- Tomasz Rydelek
The Ukrainians have been on the offensive in Zaporizhia since June. Despite some local successes, Ukrainian troops have failed to break through the front and achieve a decisive victory. But the battle for Zaporizhia continues. In recent weeks, Kyiv has received ATACMS missiles with a range of 165 km or 103 miles. This is a major challenge for Russian logistics, which have already struggled to adapt to the threat posed by the standard HIMARS missiles with a range of 70 km. Commenting on the arrival of the ATACMS, Mykhailo Podolak, a Ukrainian presidential adviser, said: "A new chapter in the war is just beginning. There are no safe places left for the Russians. In the medium term, the Russians will not be able to hold the south, Crimea and the Black Sea fleet. The countdown has already begun".
Logistics - the bane of the Russian army
Since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine, the Russians have faced enormous logistical problems. They forced the Russian army to withdraw from the outskirts of Kyiv in March 2022 and then to evacuate the Kherson bridgehead in November. Logistics are all the more difficult for Moscow because the Russian army is completely dependent on rail transport. This dependence is particularly evident on the southern front. We devoted a broader material to this issue, entitled "Logistics. "Russia's fragility in Zaporizhia". The current episode updates that material with the latest events.
In June, the Ukrainians launched their long-awaited offensive in Zaporizhzhia. Despite the commitment of considerable forces and more than four months of fighting, the offensive has yielded very limited gains for the Ukrainians. In fact, major advances were only made in 2 sectors: near the villages of Robotyne and Velyka Novosilka. These were only local successes that did not translate into a breakthrough along the entire front.
However, the ground offensive was only one part of a wider Ukrainian operation on the southern front. In parallel, Kyiv launched an intensive attack on the Russian hinterland. The aim was to destroy key roads and rail links and thus cripple the enemy's logistics.
During this period, the Crimean Bridge came under Ukrainian attack twice: first in July and then in August. Part of the road section of the bridge collapsed into the sea, but the bridge was not completely disabled.
Ukrainian attacks on the bridges over the Syvash shallow waters, linking Crimea to the Kherson region, were also only half successful. The railway bridge over the Syvash was only successfully attacked once, in late July, but the damage was minimal. The Russians quickly carried out repairs, and trains carrying war materiel from Russia resumed running to Zaporizhzhia. Although the Ukrainians managed to damage some of the road bridges over the Syvash, the impact on Russian logistics was minimal. In fact, the Russians quickly set up several pontoon bridges, which proved sufficient to transport supplies, given the shallow and narrow waters of the Syvash.
By early October, after four months of heavy fighting, the situation on the Zaporizhzhya front looked bleak for the Ukrainians. Although they had managed to advance a few kilometres in some sections, the heavily fortified terrain meant that local Ukrainian successes were not translating into a breakthrough at the front. Attacks on the Russian hinterland also yielded limited results. The Ukrainians made life difficult for Russian supply lines but did not cripple Russian logistics.
This is just the first round
Kyiv will certainly continue its attacks in the coming months, but the first round of the battle for Zaporizhzhia has been won by the Russians. Yet, Moscow is not resting on its laurels. Over the past few months, intensive fortification work has been carried out on the Russian side of the front. Existing ones are being expanded and new lines of fortifications are being built deep into the front line. They are intended to slow the Ukrainian army's progress and break its potential for further offensive operations.
However, the Russians are not just building fortifications. In September it was noted that they had begun work on a railway line that would link Melitopol to Russia. There is currently no such direct link to Russia, and all trains from Rostov to Zaporizhzhia have to take a detour through Crimea.
As a result, Russian logistics in Zaporizhzhia are very fragile, with the Crimean Bridge and the railway bridge over the Syvash (in Chonhar) being the most "weak" points. If even one of these bridges were taken out of service, trains carrying supplies to the Russian army fighting in Zaporizhia would be unable to move.
Admittedly, as we pointed out at the beginning of this material, the Ukrainian attacks on the railway bridges have not been very effective so far, but the fear of their destruction is certainly keeping Russian personnel awake at night.
This is why the Russians want to make their logistics completely independent of the rail link through Crimea. Ukrainian intelligence claims that the Russians' aim is to build a new railway line to provide a direct link between Rostov and Zaporizhia. The line would run between the cities of Rostov-Mariupol-Berdyansk-Melitopol.
The Ukrainian reports are also corroborated by British intelligence, whose analyses often highlight the Russian army's dependence on rail transport. Interestingly, according to the British, Moscow has hired mainly private contractors for the project, rather than the Russian Federation Railway Forces, which number some 30 thousand men. On the one hand, this is presumably to deter the Ukrainians from attacks that could result in the deaths of civilian contractors. On the other hand, it keeps the railway forces on standby for the immediate repair of key railway infrastructure in Crimea should it fall victim to Ukrainian attacks.
For the time being, photos confirm that work has started mainly on the section between Mariupol and Rostov.
The Russians have taken on an ambitious task. To realise the project of connecting Rostov with Melitopol, they have to lay
- 50 km of railway between Rostov and Mariupol;
- 80 km between Mariupol and Berdyansk;
- 105 km of railway between Berdyansk and Melitopol.
These are minimum values and assume that the railway line follows the main roads. In practice, because of the terrain, more kilometres of track may have to be laid.
It is difficult to say how long it will take the Russians to complete this project. In all likelihood, it will take many years.
But the Ukrainians are not losing hope. According to Kyiv, victory in Zaporizhia is still possible. The scales of victory on the Ukrainian side are to be tipped by the delivery of ATACMS missiles, capable of precision strikes on the enemy's deep hinterland.
Operation "Dragonfly"
On the 17th of October, the Ukrainian armed forces announced that they had carried out an operation codenamed 'Dragonfly'. The targets were the Berdyansk and Lugansk airfields, deep behind the front line. It was soon revealed that the Ukrainians had used ATACMS missiles in the attack. Pictures of the airfields hit suggested that the Ukrainians had received an older version of the ATACMS missile, the Block I. Such missiles have a range of about 165 km, or 103 miles and a warhead containing 950 M74 cluster submunitions.
Operation Dragonfly has been a complete success. Satellite imagery confirms the destruction or damage of up to 21 Russian helicopters at the Berdyansk and Lugansk airfields. These are some of the biggest losses suffered by the Russian air force since the start of the war.
It is no coincidence that the Berdyansk and Lugansk airfields fell victim to Operation Dragonfly. The helicopters based there played a key role in the Russian defence of Zaporizhia. They acted as a kind of 'fire brigade'. Whenever, on any part of the front the Ukrainians began to penetrate deep into Russian positions, the Russians immediately called in their helicopters, forcing the Ukrainians to retreat.
The arrival of ATACMS missiles in Ukraine complicates the continued use of helicopters to defend Zaporizhia. This is because it means that helicopter bases will have to be moved out of the ATACMS range. This in turn increases their response time. For example, while helicopters could reach the front in about 25 minutes when stationed in Berdyansk, they will now take up to an hour to reach the front after being moved out of ATACMS range.
The ATACMS missiles complicate the situation not only for the helicopters but for the entire Russian hinterland. In fact, most Russian supply depots are now within enemy range. Adapting to the new combat conditions will be a major problem for Russian logisticians. In analysing what countermeasures the Russians can take, it is worth recalling how they adapted to the presence of HIMARS launchers and M31 missiles with a range of about 70 km.
Logistical headache
The HIMARS arrived in Ukraine last summer. Along with them, Kyiv received M31 missiles with a range of about 70 km. Shortly afterwards, the Ukrainians began an intensive attack on enemy supply depots, which the Russians had unwisely placed very close to the front line.
The Russians followed the line of least resistance and simply evacuated all their major supply stations out of range of the HIMARS launchers. This lengthened Russian supply lines but did not cripple their logistics.
The arrival of ATACMS missiles, however, presents a much greater challenge. Although the Ukrainians have received an older version of the ATACMS Block I missile, it is still capable of accurately hitting targets some 165km away. This means that all of Donbas, Zaporizhzhia and even the northern part of Crimea could now become targets for precise Ukrainian rocket artillery attacks.
Russian supply depots within range of ATACMS Block I are not safe and should be evacuated as soon as possible. However, this means that Russian supply lines will more than double in length. Individual convoys will have to travel hundreds of kilometres to deliver supplies to combat troops. Even a delay of a few hours in the supply chain could be the difference between victory and defeat in the battle for Zaporizhia.
Kyiv hopes that the ATACMS missiles will tip the balance of the war in Ukraine's favour. But this is far from clear. According to media reports, the Ukrainians have received a very small number of ATACMS missiles. Some media reports speak of as few as 20 missiles. Perhaps this is just the first batch and the Ukrainians will soon receive further deliveries. And maybe this one will include ATACMS Block 1A missiles capable of hitting targets 300 km away.
It is in this uncertainty that Russian planners must operate. In theory, even a single ATACMS Block 1A missile strike on a target more than 200km from the front line could force the Russians to push back further on key storage and concentration sites.
A second scenario, however, cannot be ruled out, namely that Washington would transfer ATACMS missiles to the Ukrainians as 'drip' aid, in small batches at long intervals. After all, it should be remembered that the Ukrainians had been asking the United States for ATACMS supplies for more than a year, and the Biden administration had repeatedly refused, pointing out that the risk of escalation was too great. Washington blocked ATACMS missile deliveries even after the British handed over to the Ukrainians in May 2023 Storm Shadow cruise missiles with a range of about 250 km.
It is also worth noting the differences between the two. Storm Shadow is a low-altitude cruise missile whose 450 kg warhead can penetrate deep into a target such as a bunker, shelter or the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet Command in Sevastopol.
The ATACMS Block 1, on the other hand, is a ballistic missile with a parabolic trajectory. Unlike the Storm Shadow, it is not effective against heavily fortified targets, but its 950 M74 submunitions are ideal for destroying dispersed enemy forces, such as the helicopters at Berdyansk and Luhansk airfields. But ATACMS can be a bridge killer as well. To do so, the Americans would have to supply Kyiv with M48 variant missiles, with a single 230-kilogram penetrating warhead or with GLSDB, a de facto rocket-turned-bomb with a 100-kilogram payload. Kyiv is expected to receive the latter later this winter.
In other words, although the Ukrainians already had the capability to attack the enemy at a distance of more than 160km, they did not have the capability to destroy large dispersed groups at such a distance.
Russian response
The appearance of ATACMS in Ukraine is thus a major problem for Russian personnel. Ammunition depots will have to be evacuated deep into the frontline, which in turn will lengthen supply lines. In addition, the Ukrainians are sure to target the strategic railway bridge at Chonhar over the Syvash as soon as they receive the GLSDB rockets.
Yet, it is important to understand that the ATACMS is not a miracle weapon that will magically defeat the Russians later this winter. Regular and precise attacks on the Russian hinterland can gradually degrade the enemy's potential, cripple his logistics and prepare the ground for another battle, most likely next year, on the Zaporizhia front. Ultimately, however, it will be up to the Ukrainian ground forces to deliver another blow, break the front and eliminate the Crimean-Russian land corridor.
In analysing the impact of ATACMS on the course of the war in Ukraine, it is also worth considering how Moscow might react to this change. The Russians have no weapons in their arsenal capable of defending their troops against ATACMS missiles. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that the Kremlin will respond to the escalation with an escalation - not with nuclear weapons, but with ballistic missiles.
Unable to stop Ukrainian attacks on their hinterland, the Russians may wish to respond with similar attacks on the hinterland of Ukrainian forces. But Russia's stockpile of ballistic missiles is limited after a year and a half of persistent campaign.
Nevertheless, Iran may come to the rescue.
On the 18th of October 2023, Iran's ban on ballistic missile exports, based on United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, will expire. Iran can now trade in this type of weapon legally. This is important because Iran has a highly developed ballistic missile programme and the Russians have already signalled their desire to buy Iranian missiles on several occasions.
When Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu visited Tehran in September, the issue of ballistic missile sales was one of the main topics of discussion. The Iranian Defence Minister, General Mohammad-Reza Ashtiani, explicitly stated that Iran was ready to establish ballistic missile cooperation with all friendly states after the expiration of the resolution.
It may therefore turn out that the supply of ATACMS missiles will indeed mark a new stage in the Ukraine-Russia war. But it will be determined not only by the starvation of Russian logistics but also by the intensification of the use of ballistic missiles - American on the one hand and Iranian on the other.
