come before Russian troops withdraw. “If we don’t have it, no one will” type of thinking. In this context, the risks for the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant are also growing. On the other hand, the disaster could provide pressure and motivation for the West to strengthen Kyiv's offensive capabilities further.
Moments after the event, the commander of the Combined Armed Forces of UkraiĄne, Serhiy Nayev, reported that 'the blowing up of the dam in Nova Kakhovka will not harm the offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the command had anticipated such steps by the occupiers'.
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A step back from events in Ukraine and Russia. The situation in Belarus remains calm. Apart from reports of Lukashenko's deteriorating health, the main news remains the fact that Minsk and Moscow have signed an agreement on the deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus. The Belarusians were to carry out exercises with the Iskander system, presumably with the aim of handling nuclear warheads.
Kyiv's long-awaited decision to transfer F-16 fighter jets to the Ukrainians has also been made. There is no doubt that when Ukraine receives 40-60 F-16s, they will provide Kyiv with a major additional capability. However, they will unlikely appear in Ukrainian skies until the fourth quarter. Australians are also considering giving Ukraine their retired FA-18 Hornets.
Ukraine is ready for a reconquest of lost lands, as the current actions operations in Zaporizhia confirm. Time will tell if this is already a main push by the Ukrainian armed forces. We will be sure to report on these developments in the next episode of Mapped series.
